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“One murder made a Villain,
Millions a hero—Princes were privileg’d
To kill, and numbers sanctified the crime.”*
*BEILBYPORTEUS, DEATH: A POETICAL ESSAY, 12 (1759)
“Confusion now hath made his masterpiece!
Most sacrilegious murder hath broke ope.
The Lord’s anointed temple, and stole thence.
The life o’ the building!”
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 2, sc. 3.
I. INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment practice in recent years has diverged from em-
phasis on guilt-innocence to dedicate virtually all resources to punish-
ment issues.  This Article attempts to avoid this myopic approach by
taking stock of the current state of substantive capital law at its very
foundation.  After a brief history of modern death penalty jurispru-
dence and a restatement of the current rendition of Texas’s capital
murder statute, this Article will focus first on two troubling themes in
capital representation.  First, how mens rea issues can address the
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lack of “diminished capacity” in Texas capital punishment law while
suggesting a seldom used or understood legal strategy.  A second reoc-
curring problem in the application of the Texas capital statutes and
the cases interpreting those statutes is the use of “party responsibil-
ity” to qualify a defendant other than the “trigger man” for the death
penalty.
Following a detailed review of section 19.03 of the Texas Penal
Code (the Code), with its history and current advancements in the
law, I make the argument that the current statute is unconstitutional,
that it has “unevoled” once again into a vehicle which drove previous
capital statutes to be stricken as capricious, arbitrary, racist, and vio-
lative of the Eighth Amendment.  Finally, I argue that rather than
reintroduce the constitutional limits that once made the statute palat-
able the statute should be scrapped altogether.  The current statute is
incomprehensible to the ordinary person, subject to the capricious
whims of prosecution and appellate review, and disproportionate in its
application to minorities.  As evidence continues to mount of the
probability that innocent people are being executed, of the overbearing
financial burden this remedy places upon society, and of the growing
disfavor by which the death penalty is viewed, justice calls for the end
to this transgression upon the human condition consistent with the
evolving standards of decency in our maturing society.
II. HISTORY OF MODERN DEATH PENALTY LAW
A brief history of modern capital punishment jurisprudence will
put this discussion into context.  In 1972, the United States Supreme
Court struck down the application of the existing capital sentencing
schemes finding them unconstitutional in the manner applied as in
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1  The unfettered dis-
cretion to arbitrarily2 and capriciously3 impose a death sentence was
labeled “freakish[]” and “wanton[].”4  The Court further noted the role
of racism in the arbitrary administration of state statutes, as well as
the disproportionate number of African American defendants in capi-
tal cases.5  State statutes that provided for automatic death sentences
for all capital murders or first-degree murders were struck down as
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. Id. at 273 (Brennan, J., concurring); Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010)
(“All traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals are abolished by
this section, and each party to an offense may be charged and convicted without
alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice.”).  Consequently, the Courts
will use the term “party” or “accomplice” interchangeably.
3. Furman, 408 U.S.at 295.
4. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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violations of not only the Eighth but also the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
Responding to Furman, thirty-five states came forward with new
statutes.7  In 1976 the Supreme Court reviewed five of the new stat-
utes, approving three and rejecting two.8  In striking down North Car-
olina’s mandatory death sentence for murder, the Court said such a
mandatory statute failed to consider the character and record of the
defendant or the circumstances of the offense and violated the “funda-
mental respect for humanity” which supports the Eighth Amend-
ment.9  This is the genesis of mitigation in modern death penalty
jurisprudence.10
6. The Court specifically noted:
[D]eath stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity.  The
punishment of death is therefore ‘cruel and unusual,’ and the States may
no longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes.  Rather than kill an arbi-
trary handful of criminals each year, the States will confine them in
prison.  ‘The state thereby suffers nothing and loses no power.  The pur-
pose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just,
not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given
for the reformation of the criminal.’
Id. at 305–06 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 381 (1910)).
7. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 n.23 (1976).
8. Statutes were approved in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Profitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).  In Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976), the Court struck down statutes allowing for mandatory or automatic
death sentences for murder.  The Court found that these mandatory death
sentences failed to curb “arbitrary and wanton jury discretion” without some ob-
jective standards to “guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the pro-
cess for imposing a sentence of death.” Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
9. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
10. The use of the word “mitigation” has become so common among death penalty
practitioners that often the uninitiated struggle with its meaning and signifi-
cance.  Mitigation of punishment is a “reduction in punishment due to mitigating
circumstances that reduce the criminal’s level of culpability, such as the exis-
tence of no prior convictions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (9th ed. 2009).
Early in modern death penalty jurisprudence the Supreme Court said “in capital
cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment
. . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensa-
ble part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”  Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).  In Woodson, the Court cited its previous decision
in Trop v. Dulles wherein the Court recognized that the words of the Eighth
Amendment—as to what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment—are not
precise, and their scope is not static.  The Eighth Amendment therefore draws its
meaning from the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–101 (1958).  In the capital
murder context this means that once a jury has found a person guilty of a capital
felony with death as a possible punishment, the jury as the “sentencer” shall “not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defen-
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The new generation of capital sentencing statutes contain three
fundamental concepts: (1) Guided Discretion, (2) Individualized Sen-
tencing, and (3) Heightened Reliability.11  The sentencing jury in a
capital trial must be guided by “objective standards to guide, regular-
ize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sen-
tence of death.”12  The sentencer must be focused “on the
particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.”13  Fi-
nally, capital procedures must be more reliable than sentencing proce-
dures in ordinary criminal trials because the death penalty is “unique
in its total irrevocability[,] . . . in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice[,] . . . [and] in its absolute
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.”14
From these cases emerged four features for identifying a constitu-
tionally sufficient scheme: (1) a statutory aggravating circumstance
that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the death pen-
alty can be imposed to provide an “effective mechanism” for narrowing
those who are death-eligible; (2) a separate bifurcated sentencing pro-
ceeding apart from the culpability phase of the trial; (3) a rationally
dant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”  Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).  In
the jury’s sentencing deliberation the considering of the defendant’s “family his-
tory” is part of the “process” of imposing the death penalty. Eddings, 455 U.S.
104.  The Defendant should be allowed “to present any and all relevant mitigat-
ing evidence that is available.”  Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
Mitigation evidence “about the defendant’s background and character is relevant
because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit crimi-
nal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background . . . may be less
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse . . . .”  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, (1989).  As is stated in the introduction to this Article, the recent his-
tory of capital defense has involved the accumulation and development of punish-
ment evidence (mitigation), the litigation of consequential punishment issues,
and the allocation of virtually all defense resources to the punishment phase of
trial.  In 2003 the Court in Wiggins v. Smith clearly established the obligation to
investigate a defendant’s “life history or family background” (mitigation) in a cap-
ital case is the responsibility of the defendant’s trial counsel and failure to meet
this duty is a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective and
adequate representation.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
11. Since Furman, it is clear that “vesting of standardless sentencing power in the
jury violate[s] the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Woodson, 428 U.S. at
302.  “[T]he Eighth Amendment’s heightened ‘need for reliability in the determi-
nation that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case’” addresses the
prevention of arbitrariness in sentencing.  Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
323 (1985) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305).  In capital cases, there must be
sufficient process to guarantee that “the sentence was not imposed out of whim
. . . or mistake.”  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
12. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
13. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
14. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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reviewable, understandable process, with clear and objective stan-
dards, that channels the sentencing jury’s discretion to consider miti-
gating evidence in imposing a life sentence or in giving a punishment
of death; and (4) adequate, automatic direct appellate review to en-
sure a sentencing decision is consistent with Constitutional
requirements.
These capital sentencing procedures must be sufficiently clear so
that ordinary citizens can understand and apply them.15  Not only
must these processes be clear but also objective, providing specific and
detailed guidance for the jury in such a way that the jury decision can
be rationally reviewed.16
The new Texas statute, passed in the wake of Furman, used statu-
tory aggravating circumstances that made a defendant constitution-
ally eligible for the death penalty as one of its elements and used
“special questions” governing the sentencing decision.17  Initially, the
new Texas Penal Code limited capital homicides to intentional and
knowing murders committed in five specified situations and required
the jury to answer three questions in a proceeding that took place af-
ter a guilty verdict.18  Essentially, the Texas scheme remains as it was
originally written with a revision of the special issues put to the jury
that reflects the evolution of capital punishment jurisprudence.19  The
15. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (Burger, CJ, concurring) (“I agree with
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens that the issues posed in the sentencing
proceeding have a common-sense core of meaning and that criminal juries should
be capable of understanding them.”).
16. Georgia’s “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman” aggravating cir-
cumstance was invalidated as vague and providing no meaningful guidance.
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1980).  Oklahoma’s “especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel” standard was also struck down on this same basis.
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1988).  “[C]hanneling and limiting
of the sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental con-
stitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action.” Id. at 362.
17. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
18. As articulated by the Court in Jurek:
The new Texas Penal Code [§ 19.03 (1974)] limit[ed] capital homicides to
intentional and knowing murders committed in five situations: [(1)]
murder of a peace officer or fireman; [(2)]murder committed in the
course of kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson; [(3)]
murder committed for remuneration; [(4)] murder committed while es-
caping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; and [(5)] murder
committed by a prison inmate when the victim is a prison employee.
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268.
19. Effective September 1, 1991, Texas approved new language in its sentencing pro-
cedure statute, Article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and left
the procedure for pre-September 1, 1991, cases in effect by renumbering the stat-
ute to Article 37.0711 and changing the title.  The wording and number of the
special issues has changed several times over the years and is beyond the scope of
this Article.  For the current versions see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts.
37.071, 37.0711 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 7 30-AUG-11 12:43
246 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:240
following discussion of the elements of capital murder as presently set
out in the Texas Penal Code shows an expansion of aggravating cir-
cumstances over the past three decades from five subsections to
nine.20
III. TEXAS PENAL CODE SECTION 19.03 CAPITAL MURDER
Currently, section 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code defines capital
murder as follows:
(a)  A person commits an offense if the person commits murder as defined
under Section 19.02(b)(1)21 and:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful
discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or
fireman;
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing
or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual as-
sault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat under Section
22.07(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), or (6);22
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remu-
neration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape
from a penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another:
(A) who is employed in the operation of the penal institution; or
20. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.  It is argued this expansion has actu-
ally reached twenty-seven classifications of capital murder, which does not in-
clude the one non-death capital felony that remains in Texas law. See infra Part
XVI.
21. Murder is defined in the Texas Penal Code as “intentionally or knowingly
caus[ing] the death of an individual.”  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West
2003 & Supp. 2010).
22. Terroristic threat is one in which a person threatens violence with intent to:
(1) cause a reaction of any type to his threat by an official or volunteer
agency organized to deal with emergencies; . . . (3) prevent or interrupt
the occupation or use of a building, room, place of assembly, place to
which the public has access, place of employment or occupation, aircraft,
automobile, or other form of conveyance, or other public place; (4) cause
impairment or interruption of public communications, public transporta-
tion, public water, gas, or power supply or other public service; (5) place
the public or a substantial group of the public in fear of serious bodily
injury; or (6) influence the conduct or activities of a branch or agency of
the federal government, the state, or a political subdivision of the state.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class B misdemeanor . . . .  (d)
An offense under Subsection (a)(3) is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the
actor causes pecuniary loss of $1,500 or more to the owner of the build-
ing, room, place, or conveyance, in which event the offense is a state jail
felony.  (e) An offense under Subsection (a)(4), (a)(5), or (a)(6) is a felony
of the third degree.
Id. § 22.07.
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(B) with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in
the profits of a combination;23
(6) the person:
(A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section or Section 19.02,24
murders another; or
(B) while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99 years for an
offense under Section 20.04,25, 22.021,26, or 29.03,27 murders another;
(7) the person murders more than one person:
(A) during the same criminal transaction; or
(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pur-
suant to the same scheme or course of conduct;
(8) the person murders an individual under six years of age; or
(9) the person murders another person in retaliation for or on account of the
service or status of the other person as a judge or justice of the supreme court,
the court of criminal appeals, a court of appeals, a district court, a criminal
district court, a constitutional county court, a statutory county court, a justice
court, or a municipal court.
(b) An offense under this section is a capital felony.
(c) If the jury or, when authorized by law, the judge does not find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense under this section,
he may be convicted of murder or of any other lesser included offense.28
IV. MENS REA IN THE CAPITAL MURDER CONTEXT
In all nine of the capital murder scenarios just defined, either an
intentional or knowing mens rea is required, except for when a person
commits a capital murder in the course of committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, ar-
son, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat, in which case the
requisite mens rea is restricted to intentional acts only.29  To develop
a proper insight into the Texas capital statutes and a thorough under-
23. “ ‘Combination’ means three or more persons who collaborate in carrying on crim-
inal activities.” Id. § 71.01(a); see infra Part XI.
24. Section 19.02 defines murder in all respects, not just as applicable to the capital
murder context and so includes a more complete definition of “murder”. TEX. PE-
NAL CODE ANN. § 19.02.
25. “Aggravated Kidnapping.” Id. § 20.04.
26. “Aggravated Sexual Assault.” Id. § 22.021.
27. “Aggravated Robbery.” Id. § 29.03.
28. Id. §19.03 (footnotes added).
29. Id. To commit a capital murder, one must first commit a murder as defined in
Texas Penal Code section 19.02.  Under that section, murder is commited when a
person:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; (2) in-
tends to cause serious bodily injury by and commits an act clearly dan-
gerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or (3)
commits or attempts to commit a felony [(presumably with the requisite
mens rea for the underlying felony)], other than manslaughter, and in
the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in the
immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he [or she] commits or
attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes
the death of an individual.
Id. § 19.02.
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standing of their application, an appreciation for how the statutes de-
fine an intentional or knowing mens rea is essential.
Both intentional and knowing are defined in section 6.03 of the
Texas Penal Code.  Intentional is defined as follows: “A person acts
intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct
or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause the result.”30  Knowing is defined as:
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the
nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist.  A person acts know-
ingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.31
Consequently, Texas Penal Code, section 6.03 defines “three ‘con-
duct elements’ which may be involved in an [intentional or knowing]
offense: (1) the nature of the conduct; (2) the result of the conduct; and
(3) the circumstances surrounding the conduct.”32  The statutory defi-
nition of “intentional” culpability requires the person accused to have
the “conscious” objective or desire (1) to engage in the illegal conduct
(nature of conduct) or (2) to cause the result of that conduct (result of
conduct), while “knowing” culpability requires the person to be
“aware” (1) of the criminal nature of his conduct (nature of conduct),
(2) the circumstances surrounding his criminal conduct (circum-
stances surrounding conduct) or (3) that his criminal conduct is rea-
sonably certain to cause the result (result of conduct).33
Proving a person committed a capital murder knowingly is proof by
means of a lower mens rea than intentional, but none the less still
exposes the actor to the full range of punishment for a capital murder,
with one exception.34  This exception is if the actor knowingly causes
the death of another, without a conscious desire to cause the death,
while committing or attempting to commit a crime specifically enu-
merated in section 19.03(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code.35  In this sce-
nario, the actor cannot be guilty of capital murder, only the lesser
30. Id. § 6.03(a).
31. Id. § 6.03(b).
32. Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 491–92 & n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting
McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
33. See Lugo-Lugo v. State, 650 S.W.2d 72, 85–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Clinton, J.,
concurring).  This concurring opinion includes a primer in “elements of conduct”
and the intent of Chapter 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in its definitions of
the culpable mental states of intentional, knowing, reckless and criminal negli-
gence. Id.  Mental states of reckless and criminal negligence are not discussed
herein as to “conduct elements” as capital murder cannot be by reckless or crimi-
nal negligence behavior. Id.
34. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(d).
35. Id. § 19.03(a)(2).  The underlying crimes being: kidnapping, burglary, robbery,
aggravated sexual assault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat.
Id. at § 22.07(a)(1),(3),(4),(5),(6).
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included offense of murder as defined in section 19.02 of the Texas
Penal Code.36
Should the language of the indictment and the jury charge contain
the “intentional or knowing” language as to the murder committed
during the commission of one of the stated crimes in section
19.03(a)(2), case law has long approved this “mistake” rationalizing
the “intentional or knowing” language as descriptive of the first prong
of section 19.03(a)(2) that a murder defined by section 19.02 Texas
Penal Code must first be committed.37  “Texas courts have consist-
ently held that capital murder indictments and jury charges using the
‘intentionally and knowingly’ language are sufficient, even if the defi-
nitions of intentionally and knowingly are not properly limited as to
result of conduct, nature of conduct, or nature of circumstances in-
structions.”38  In Medina, the trial court used the wrong definition for
knowing murders, and the appellate court reasoned that awareness by
the defendant that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the re-
sult (result of conduct) requires awareness of the lethal nature of his
conduct (nature of conduct), so the distinction “blurs.”39  However,
there is conflicting authority that upon proper objection these mis-
takes as to the application of the definitions of “intentional” and
“knowing” in indictments and jury charges is error.40
36. See Kuntschik v. State, 636 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. App. 1982); see also Kinnamon
v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that when the defendant,
while committing a robbery, fired a warning shot into floor that ricocheted into
victim causing her death there was no showing of intent to cause the death), over-
ruled on other grounds by Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 488–91, as recognized in Roberts v.
State, 273 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
37. Cameron v. State, 988 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App. 1999).
38. Id. at 851; see Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 639–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(holding the trial court incorrectly defined “knowingly” with reference to nature
of conduct and not as to result of conduct, but where the application paragraph
correctly instructs the jury, an error in the abstract instruction is not egregious);
Richardson v. State, 744 S.W.2d 65, 83–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), vacated, 492
U.S. 914 (1989), and 509 U.S. 917 (1993); Wilder v. State,  583 S.W.2d 349, 361
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 (1981); Hammett
v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Granviel v. State, 552
S.W.2d 107, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976).
39. Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 640.
40. See Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 639; Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 492 n.6; Miller v. State, 815
S.W.2d 582, 586 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157,
171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986); Martin v. State, No. 14-95-01135-CR, 1997 WL 269102, *4–5 (Tex. App.
May 22, 1997).  In Martin, the jury was instructed:
Before you would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of capital
murder, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt not
only that on the occasion in question the defendant was in the course of
committing or attempting to commit the felony offense of robbery . . . but
also that the defendant intentionally caused the death of Joel Congdon
by stabbing Joel Congdon with a deadly weapon, namely, a knife, with
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As a “result of conduct” crime, murder while committing a desig-
nated crime must be with the specific intent to cause the death to
qualify as a capital murder under section 19.03(a)(2), with the culpa-
ble mental state necessary to satisfy the “conduct elements” of the un-
derlying offense.41  A trial court should only include the “proper”
culpable mental state definitions specific to the facts of a case, as to
the underlying offense.42  It is error for a court to fail to limit its defi-
the intention of thereby causing the death of Joel Congdon. . . . Now, if
you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about
the 15th day of May, 1994, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant,
Larry Lee Martin, Jr., did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or
knowingly while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the
robbery of Joel Congdon, cause the death of Joel Congdon by stabbing
Joel Congdon with a deadly weapon, namely a knife; . . . or if you find
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 15th
day of May, 1994, in Harris County, Texas, Johnny Lopez did then and
there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly while in the course of com-
mitting or attempting to commit the robbery of Joel Congdon, cause the
death of Joel Congdon, by stabbing Joel Congdon with a deadly weapon,
namely a knife, . . . then you will find the defendant guilty of capital
murder as charged in the indictment.
1997 WL 269102 at *4 (emphasis added).  This instruction was confessed by the
State to be error, but there was no objection at trial and hence not preserved, and
the appellate court found no “egregious error” as per Almanza, as the circum-
stances surrounding the crime clearly demonstrated a specific intent to kill. Id.
at *4–6.  “However, finding error in the jury charge begins, rather than ends, the
appellate court’s inquiry.  The next step is to make an evidentiary review, as well
as a review of the record as a whole which may illuminate the actual, not just
theoretical harm to appellant.” Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 491–92 (citing Kelly v. State,
748 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174; see
also Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (finding error
and remanding for harm analysis).  Part of this harm analysis may be the degree,
if any, to which the application portion of the charge limited the culpable mental
states. See Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Miller,
J., concurring).
41. Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see Gardner v.
State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).  In an unpublished opinion,
Sandoval v. State, No. 13-07-00392-CR, 2009 WL 2915009 (Tex. App. August 27,
2009), the court of appeals in Corpus Christi distinguished Gardner and English
v. State, 592 S.W.2d 949, 954–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).  In Sandoval, the court
affirmed the trial court’s failure to require the jury to find the defendant not only
intended to kill but also intended to engage in the underlying felony conduct that
led to the murder (i.e., robbery).  2009 WL 2915009 at *3.  The jury instruction
approved in Sandoval was that the defendant knew of the actor’s intent to kill
the victim and that he acted with intent to aid the actor in committing the offense
of capital murder. Id.  In English and Gardner, the jury was instructed to deter-
mine if the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim as well as rob the
victim. Id.  It is unclear why the Corpus Christi court failed to address the issue
of lack of a mens rea as to the underlying offense, other than to say that the jury
charge addressed the defendant’s intent.
42. For example, if a case contains only two of the three conduct elements and in its
jury charge the court has given the statutory definitions for all three conduct
elements, the court commits error by not limiting its instructions to only the two
relevant conduct elements.
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nitions, subject to a properly preserved objection and “egregious harm”
analysis under Almanza.43  But, if the facts of the case, as applied to
the law in the application paragraph of the charge, point the jury to
the appropriate portion of the definitions, no harm results from the
court’s failure to so limit the definitions of the culpable mental
states.44  In assessing harm resulting from the inclusion of improper
conduct elements in the definitions of culpable mental states, the
courts “may consider the degree, if any, to which the culpable mental
states were limited by the application portions of the jury charge.”45
If, however, all three conduct elements are included in the underlying
offense, the court may include all statutory definitions of “intention-
ally” and “knowingly” without error.46
V. DIMINISHED CAPACITY
The substantive discussion of the statutes and, specifically, mens
rea should be briefly enlarged at this point to a related topic in Texas
capital jurisprudence that the courts and practitioners have been
waltzing around and stepping over for some time.  This Part of the
Article is designed to enhance the reader’s understanding of the sub-
tleties of mens rea applicable to the advancements in case law involv-
ing defendants with serious mental health issues.  In 2000, as many
as twenty percent of those incarcerated in the United States suffered
from serious mental illness47–over triple the rate in the general popu-
lation.48  This means over 320,000 people in prisons have a serious
mental illness.49  As 700,000 mentally ill people enter the jails and
prisons of this country each year,50 it is likely that a capital defendant
charged with the most horrific of crimes will fall among these statis-
43. Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Almanza, 686
S.W.2d at 171.
44. Hughes, 897 S.W.2d at 296.
45. Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 492 n.6.
46. Barnes v. State, 56 S.W.3d 221, 234 (Tex. App. 2001); see infra Part VIII (discuss-
ing section 19.03(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code classification of capital murder, as
it relates to the nexus between the underlying crime and the murder committed
while attempting or committing the underlying crime).
47. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS xix (2d ed.
2000) [hereinafter APA Report].
48. What is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILL-
NESS, http://www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=about_mental_illness (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2010) (“[A]bout 6 percent, or 1 in 17 Americans . . . live with a
serious mental illness.  The National Institute of Mental Health reports that One
(sic) in four adults-approximately 57.7 million Americans-experience a mental
health disorder in a given year.”).
49. Based upon state and federal prison population of 1,613,740 at the end of 2009.
See HEATHER C. WEST, WILLIAM J. SABOL & SARAH J. GREENMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2009, at 2 tbl.1
(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.
50. See APA Report, supra note 47.
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tics.  In the proper case, a meticulous application of the following prin-
ciples may produce an unexpected result.
A culpable mental state must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
as an element of the offense.51  In Cowles v. State,52 it was recognized
that evidence of a defendant’s abnormal mental condition, falling
short of legal insanity, is admissible whenever that evidence is rele-
vant to the issue of whether he had the mental state that is a neces-
sary element of the crime charged, where specific intent is an element
of the offense, and for the “with intent” crimes.53  Several attempts
have been made to introduce diminished capacity into the culpability
phase of criminal trials in Texas with varying degrees of success.54
After Cowles, in Wagner v. State, diminished capacity was a recog-
nized doctrine.55  In Wagner, the appellate court permitted evidence of
a physical injury, which may have impaired the defendant’s mental
function and impulse control, on the issue of adequate cause to justify
sudden passion.56 Wagner’s use of diminished capacity in this way
has since been superseded by statute making sudden passion now a
punishment issue.57
Wagner, however, was a true “diminished responsibility” case in
which the defendant’s claim of mental abnormality showed him less
51. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 2.01, 6.02 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); LaSalle v. State,
973 S.W.2d 467, 473 (Tex. App. 1998).
52. Cowles v. State, 510 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
53. Wagner v. State, 687 S.W.2d 303, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Cowles, 510 S.W.2d
at 610.  The rule in Cowles is dicta. See Wagner, 687 S.W.2d at 311; Cowles, 510
S.W.2d at 610.
54. In fact, a search on Westlaw for the search term “diminished capacity” yields 604
cases in Texas alone.  An illustrative case is De la Garza v. State, where the de-
fendant argued for the trial court to submit a requested jury instruction on “spe-
cific intent and the mental state of diminished capacity” because at the time of
the offense the defendant was struck in the head which he believed diminished
his capacity to form the culpable mens rea for attempted capital murder.  650
S.W.2d 870, 876 (Tex. App. 1983).  The Court failed to recognize the defense of
diminished capacity finding the evidence sufficient to conclude the defendant was
aware of his conduct and the results of his conduct thereby avoiding the specific
intent exception set out in Cowles.  Id.
55. Wagner, 687 S.W.2d at 311.
56. Wagner predated bifurcated guilt-innocence and punishment hearings.
57. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).  There is no provi-
sion in Texas Capital Jurisprudence that addresses sudden passion.  Under cur-
rent Texas law it is an affirmative defense only in the punishment phase of a
murder trial. Id.  Is there not a constitutional challenge available in this circum-
stance?  Unfortunately this is beyond the scope of this Article, but a question
begging an answer. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 112–13 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000) (“The Legislature is vested with the lawmaking power of the people in
that it alone ‘may define crimes and prescribe penalties’ . . . . The Legislature,
through its broad power to classify crimes and those who stand accused of crimes,
chose not to permit the defense of “sudden passion” in the context of capital
murder.”).
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culpable, as if Texas had adopted a lesser form of insanity.  The courts
have often struggled understanding and applying correctly the differ-
ence between “diminished capacity” and diminished responsibility sce-
narios.  In Judge Maloney’s concurring opinion in Penry v. State,58
albeit dicta, he defines diminished capacity as evidence which is of-
fered to negate the requisite culpable mental state (which if successful
leads to a not guilty), whereas evidence of diminished responsibility
means the defendant is not fully responsible for the crime (the ele-
ments of the offense being satisfied but the defendant is less culpable
and convicted of a lesser crime or punished less severely).59  These
concepts are different from “insanity” which also addresses the defen-
dant’s mental state but is an affirmative defense to prosecution if at
the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental
disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.60
Often, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 38.36(a) is
used to introduce mental health evidence into the guilt-innocence
phase of a murder trial.61  That article provides:
In all prosecutions for murder, the state or the defendant shall be permitted to
offer testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the kill-
ing and the previous relationship existing between the accused and the de-
ceased, together with all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the
condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense.62
In Thomas v. State63 a clinical psychologist was not allowed to tes-
tify during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial about the condition of
the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the murder as permitted
by article 38.36(a).  The testimony was offered on the issue of whether
the defendant acted intentionally and knowingly in committing mur-
der.64  The court of appeals took the argument to be “some sort of in-
sanity defense.”65  Absent a plea of insanity or evidence raising
insanity, the court found it was not a proper way to negate intent by
showing the defendant did not have the “concurrent mental capability
to know that his conduct was wrong.”66  The court further noted that
“[t]he negation of intent is absence of intent” and is entirely different
58. 903 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
59. Id. at 767 n.1; Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capac-
ity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 20 (1984).  Judge Maloney cites cases from
many jurisdictions supporting his contention, including United States v. Pohlot,
827 F.2d 889, 903–06 (3d Cir. 1987) (distinguishing doctrine of diminished re-
sponsibility from negation of mental state).
60. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a).
61. Id. § 19.06 (repealed 1994).
62. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
63. Thomas v. State, 886 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex. App. 1994).
64. Id. at 390.
65. Id. at 391.
66. Id.
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than lacking the capacity to form intent due to severe mental illness.67
This court labeled the latter “insanity.”68  This is just one example of
how the courts have misunderstood and struggled with the concept of
diminished capacity.
A few years later, in Warner v. State, testimony of defendant’s post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was excluded at the guilt-innocence
stage of trial.69 Warner found that short of inability to distinguish
right from wrong (insanity), such evidence is not admissible as to spe-
cific intent crimes of aggravated kidnapping and arson.70  A petition
for discretionary review (PDR) was granted to determine if the trial
court had erred in excluding evidence of the defendant’s alleged PTSD
at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial.  The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals (TCCA) concluded that their decision to grant PDR was im-
provident because the defendant did not preserve his complaint for
appellate review by making an offer of proof or evidence after the trial
court ruled the evidence inadmissible.71
Thirty years after Cowles, in Jackson v. State,72 the courts were
still struggling with these concepts.  The defendant in Jackson killed
his brother by hitting him with a hammer while he slept.73  The defen-
dant suffered from mental illnesses74 and complained on appeal that
he was prevented from arguing to the jury that he lacked the requisite
mens rea as a consequence of his illnesses.75  The TCCA granted re-
view “to determine whether the doctrine of diminished capacity exists
in the jurisprudence of Texas.”76  The TCCA agreed with the court of
appeals that Texas does not recognize diminished capacity as an af-
firmative defense (i.e., a lesser form of the defense of insanity).77
Relevant evidence, however, may be presented to the fact finder to
negate the mens rea element—including the accused’s history of
mental illness.78  In a murder prosecution, the trial judge has the dis-
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Warner v. State, 944 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App. 1997).
70. Id. at 815.
71. Warner v. State, 969 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
72. 160 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
73. Id. at 569.
74. Id. at 570–71.
75. Id. at 571.  In closing argument, counsel tried to argue the jury should find the
defendant lacked the mental capacity to intentionally or knowingly cause bodily
injury. Id. The State objected to the improper argument, which was sustained.
Id.  On appeal the defendant made a due process and due course of law argument
that the jury should have been allowed to consider evidence of diminished capac-
ity to negate the element of mens rea. Id. at 572.  But the defendant failed to
show what specific evidence the jury was not allowed to consider. Id. at 574.
76. Id. at 572.
77. Id. at 573.
78. Id. at 574.
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cretion under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.36(a) to ad-
mit all relevant facts and circumstances showing the condition of the
mind of the accused at the time of the offense, subject to a Texas Rules
of Evidence Rule 403 objection.79
If such evidence is admitted, the court may determine whether it
raises the issue of a lesser-included offense.80  The court in Jackson
found the jury could then either find (1) if the evidence reduces culpa-
bility, that the defendant is guilty of the lesser-included offense or (2)
the jury could find the defendant guilty of the more serious charge and
just assess a lesser punishment.81
The TCCA found evidence of mental illness “in this case” does not
negate mens rea.82  The court found there is no defense in Texas that
due to mental illness the defendant did not have the requisite mens
rea at the time of the offense because he lacked the mental capacity, or
was absolutely incapable of ever forming that frame of mind.83
Recently, Jackson was distinguished in Sparks v. State.84  The de-
fendant in Sparks attempted to argue his mental conditions negated
the necessary mens rea to commit a crime used as the basis for a mo-
tion to proceed on adjudication of guilt.85  The court of appeals some-
how interpreted Jackson for the proposition that the defendant’s
mental condition did not negate the mens rea but provided only an
excuse for his aggressive behavior.86  Once again the court seemed to
confuse diminished capacity with diminished responsibility or, per-
haps, the court—as the fact finder—just did not believe that the of-
fered proof of the defendant’s mental illness negated the mens rea of




81. Id. at 575.  The Court failed to mention the third option, which is if the fact finder
did not believe the state met its burden on the mens rea element of the crime,
then the jury could find the defendant not guilty.
82. Id. at 572.
83. Id. at 575.  Perhaps trial counsel used the wrong words, but would it have been
correct had he argued that during the offense, because of mental illness, the de-
fendant simply did not form the requisite mens rea to commit the subject offense?
Did the TCCA find in essence against Jackson on the legal and factual sufficiency
of the evidence without saying so?  What if trial counsel had not used the words
“mental capacity?”  Would the trial court by preventing argument have erred?  In
their discussion of Jackson’s mental capacity and his “ever” being able to form the
requisite mens rea, the TCCA confused diminished capacity with diminished re-
sponsibility just as Judge Maloney had complained in Penry. See Penry v. State,
903 S.W.2d 715, 767 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
84. Sparks v. State, No. 2-07-285-CR, 2008 WL 4180288 (Tex. App. Sept. 11, 2008).
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id.
87. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines an excuse as:
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Following Jackson came Ruffin v. State.88  The defendant in Ruffin
was charged with aggravated assault for shooting at ten police of-
ficers.  The defendant tried to offer testimony from a psychologist that
he was suffering from severe delusions on the night of the event and
believed that he was shooting at Muslims, not police officers.89  The
trial court excluded the testimony about the defendant’s mental dis-
ease and delusions, ruling that such expert testimony was admissible
only in a homicide or when the defendant pleads insanity.90  The
TCCA found that testimony of a mental disease or defect that rebuts
the mens rea of the charged offense is relevant and admissible unless
excluded under a specific evidentiary rule.91  Speaking to many of the
issues raised in this Article, the TCCA said:
Insanity is the only ‘diminished responsibility’ or ‘diminished capacity’ de-
fense to criminal responsibility in Texas.  These ‘diminished’ mental-state de-
fenses, if allowed, would permit exoneration or mitigation of an offense
because of a person’s supposed psychiatric compulsion or an inability to en-
gage in normal reflection or moral judgment.  Such defenses refer to a person’s
lesser or impaired mental ability (compared to the average person) to reason
through the consequences of his actions because of a mental disorder.  The
Texas Legislature has not enacted any affirmative defenses, other than in-
sanity, based on mental disease, defect, or abnormality.  Thus, they do not
exist in Texas.92
The TCCA further noted that the “Supreme Court [had recently]
upheld Arizona’s wholesale exclusion of expert psychiatric testimony
concerning mental illness offered to rebut proof of the defendant’s
mens rea.”93  Despite the ruling of the Supreme Court, the TCCA reaf-
firmed Jackson in finding that “such expert evidence might be rele-
vant, reliable, and admissible to rebut proof of the defendant’s mens
rea.”94
[A] reason that justifies an act or omission or that relieves a person of a
duty. . . . A defense that arises because the defendant is not blameworthy
for having acted in a way that would otherwise be criminal.  The follow-
ing defenses are the traditional excuses: duress, entrapment, infancy,
insanity, and involuntary intoxication. — Also termed legal excuse.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 649 (9th ed. 2009).
88. 270 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
89. Id. at 587.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 588.
92. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 593 (citing Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903–06 (3d Cir. 1987)).
93. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 595 (citing Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 779 (2006)).
94. Id.  Ruffin was recently twice distinguished by the TCCA: (1) in Mays v. State,
318 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), the defendant knew he was shooting at
police officers and mental illness was relevant for mitigation in punishment but
did not directly rebut mens rea. (2) Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75879, 2010 WL
1817772 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5, 2010) (unpublished opinion), where the court
noted:
[T]he excluded testimony suggested general limitations in cognitive abil-
ity, intoxication at the time of the offense, and general deficits in adap-
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At the time of preparation of this Article, the most recent case to
discuss this problem was Zorn v. State,95 dated May 28, 2010.  In
Zorn, a friend attempted to testify that the defendant suffered from
paranoid schizophrenia and other related emotional problems.96  The
trial court heard the testimony outside the presence of the jury and
ruled it inadmissible at the guilt-innocence stage.97  The appellate
court found that evidence of the defendant’s mental state was admissi-
ble “when it is relevant to the issue of mens rea.”98  Although Texas
still does not recognize a diminished capacity defense, psychological
evidence is admissible if relevant to the issue of the defendant’s mens
rea to commit the crime.99  The court noted:
[J]ust as a blind person would be permitted to offer evidence that his blind-
ness prevented him from understanding that a person he shot at was a police
officer, so too could a person suffering from mental delusions offer evidence
about those delusions if they prevented him from apprehending that the per-
son he shot at was a police officer.100
Nevertheless, the Zorn court found the defendant’s “lowered ability to
navigate stressful situations explain[ed] why she was drinking and
why she was in a hurry, but [did] not serve to negate the mens rea or
to show that she could not appreciate the risk that her conduct
created.”101
It is apparent that most courts in Texas will now recognize that
evidence of a defendant’s mental state is admissible and relevant to
the issue of the mens rea element of a crime.  Unfortunately, many
defense lawyers do not recognize it, present it, and argue it in the
right way, at the appropriate time, or with authority.
tive functioning. The excluded testimony had relevance only to whether
the appellant’s mental functioning was below normal to some degree.
There was no evidence showing a connection between the appellant’s
generally low level of mental functioning and his knowledge during the
commission of the offense that the victim was a police officer.
Id. at *21.
95. 315 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App. 2010).
96. Id. at 623.
97. Id. at 622–23.
98. Id. at 624; see Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 597.
99. Zorn, 315 S.W.3d at 624; see Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573–74 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005).
100. Zorn, 315 S.W.3d at 624 (citing Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 593–94).
101. Id. at 625.  The TCCA recently issued Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010), where a defendant, during the guilt-innocence phase, tried to intro-
duce psychiatric testimony about defendant’s substance abuse to negate mens rea
of underlying burglary and the court found the testimony not admissible at guilt-
innocence due to voluntary intoxication.
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VI. PARTY RESPONSIBILITY
By the use of the law of parties, a person’s criminal responsibility
can be enlarged to acts in which he may not be the principal actor.102
The Texas Penal Code explicitly provides that “[a] person is criminally
responsible as a party to an offense” whether the offense is “by his own
conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsi-
ble, or by both.”103  This expanded criminal responsibility for the acts
of another falls on a person in one of three ways: (1) If a person “causes
or aids an innocent or non-responsible person” to engage in the crime
with the kind of culpability required for that crime, then he is crimi-
nally responsible for the other’s acts;104 (2) if a person “solicits, en-
courages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid” another to commit a crime
acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the crime,
criminal responsibility results;105 or (3) if a person fails to make a rea-
sonable effort to prevent the commission of a crime he had a “legal
duty to prevent” and if he acted with “intent to promote or assist” the
commission of the crime, that person is criminally responsible for the
acts of the other person.106
Additionally, if in attempting to carry out a felony conspiracy, an-
other felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators
are guilty of the felony committed even without intent to commit the
felony, if the crime was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
and one should have anticipated the crime as a result of carrying out
the conspiracy.107  Case law indicates that for a person to be held
102. Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 7.01(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (“All traditional distinctions between
accomplices and principals are abolished by this section, and each party to an
offense may be charged and convicted without alleging that he acted as a princi-
pal or accomplice.”).  Consequently, the Courts will use the term “party” or “ac-
complice” interchangeably.
103. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a).
104. Id. § 7.02(a)(1).
105. Id.§ 7.02(a)(2).
106. Id. § 7.02(a)(3).
107. See id. § 7.02(b).  The definition of criminal conspiracy addresses situations
where a person, “with intent that a felony be committed, (1)[] agrees with one or
more persons that they or one or more of them engage in conduct that would
constitute the offense; and (2) he or one or more of them performs an overt act in
pursuance of the agreement.” Id. § 15.02(a).  Prosecution under the criminal con-
spiracy statute results in being charged with a crime one level lower than the
most serious felony a part of the conspiracy. Id. § 15.02(d).  Case law tends to
indicate that the section 15.02 conspiracy “reaches further back into preparatory
conduct constituting inchoate offenses . . . .”  Woods v. State, 801 S.W. 2d 932, 943
(Tex. App. 1990) (quoting 1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02 (E.T. Branch, 3d ed.
1974) .  Whereas, in a section 7.02(b) conspiracy, the defendant’s presence at the
time of the offense often is a distinguishing factor. Compare Vodochodsky v.
State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that the evidence was
factually insufficient to convict the defendant and mitigated against the defen-
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criminally responsible in this situation, he must have knowledge of
the actor’s unlawful intent at the time he acted to promote or assist
the other person’s unlawful conduct.108  This is whether or not the
person had such intent himself.  The evidence, in a parties’ case, will
be legally sufficient where the person charged is physically present at
the commission of the offense and encourages its commission by words
or other agreement.109  “But mere presence during the commission of
a crime is not enough to make one an accomplice,”110 and a person
dant’s party responsibility, did not show he acted as part of a conspiracy and
failed to prove he was present at the scene of the shooting, but merely that he
“had the bad luck of being the friend and roommate of a man determined to kill
police officers and himself”), with Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 534–35 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992) (discussing a case wherein the defendant was present at the
time of the capital murder and unsuccessfully argued that he could not be con-
victed or given a death sentence using the law of parties).  Not to mention that if
one is a party to a capital murder, seldom will a prosecutor desire to reduce the
defendant’s culpability by one level if his active participation in the crime aided
the commission as is anticipated by section 7.02(b). See Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); cf. People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ill.
1974) (defining party liability, not applying the often used “natural and probable
consequence” of the criminal enterprise test, but applying a much stricter statu-
tory standard that one is responsible for acts committed by an accomplice in the
course of committing another felony whether the acts were reasonably foresee-
able or not).  The Illinois accountability statute for conduct of another provides,
“where one aids another in the planning or commission of an offense, he is legally
accountable for the conduct of the person he aids; and that the word ‘conduct’
encompasses any criminal act done in furtherance of the planned and intended
act.” Id. at 32.  The defendant in Kessler was convicted of two counts of at-
tempted murder and one count of burglary even though he only “told two compan-
ions where he had seen a large sum of money” in a building, remained in the car
while his companions burglarized the premises, and after the companions found a
gun inside the building they shot the owner and a police officer while fleeing on
foot. Id. at 29–30.  Under section 7.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code, unless the
defendant should have anticipated the shooting of the owner and the police officer
as a result of carrying out the burglary conspiracy he would not be a party to the
shootings.  Although the word “anticipated” is not defined in the Penal Code, THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), defines anticipated as “reasonably
foreseeable,” and a Texas court would likely say it means actions that are reason-
ably foreseeable “by a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of ordinary care
that the event or some similar event would occur as a natural and probable conse-
quence.” See Hamilton v. Fant, 422 S.W.2d 495, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).  Antic-
ipation would be intentional, not accidental, and the “natural and probable
consequence[ ]” of one’s action as the acts of one of sound mind and discretion.
Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  As in Hill, next
discussed, the defendant would have only been responsible in Texas for the shoot-
ings if he was acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the at-
tempted murders at the time he solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or
attempted to aid his accomplices in the burglary.
108. Hill v. State, 883 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Tex. App. 1994).
109. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
110. Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Medina v.
State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
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may be charged as a party and convicted even though he was not pre-
sent at the time of the offense.111  The trier of fact may look to events
and the actions of the accused before, during and after the crime to
determine his understanding of the plan to commit the crime and
whether at the time of the offense the parties were acting together,
each contributing some part for their common purpose.112  Circum-
stantial evidence alone may be sufficient to show a person is a party to
a crime.113
Although the workings of the special issues in punishment are be-
yond the scope of this Article, a person can be convicted of capital mur-
der as a party, exposing that person to a potential death sentence,
“without having the intent or actual anticipation that a human life
would be taken that is required for an affirmative answer to the anti-
parties issue.”114
111. Rodriguez v. State, 203 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  Although admit-
tedly not a capital case, Rodriguez aided in the commission of the crime and could
therefore be held criminally responsible. Id.
112. Id.  Hooper is also illustrative. In Hooper, the defendant was found guilty of be-
ing a party to an aggravated assault of a public servant. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at
11.  Lack of evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of his co-conspirators’ violent
nature or of his co-conspirators’ intent to commit an aggravated assault is not an
element of the offense under either party liability theory. Id. at 14.
113. Powell v. State, 219 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex. App. 2007); see Guevara v. State, 152
S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding direct evidence is not required, as
the fact finder may make reasonable inferences from the evidence and circum-
stantial evidence is just as probative as direct evidence).
114. Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 503–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see TEX. CODE
CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); see also Medrano
v. State, No. AP-75320, 2008 WL 5050076, at *10 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2008)
(finding the mens rea required for the robbery supplies the mens rea for the capi-
tal murder committed by a co-conspirator).  The defendant in Medrano furnished
members of his gang the gun used in a planned robbery which became a murder
of more than one person. Id. at *3–4.  The defendant did not participate in the
offense but was found guilty of capital murder and received a sentence of death.
Id. at *1.  The court found the jury could find the defendant knew there was going
to be a robbery and that by giving his gang the gun he could have anticipated
someone might be shot. Id. at *9–10.  However, the jury could have found other-
wise. See id. Under the TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(2), the
“anti-parties” charge will be given in punishment, to-wit:
(2) in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage per-
mitted the jury to find the defendant guilty as a party under Sections
7.01 and 7.02, Penal Code, [and the jury did so find the defendant guilty
as a party.  The jury shall be given the following charge:] whether the
defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actually
cause the death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or an-
other or anticipated that a human life would be taken.
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782 (1982) and Ti-
son v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), discussed the use of the death penalty on
defendants who were not proven to have an intent to kill.  In Enmund, the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of one who does not him-
self intend that murder be committed and participates in the crime with others
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In a capital murder setting, using Texas Penal Code section
7.02(b), if a person agreed with another to commit an initial felony
(such as burglary, kidnapping, robbery, sexual assault, delivery of a
controlled substance or the like), and while committing that felony his
fellow conspirator commits murder, if that initial person should have
anticipated a murder would occur,115 then the initial person can be
held responsible and prosecuted for capital murder.116
Most usually, section 7.02(a)(2) is used to expand a person’s crimi-
nal responsibility for the acts of others, by showing in some way he
“solicit[ed], encourage[d], direct[ed], aid[ed], or attempt[ed] to aid” an-
other to commit capital murder while acting with intent to promote or
assist the commission of the crime.117
An accomplice can be convicted of a lesser included offense if it can
only be shown that his intent was to promote or assist in the commis-
sion of the lesser offense, not the more serious offense.118  It is no de-
but only in an attenuated capacity. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 790–91.  In Tison, the
Supreme Court clarified Enmund and held that the Constitution does not pro-
scribe the execution of a major participant in an offense who possesses “reckless
indifference” towards a murder committed by parties acting with him in a crime.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.  But see Gongora v. State, No. AP-74636, 2006 WL
234987, at *12 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2006) (authorizing the jury “by the charge
to convict appellant as a party does not make Article 37.071, section 2(b)(2) un-
constitutional as applied to appellant in this case”); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d
249, 263 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998);  Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 555 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995) (“[T]hat the jury may have found that appellant only antici-
pated that death would result under Article 37.071 is inconsequential to Enmund
and Tison concerns; the jury had already found that appellant intended to at
least promote or assist in the commission of an intentional murder.”).  A proposed
repeal of the anti-parties charge was introduced in the Texas House during the
80th Legislature in 2007 but did not make the final bill. Legislative History, HB
8, TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE (last accessed April 18, 2011), http://www.capitol.
state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=80R&Bill=HB8.
115. As defined in any of the nine ways set out in section 19.03 or if the person should
have anticipated a capital crime would be committed as set out in section 22.021.
This is assuming Kennedy v. Louisiana, 544 U.S. 407 (2008), has not in effect
rendered this statute ineffectual and unconstitutional. See infra Part XVI.
116. Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
117. Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 529–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
118. See Vanderbilt v. Collins, 994 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hopper v.
Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610 (1982)).  The law in Texas as to lesser included offenses
is set out in Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  In Texas, the
first step is the pleadings approach as the “sole test for determining . . . whether a
party may be entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction” and is a question of
law. Id. at 535–36.  The second step is whether there is some evidence, anything
more than a scintilla, “adduced at trial to support such an instruction.” Id.  In
the recent case of Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), the
Court did not grant the State’s request for an instruction on the lesser included
offense of murder in a capital murder-robbery case.  The defendant did not want
the charge, taking an all or nothing approach.  This instruction, like a “ ‘defensive
issue,’ is not ‘applicable to the case’ unless the defendant timely requests the is-
sue or objects to the omission of the issue in the jury charge.” Id. at 780 (citing
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fense that the primary actor has been acquitted,119 has not been
prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of
a different type or class of offense, has gone to trial before or after the
accomplice,120 or is immune from prosecution altogether.121  It is the
criminal mens rea of each accomplice that matters as each party to a
crime may be convicted of only those crimes for which he had the req-
uisite mental state.122
Occasionally, the courts have found evidence insufficient to sup-
port a conviction using the conspiracy language of section 7.02(b).123
Also, it is not necessary that an individual be indicted as a party to be
convicted as one, as this is not an element of an offense.124  And fi-
Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).  The court found the
trial court was not required to sua sponte provide this jury instruction. Id. at
781; cf. Cordova v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Beck stands for the
proposition that the jury [in a capital case] must be permitted to consider a ver-
dict of guilt of a noncapital offense ‘in every case’ in which ‘the evidence would
have supported such a verdict.’ ”).
119. Cf. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25–26 (1980) (interpreting federal
statute to allow conviction of accessories to federal crimes notwithstanding prin-
cipal’s acquittal).
120. See Owens v. State, 867 A.2d 334, 340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (noting that the
“clear answer given by other courts and treatise writers” is that even after a prin-
cipal has been acquitted of a crime, another person can be convicted for his role in
aiding and abetting the commission of that same crime).
121. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.03(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); see, e.g., Singletary v.
State, 509 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (“[a]n accomplice is not enti-
tled to a new trial or reversal just because a subsequently tried principal has
been acquitted.  The fact that another jury acquitted the principal in a subse-
quent trial does not by itself entitle an accomplice to the same offense to a new
trial.  In many instances different juries reach opposite results on the same
evidence.”).
122. Ex parte Thompson, 179 S.W.3d 549, 553–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“What mat-
ters under section 7.02(a) is the criminal mens rea of each accomplice; each may
be convicted only of those crimes for which he had the requisite mental state.”).
123. Isham v. Collins, 905 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding insufficient evidence where
defendant was present at scene with triggerman and assisted in disposing of the
murder weapon); Turner v. McKaskle, 721 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding insuf-
ficient evidence where defendant possessed stolen property of the murder victim);
Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding insufficient
evidence where defendant committed a crime, bonded triggerman out of jail
knowing he might commit a crime, but where state failed to show the defendant
was aware of a looming specific capital murder); Flores v. State, 551 S.W.2d 364
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (finding insufficient evidence where defendant possessed
deceased’s car with license plates to another car and stored deceased’s suitcase
with deceased’s items inside); Moffett v. State, 207 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App.
1948) (holding mere presence at scene of capital murder by itself insufficient to
convict as a party or a conspirator); Navarro v. State, 776 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.
1989) (finding insufficient evidence where defendant supplied murder weapon to
triggerman); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b).
124. Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  The defendant in
Sorto brought his claim under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) and Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that party status must be alleged in the indict-
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nally, it is always discretionary with the trial court to include an in-
struction to the jury on the law of parties if the evidence supports
it.125
VII. SECTION 19.03(A)(1) PENAL CODE: MURDER OF A
PEACE OFFICER OR A FIREMAN
As discussed above, a constitutionally sufficient capital punish-
ment scheme must first include a statutory aggravating circumstance
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty can
be imposed to provide an effective mechanism for narrowing those
who are death-eligible.126
The first “statutory aggravating circumstance” in Texas is the
murder of “a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful dis-
charge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer
or fireman.”127  “[T]he phrase ‘lawful discharge of an official duty’ is
not statutorily defined, but it does have an ordinary meaning that ju-
rors can apply using their own common sense . . . .”128  The phrase
“who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty” has been
challenged as unconstitutionally vague, but as long as the officer was
acting within his capacity as a peace officer, he was acting within the
discharge of his official duties.129  Further,
[w]hether [the deceased police officer] was making a lawful arrest is not rele-
vant to determining if [he] was acting in the lawful discharge of his official
duties.  A police officer is still acting within the lawful discharge of his official
ment and proven by the finder of fact, and failure to do so violated the Sixth
Amendment and defendant’s rights to due process. Sorto, 173 S.W.3d at 476.
The court made no finding on the claim saying it was not properly preserved for
review. Id.; see Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232 (1999) (explaining that
only the elements of an offense must be charged in an indictment, submitted to
the fact finder, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).  In Texas, an “ ‘[e]lement
of the offense’ means: (A) the forbidden conduct; (B) the required culpability; (C)
any required result; and (D) the negation of any exception to the offense.” TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(22).
125. Coleman v. State, No. AP-75478, 2009 WL 4696064, *10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
(citing Marable v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287, 287–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
126. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
127. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1).
128. Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see Daniels v. State,
754 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (“[W]hen statutory words are not
defined, they are ordinarily given their plain meaning, . . . unless the act clearly
shows that they were used in some other sense.”); Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416,
419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)) (“[I]n the absence of special definitions, the language
under attack [as vague] can be measured by common understanding and prac-
tices or construed in the sense generally understood.” (quoting U.S. v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
129. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (officer made a war-
rantless arrest without probable cause); Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15, 29
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 388–89.
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duties when he makes an unlawful arrest, so long as he is acting within his
capacity as a peace officer.130
The second prong of this section is the accused knowing the person
is a police officer or fireman.  This is fact driven by each case but still
requires actual knowledge on the part of the accused that the de-
ceased was a peace officer.131
VIII. SECTION 19.03(A)(2) PENAL CODE: MURDER IN THE
COURSE OF COMMITTING OR ATTEMPTING TO
COMMIT CERTAIN CRIMES
Under this subsection of section 19.03, a person who intentionally
commits a murder in the course of committing or attempting to com-
mit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, arson,
obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat under section
22.07(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), or (6), commits a capital felony.132  The culpa-
ble mental state peculiar to this section is discussed in greater detail
in Part IV of this Article.  For this section, it is sufficient to state that
the requisite mens rea in this type of capital felony is restricted to
intentional murders only.133
130. Montoya, 744 S.W.2d at 29; see also Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 297–98
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Montoya to hold that the constitutionality of a
state trooper’s stop was irrelevant to the consideration of whether he was law-
fully discharging his duty); Hafdahl v. State, 805 S.W.2d 396, 401 n.6 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990) (pointing gun at motorist during routine traffic investigation is a law-
ful exercise of an officer’s duties); Guerra v. State, 771 S.W.2d 453, 460–61 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988) (citing Montoya for the proposition that whether or not an of-
ficer was making a valid arrest has no bearing on whether the officer was acting
in the lawful discharge of his duties).
131. In Excamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), the appellant ar-
gued that the state offered no proof that he knew victim was police officer.  How-
ever, the TCCA found that there was sufficient proof where an officer that
performed CPR testified he unbuttoned the victim’s “uniform shirt,” another of-
ficer testified that clothing “clearly identified” him as a police officer, a valet
parking employee said the victim was in uniform, the defendant told reporter he
knew victim was police officer, and the defendant told a hospital employee he had
shot a cop. Id. at 820–21; see also Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 404 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999) (finding the off-duty officer was acting in official capacity when
he intervened in a burglary and defendant knew he was an officer, so noting four-
teen times in his confession); Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 698–99 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985); Venegas v. State, 660 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. App. 1983) (hold-
ing that the jury should have been instructed that if defendant did not know
plainclothes officers were police when they broke into his house the defendant
was not guilty).
132. Terroristic threat is discussed in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07; see supra note
22 (providing the complete text of section 22.07).  It is interesting to note, that
while committing or attempting to commit a Class B or Class A misdemeanor,
one may commit a capital felony under the current scheme. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 19.03, 22.07.
133. In defining capital murder section 19.03 first requires that one must commit
murder as defined in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. section 19.02 which allows for mur-
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A. Nexus between the Murder and the Underlying Crime
There are some additional limitations to this form of capital felony.
For one, there must be a nexus between the murder and the crime
committed or attempted to be committed.134  The TCCA construed the
phrase “in the course of committing or attempting to commit” to mean
“conduct [occurring] in an attempt to commit, during the commission,
or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of” the under-
lying offense.135  The victim, or things done to the victim, may provide
the nexus as the history of this language will show.136
The evolution of this concept can best be understood by studying
the relation between a robbery137 (theft) and a murder (resulting in
capital murder) through case law developments since the implementa-
tion of the modern penal code.
1. Robbery
i. Moore v. State138
In Moore—involving an early pre-Penal Code offense—the defen-
dant took the position that there was no nexus between a robbery that
took place at one location and a murder of the victim of the robbery
that took place at another location, some distance away.139  While be-
ginning the process of defining the nexus requirement of section
19.03(a)(2), the TCCA rejected the defendant’s position, and refused to
limit murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit rob-
bery to only those circumstances where the killing takes place at the
der to be committed with either an intentional or knowing mens rea.  However,
under section 19.03(a)(2), the mens rea for the murder must be intentional; know-
ing is not sufficient.
134. Rivera v. State, 808 S.W.2d 80, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding the nexus
requirement for capital murder involving murder in the course of a robbery is the
same as the nexus requirement in a robbery between the assault and the theft);
Ibanez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
135. Riles v. State, 595 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
136. The following baker’s dozen cases, from pre-Penal Code to modern era TCCA in-
terpretations, show a steadfast interpretation of section 19.03(a)(2) as requiring a
nexus between the underlying crime alleged as an aggravating circumstance and
the commission of a murder to make the murder a capital felony, stating: “in the
course of committing or attempting to commit” means “conduct that occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the at-
tempt or commission of [the underlying offense].” Riles, 595 S.W.2d at 862.
137. The Texas Penal Code defines robbery as follows:
A person commits [robbery] if, in the course of committing theft as de-
fined in Chapter 31 and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the
property, he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily in-
jury to another; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places an-
other in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a).
138. 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
139. Id. at 674.
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same location and around the same time of the robbery.140  The court
felt this would permit a defendant who has committed robbery to es-
cape capital murder charges by removing the robbery victim to an-
other place for the purpose of killing the victim to prevent the victim’s
testimony.141  The court refused to adopt a construction of the statute
that would make the statute “absurd or ridiculous,” or that would lead
to “absurd conclusions of consequences.”142
ii. Palafox v. State143
The nexus requirement can also be used to remove a defendant
from capital murder exposure.  In Palafox, the defendant admitted he
killed the victim and took items from the victim’s home.144  However,
he clearly stated that the murder was done for its own sake and upon
urging from another they tried to make it appear that the murder was
part of a burglary.145  “It was only for this reason . . . that the items
were taken” from the victim.146  The TCCA found this was a murder
and a subsequent theft and therefore not a capital murder-robbery.147
There was no nexus between the murder and the alleged underlying
crime of robbery which contained an element of theft.
iii. Fierro v. State148
The question of how the state shows intent to commit the underly-
ing crime to establish the nexus was addressed in Fierro.  In Fierro, a
cab driver was shot and subsequently items were taken from him.149
The defense argued there was no showing of intent to commit robbery
prior to the victim’s death.150  The court found a robbery of the victim
immediately after the shooting of the victim which resulted in his
death is capital murder occurring in the course of committing rob-
bery.151  “The fact that there was no prior discussion of robbery and no
indication of intent to commit robbery mentioned in the confession
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Moore, 542 S.W.2d at 673–75.
143. 608 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) superseded by TEX. R. EVID. 607 (West
2003 & Supp. 2005), as recognized in Junecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996).
144. Id. at 182.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Palafox is an old “voucher” rule case, in which the state failed to sufficiently
rebut exculpatory evidence the state introduced and the conviction was reversed.
Id. at 183–84.  Although this is no longer the law, the case is instructive on the
facts.
148. 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
149. Id. at 312.
150. Id. at 312–13.
151. Id. at 313.
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[was] not controlling.”152  A verbal demand for money is not the “talis-
man of an intent to steal.  Such intent may be inferred from actions or
conduct.”153
iv. DeMouchette v. State154
Addressing the proof necessary to establish the nexus in a robbery-
murder scenario is DeMouchette.  In DeMouchette, the defendant
claimed there was no nexus between the murders and an alleged un-
derlying robbery.155  The defendant claimed that the state’s failure to
prove theft left the state with no proof of murder in an attempt to
commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of a robbery.156  The TCCA noted that proof of
a completed theft is not necessary in proving a robbery-capital mur-
der, and certainly in proving an attempted robbery-capital murder.157
The court found the evidence sufficient to convict for capital murder
with the underlying offense of robbery when it showed three employ-
ees of the restaurant were shot, and at least one killed, immediately
preceding a ransacking of the business at closing time, which included
obtaining keys from one of the victim’s person after he was shot.158
v. Barnard v. State159
In Barnard, a murder occurred during the commission of an aggra-
vated robbery of a convenience store where one person was killed and
another robbed.160  The nexus between the murder and the underly-
ing crime can be the robbery of one person and the murder of another
in the course of committing the underlying robbery.161  The defendant
argued that since the indictment included all the detailed elements to
prove robbery, including theft with its component parts, the nexus the
state made was the murder that occurred while the defendant was
committing theft and that theft was not an authorized underlying
crime for capital murder.162  The court quickly dispatched this argu-
ment by showing the indictment when read as a whole showed robbery
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 731 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
155. Id. at 78.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 78–79.
159. 730 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
160. Id. at 707.
161. Id. at 709 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(1)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010)).
162. Id. at 708.
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as the underlying crime by detailing the elements of robbery including
theft.163
vi. McGee v. State164
McGee addressed the nexus requirement that the aggravating ele-
ment of murder must have occurred during the commission or in the
immediate flight after the commission of a robbery.165  The Mcgee
court held that it is “sufficiently proven if the State proves the robbery
occurred immediately after the commission of the murder.”166  Fur-
ther, “an intent to steal may be inferred from the facts.”167
vii. White v. State168
In the same year as McGee, the TCCA decided White, a case involv-
ing how the trier of fact should decide the timing of the formation of
intent to commit the underlying crime.169  The TCCA agreed that the
point at which the defendant formed his intent to take the victim’s
property is critical to deciding whether his acts are a capital murder in
the course of robbery or a first degree murder, followed by theft from a
corpse, a third degree felony.170  The question is whether any rational
trier of fact, from the evidence as a whole, would find the defendant
intended to take the victim’s property before, or as, he murdered
her.171  It is permissible for the jury to infer that sequence from all the
evidence admitted.172  If a theft (or robbery) was committed “as an
afterthought and unrelated to” an assault (or murder),173 then the evi-
dence is insufficient to show a robbery-capital murder nexus.174
163. Id. at 708–09.  The defendant on appeal also made an interesting “bootstrapping”
argument (or some would say merger argument) that by using the shooting to
elevate a theft to a robbery that the state could not use the shooting to then ele-
vate the robbery to a capital murder. Id. at 708.  The TCCA noted robbery can be
by assault or by the threat of violence and any shared elements with capital mur-
der are not relevant to the legislature’s purpose of using this mechanism to nar-
rowly define offenses as aggravating circumstances to elevate certain crimes to a
capital felony as mandated by the constitutional death penalty scheme required
by Furman v. Georgia and approved by Jurek v. State. Id. at 709.
164. 774 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), reaffirmed by Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d
221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
165. Id. at 234.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 235.
168. 779 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).




173. Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 224.
174. White, 779 S.W.2d at 814–15; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)
(explaining that the appellate court is to determine, based on the evidence
presented to the trier of fact and all reasonable inferences there from, whether
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viii. Nelson v. State175
While once again struggling with intent, the TCCA in Nelson again
recognized it is possible to have a murder followed by theft without
having a murder in the course of robbery (capital murder).176  In Nel-
son, what makes a theft into a robbery is the presence of the “intent to
obtain or maintain control of the victim’s property” at the time of, or
prior to, the murder.177  This intent is the nexus that ties the theft
(robbery) and the murder together to create a capital felony.178  If the
State proves that the intent was present, it has proven the murder
occurred in the course of robbery, even though appropriation may oc-
cur after the murder.179  Once again the court confirmed that the trier
of fact, if acting rationally, may infer the defendant’s intent from the
facts of the case.180
ix. Alvarado v. State181
In Alvarado, the defendant believed the victims had cheated him
on a drug deal.182  He and two others went to the victim’s house with
knives with intent to kill the victims.183  After they killed the victims,
they searched the house for things to steal.184  The TCCA found a ra-
tional jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at or
before the time of the killings the defendant formed the intent to com-
mit robbery by taking the victim’s property and thereby establishing a
nexus.185  The court noted that a jury may infer the intent from the
conduct of the defendant, but robbery as an afterthought and unre-
lated to the murder will not suffice.186
any rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt); Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 224.
175. 848 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).




180. Id. at 131–32.  Interestingly, the TCCA toyed with the theft language elements in
coming to its conclusion, which is the exact thing that caused the Barnard court
so much difficulty five years earlier when the indictment there had all the ele-
ments of robbery in it including all the elements of theft. Compare id., with Bar-
nard v. State, 730 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
181. 912 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
182. Id. at 205.
183. Id. at 207.
184. Id. at 208.
185. Id. at 207.
186. Id.; see Robertson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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x. Holberg v. State187
The court continued to use the same language to draw a nexus be-
tween the underlying crime and the murder in Holberg, stating “[t]he
term ‘in the course of committing’ an offense means conduct that oc-
curs in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of the offense.”188  The TCCA
noted:
[A] trial court’s charge [must] accurately track the relevant statutes, [giving]
the jury clear guidance on the distinction between murder in the course of
[committing or attempting to commit the underlying crime] (a capital offense),
. . . and lesser included offense[s], [including murder] (a non-capital offense),
and [give] the jury the option of finding appellant guilty of any, or none, of
those offenses.189
As the charge authorized the jury to convict on alternative theories, if
any one theory was sufficient the verdict of guilt would be upheld,
which it was.190  As to the nexus requirement, the jury found the de-
fendant murdered the victim, an eighty year old man, with fifty-eight
stab wounds and numerous blunt force injuries, shoved the base of a
lamp five inches down his throat, took $1,400 in cash from his wallet,
and spent the evening buying and snorting cocaine with a friend.191
The jury’s implicit finding of a nexus between the defendant’s murder
of the victim while committing robbery and burglary was affirmed.192
187. 38 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
188. Id. at 141 (quoting Riles v. State, 595 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
189. Id. at 141.  Note this quoted material is only available via Westlaw because the
Soutwest Reports only print the redacted version released by the court for
publication.
190. Id. at 139 (citing Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 558–59 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992)).
191. Id.  In Anderson v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir. 1994), the court noted:
The phrase ‘in the course of committing . . . robbery’ is, of course, not
technically an ‘aggravating circumstance,’ but rather an element of the
substantive offense.  However, this distinction is perhaps not constitu-
tionally significant in light of the Supreme Court’s statements that
designating aggravating circumstances and restricting the categories of
murder for which death may be imposed serve, in the statutes of differ-
ent states, the equivalent function of narrowing the class of persons eli-
gible for the death penalty.
Id. at 1222; see Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 243–45 (1988).  The Supreme
Court relied on this narrowing at the guilt-innocence phase in upholding the
Texas capital sentencing scheme. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S 262, 269–71
(1976).  A robbery, as defined in the statute, must have been committed or at-
tempted, and the murder must have had some temporal proximity and factual
connection to the robbery.  The only real room for uncertainty is how far one can
expand the temporal proximity if the logical connection exists. Id.
192. Holberg, 38 S.W.3d at 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Riles v. State, 595
S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).  The defendant, Brittany Marlowe
Holdberg, remains on death row where she has been since March 27, 1998. See
Offender Information, Brittany Holberg, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUS-
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xi. Cooper v. State193
And finally in this survey of nexus in the section 19.03(a)(2) rob-
bery-murder context is Cooper.  Although not a capital case, but a rob-
bery case, the TCCA confirmed Nelson for the proposition that a theft
could be committed “as an afterthought and unrelated to” a murder
and that would not satisfy the “in the course of” requirement.194  The
TCCA has held “numerous times” that murder is sufficiently proven
“in the course of” committing robbery if the State proves that the rob-
bery occurred immediately after the murder.195  The nexus require-
ment for murder in the course of a robbery, creating a capital felony, is
the same as the nexus requirement between an assault and a related
theft creating a robbery.196 Cooper stated that the nexus is “proven if
the State proves that the theft occurred immediately after the as-
sault.”197  The intent to commit the underlying offense (i.e., robbery
prior to or during the commission of the murder) can be inferred by
acts and conduct of the defendant.198  “Even if there is no other evi-
dence of a nexus, that inference will support a conviction.”199  In addi-
tion to these robbery-murder cases, there are two cases involving
aggravated sexual assault200 that provide additional nexus concepts.
TICE, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/holbergbrittany.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2011).
193. 67 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
194. Id. at 225; see also Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(holding that intent to commit robbery must be formed prior to or concurrent
with murder); White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (hold-
ing that if intent to rob were formed after murder, the murder would not be “in
the course of” robbery); Ibanez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (holding that murder and robbery must be related).
195. McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
196. Ibanez, 749 S.W.2d at 807.
197. Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 223.
198. Id. at 224.
199. Id.  Judge Meyers filed a dissenting opinion in Cooper, in which Judges Price,
Johnson, and Cochran joined.  The dissent agreed with the lower court that proof
of an assault followed by a theft without a showing that the assault was commit-
ted with the intent of facilitating the theft is not enough to sustain a robbery
conviction. Id. at 226.  The dissent found no evidence that the defendant devel-
oped the requisite intent to commit theft either prior to or during the assault. Id.
at 228.  The dissent said the majority’s interpretation of McGee was inaccurate
and that McGee (and Nelson) said the proof of a nexus can be shown by a robbery
immediately after the murder, with other evidence that tended to prove the actor
formed the intent to commit the robbery either during or immediately after the
commission of the murder. Id. at 226.  The dissent believes the majority’s “gen-
eral rule” set out in McGee, i.e., proof of a theft occurring immediately after an
assault is enough evidence from which intent can be inferred, fails to examine the
other cases cited as authority which makes it clear there was never a “general
rule” and it would be unwise to begin to treat it as such. Id. at 225–28.
200. A person commits aggravated sexual assault if the person intentionally or know-
ingly penetrates or contacts the anus, sexual organ, or mouth of another without
consent, or does the same with a child, regardless of consent. TEX. PENAL CODE
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2. Aggravated Sexual Assault
i. Dorough v. State201
In Dorough the question was settled as to whether the underlying
crime, even though completed, must have the same victim as the mur-
der.  The nexus between the murder and the underlying crime can be
the aggravated sexual assault of one person and the murder of an-
other in the course of committing the underlying aggravated sexual
assault even though forty-five minutes had elapsed between the last
sexual assault and the murder.202
ii. Woolridge v. State203
In Woolridge, the court found that a nexus can be established
where the victim is murdered during her flight from being the victim
of the underlying crime after the completion of the underlying
crime.204  The court noted that just because an aggravated sexual as-
sault was committed prior to the events leading to the death of the
victim, who was killed in flight after the sexual assault, did not mean
that the death of the victim was not caused in the course of commit-
ting the aggravated sexual assault alleged as the underlying crime.205
The court noted that:
‘[I]n the course of committing’ an offense listed in [Texas Penal Code], section
19.03(a)(2), means conduct occurring in an attempt to commit, during the
commission, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the
offense . . . .  [and there is] no material difference between this and the armed
ANN. § 22.021 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).  This can involve serious bodily injury
or death, or fear of the same, kidnapping, and deadly weapons.
201. 639 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
202. Id. at 480.  The court here expanded the definition of “in the course of committing
aggravated rape.” Id.  It highlighted the assaultive conduct that remained pre-
sent after the last sexual assault as “both victims were in the appellant’s custody
throughout the course of the episode, and the appellant threatened them with a
gun the entire time.  The appellant never left the scene.” Id. at 481.  The subject
murder occurred after the murder victim and the sexual assault victim had been
turned loose. Id. at 480–81.  The murder victim, instead of walking away, turned
back and the defendant shot him again, this time fatally. Id. at 480.  One could
argue that the “assaultive conduct” to which the Court used to expand the nexus
requirement was aggravated assault, not the underlying aggravated sexual as-
sault charged in the indictment.  John Melvin Dorough, Jr., is now fifty-three
years of age and remains in prison serving his life sentence with no scheduled
release date even though he was eligible for release over thirteen years ago. See
Offender Information Detail, John Dorough, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, http://168.51.178.33/webapp/TDCJ/InmateDetails.jsp?sidnumber=0239
6388 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
203. 653 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
204. Id. at 816.
205. Id.
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bank robber who shoots his victim as he flees, in order to eliminate the only
witness to his crime.206
This was the very conduct proscribed as a capital offense in section
19.03(a)(2).207
3. Kidnapping208
Generally, the developed rules as to nexus apply to any of the un-
derlying crimes in section 19.03(a)(2).  However, specifically as to kid-
napping, unlike robbery, the nexus cannot be created unless the
kidnapping (attempted or otherwise) occurs prior to the murder.209
The courts have determined that kidnapping cannot occur after a vic-
tim is dead.210
Kidnapping is defined in the Texas Penal Code as “intentionally or
knowingly abduct[ing] another person.”211  The definition of a “per-
son” is an “individual.”212  Murder is “intentionally or knowingly
caus[ing] the death of an individual.”213  And an individual is defined
as “a human being who is alive.”214  So once a victim is dead, kidnap-
ping is no longer possible.  Additionally, any moving of a dead body
could not possibly be kidnapping.215  Therefore kidnapping could not
be assumed to establish the proper nexus to make the murder rise to a
capital felony unless the kidnapping occurred, or was attempted,
while the individual was alive.216
206. Id. (citing Riles v. State, 595 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
207. Id.; Riles, 595 S.W.2d at 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
208. Kidnapping is the intentional or knowing abduction of another person.  TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
209. Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
210. The majority in Herrin, answering the dissent who pointed to acts of the defen-
dant that indicated intent to kidnap, found evidence of the defendant’s intent to
kill the victim prior to the shooting and no evidence of the defendant’s intent to
kidnap the victim. Id. at 440 n.8.  The court cited Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d
155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) to illustrate how moving the body after the shooting
showed the defendant’s intent to kidnap the victim. Id.  The defendant’s own
statements in that case showed his intent to abduct the victim by saying he
thought the victim might still be alive when he moved her, that he “wanted to get
away and be with her and spend some time together,” that after the shooting he
laid with the victim and held her “like [they] used to” and that he “wanted to
show her how much [he] really loved her.” Id. at 163–64.
211. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.03.
212. Id. § 1.07(38).
213. Id. § 19.02(b)(1).
214. Id. § 1.07(26) (emphasis added).
215. Herrin, 125 S.W.3d at 440; see Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 72 n.16 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (plurality opinion) (“We accept for purposes of analysis that a
dead body cannot be kidnapped.”).
216. In White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), the court noted that
theft from a corpse does not rise to robbery thereby creating the nexus between
the theft and the previous murder. Id. at 815.  If murder is sufficiently proven “in
the course of” committing robbery where the State proves that the robbery oc-
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There are those that believe including kidnapping in the list of un-
derlying crimes used as an aggravating circumstance to increase a
murder to a capital felony may be over-broad in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.217  The Texas Penal Code defines “abduct” as to “re-
strain a person with intent to prevent liberation by: secreting or hold-
ing the victim in a place where he is not likely to be found; or [by]
using or threatening to use deadly force.”218  Restraint can be shown
with slight movement or temporary confinement.219  Virtually every
murder involves some restraint of the victim’s movements.  An argu-
ment can be made that using kidnapping as an aggravating circum-
stance hardly narrows the class of murderers who are eligible for
capital punishment as contemplated by Jurek.220
4. Burglary
Burglary221 as the underlying crime to aggravate murder to capi-
tal murder presents an interesting scenario.  If one shoots the owner
of a house as the owner answers the door and the actor enters the
house and commits theft, does the theft provide such a bright line rule
for the assumption of intent and the establishment of a nexus as is set
out in the robbery-murder situation of Cooper?222  The TCCA has con-
curred immediately after the murder, then how does the mere fact of moving a
body, immediately following a murder, not give rise to the assumption by infer-
ence, as set out in Cooper, that the defendant committed the murder while in the
act of committing kidnapping? See Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002); McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
(finding the intent to commit the robbery can be inferred by acts and conduct of
the defendant).  Is the claim that the accused was merely moving a dead body not
an alternative motive the jury could rationally disregard, drawing the inference
that if it was not the defendant’s intent to abduct the victim, he would have let
the victim live? See Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 224.
217. See Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 489 (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting).
218. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.01(2).
219. Hines v. State, 75 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
220. See Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 484 (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting).
221. Burglary, under the Texas Penal Code, occurs when:
[W]ithout the effective consent of the owner, a person (1) enters a habita-
tion, or building . . . not then open to the public, with intent to commit a
felony, theft, or an assault; or (2) remains concealed, with [the same in-
tent], in a building or habitation; or (3) enters a building or habitation
and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or an assault.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §30.02(a).
222. The TCCA might well extend the Cooper rule to burglary-murder because of its
property crime nature.  But, could not the actor have the intent to just commit
murder with no present intent to burglarize the victim’s home and once the vic-
tim is dead sees the unprotected belongings and takes advantage?  Is this a capi-
tal murder?  The theft statute does not speak of unlawfully appropriating
property with intent to deprive the property from an “individual” but from an
“owner.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a).  The assets of a person upon his
death are vested in his heirs, either his devisees, legatees, or donees if the person
dies testate or if intestate to his heirs at law. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (West
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sistently held otherwise, allowing the murder itself to constitute the
nexus between the murder and the burglary, most notably in Homan
v. State.223
The rule in Cooper, as to robbery-murder, is that a theft following
the murder shows intent to commit robbery.224  In Homan the court
required nothing after the murder to show intent other than the mur-
der itself, letting the murder serve double duty by creating a nexus
with the underlying crime.225  Judge Johnson in her dissent in Homan
opined, “As the majority acknowledges, this appears to be a case of
‘bootstrapping’ to get a charge of capital murder.”226  She chastised
the majority for relying “upon case law which ha[d] no basis in logic”
and for “misinterpret[ing] earlier precedent.”227
2003 & Supp. 2010).  Therefore, one can no more steal from the dead than one can
sexually assault the dead or kidnap the dead.  So committing an act of theft from
a dead person is stealing from that person’s heirs and provides no nexus between
the murder and the alleged underlying crime and shows nothing about the intent
of the actor as to robbery prior to committing, while committing, or in immediate
flight from committing (or attempting to commit) robbery.  What inference can be
drawn from a killing at a person’s front door, or in their bedroom, toward the
actor’s intent to burglarize the victim’s home?  The TCCA appears to have created
a special rule for burglary.  The more special rules are created the less likely an
ordinary person is put on notice as to what activity is proscribed.
223. 19 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“This Court has upheld capital mur-
der convictions, concluding that the evidence sufficiently established the underly-
ing felony of burglary by murder of the victim following the unlawful entry into
the habitation.”).  As an aside, just as in the murder-burglary scenario, in a bur-
glary with the intent to commit a felony situation, the felony requirement is also
“satisfied by the actual murder of the victim.”  Matamoros v. State. 901 S.W.2d
470, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); See Brown v. State, 92 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex.
App. 2002) (citing Homan, 19 S.W.3d at 849), aff’d, 122 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003) (noting that the court of appeals found Brown’s argument—that the
evidence was legally insufficient when the State uses the murder to support the
burglary and the “charged murder”—lacked merit citing the court of criminal ap-
peals prior rejection of this argument in Homan).
224. Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
225. Homan, 19 S.W.3d at 849.
226. Id. at 850 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 851.  It is almost as if Homan adopts a rule that to meet the underlying
felony requirement of burglary-capital murder, all that needs to be shown is the
inference the victim (the owner or another) was intentionally murdered in a
habitation or a building not open to the public.  Or said another way, the underly-
ing burglary with the intent to commit a felony (murder) is elevated to burglary-
capital murder by the one single act of intentionally causing the death of an indi-
vidual within a habitation or building.  Of course there have to be some facts to
sustain the additional inference that the entry was without the owner’s consent,
but the courts seldom fail to affirm the apparent inferences of the fact finder.
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5. Arson
As to arson,228 the mens rea is satisfied when both the intent to
murder and the intent to commit arson are shown under the facts of
the case.229  The “intent may . . . be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence such as acts, words, and the conduct of the [defendant].”230  In
an arson case, intent cannot be inferred from the mere act of burn-
ing,231 unlike in the robbery-murder case where intent can be inferred
by the mere act of a theft following the murder232 or in a burglary-
murder case where the intent to commit burglary is inferred by the
murder itself.233
228. The Texas Penal Code defines arson as follows:
A person commits an [arson] if the person starts a fire, regardless of
whether the fire continues after ignition, or causes an explosion with
intent to destroy or damage: (1) any vegetation, fence, or structure on
open-space land; or (2) any building, habitation, or vehicle: (A) knowing
that it is within the limits of an incorporated city or town; (B) knowing
that it is insured against damage or destruction; (C) knowing that it is
subject to a mortgage or other security interest; (D) knowing that it is
located on property belonging to another; (E) knowing that it has located
within it property belonging to another; or (F) when the person is reck-
less about whether the burning or explosion will endanger the life of
some individual or the safety of the property of another.  (a-1) A person
commits an [arson] if the person recklessly starts a fire or causes an
explosion while manufacturing or attempting to manufacture a con-
trolled substance and the fire or explosion damages any building, habita-
tion, or vehicle.  (a-2) A person commits an [arson] if the person
intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion and in so doing: (1)
recklessly damages or destroys a building belonging to another; or (2)
recklessly causes another person to suffer bodily injury or death.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a).  Offenses under this section range from state
jail to first degree felony. Id. § 28.02(d)–(f).
229. Hogue v. State, 711 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
230. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Patrick v.
State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
231. Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (citing Miller v.
State, 566 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).
232. See supra subsection VIII.A.1.
233. See supra subsection VIII.A.4.  Perhaps it is because a capital felony involving
arson is more rare, the cases tend to follow what this writer believes is a more
logical interpretation of the intent of the statute.  In an arson-murder case, as
there is no assumption of intent on the underlying crime, there is no necessity on
the part of the courts to use the murder as the nexus to the underlying crime.
This could be because usually the victim remains in the burned structure and the
facts and circumstances leading up to the arson often show an independent intent
to commit the arson (i.e., the presence of accelerants or their containers, financial
hardships, or recent insurance acquisitions for example).  The courts would do
better by using the arson line of cases to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt
both as to the defendant’s intent on the murder and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as to the proper mens rea on the underlying aggravating crime and to stop
bootstrapping the facts of cases to justify a capital conviction, especially in the
robbery-murder and burglary-murder scenarios that have been discussed above.
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6. Obstruction or Retaliation
The underlying crime of obstruction or retaliation234 can occur
with no violence being committed.  In these circumstances, where no
injury results, only “harm,”235 or even just a mere threat of harm, a
murder committed in the course of committing or attempting to com-
mit such an obstruction or retaliation becomes a capital felony.236
Even in those cases where the harm is more than a mere “loss or dis-
advantage,” but rather an actual injury including harm to another in
“whose welfare the person affected is interested,” the statute does not
speak of bodily injury, serious or otherwise.  The statute references
only “injury” implying a violation of a legal right, a wrong or injustice
or an actionable invasion of a legally protected interest.237  There are
only a few cases involving the obstruction and retaliation portion of
the capital murder statute and no clear overriding problem with the
statute has developed.238
234. Obstruction or retaliation is defined in the Texas Penal Code as:
A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly harms or
threatens to harm another by an unlawful act: (1) in retaliation for or on
account of the service or status of another as a:  (A) public servant, wit-
ness, prospective witness, or informant; or  (B) person who has reported
or who the actor knows intends to report the occurrence of a crime; or (2)
to prevent or delay the service of another as a: (A) public servant, wit-
ness, prospective witness, or informant; or (B) person who has reported
or who the actor knows intends to report the occurrence of a crime.”
Tex. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
235. Harm is defined in the Texas Penal Code as: “anything, reasonably regarded as
loss, disadvantage, or injury, including harm to another person in whose welfare
the person affected is interested.” Id. § 1.07(25).
236. “And if you don’t get away from me, Mr. Police Officer, I’m going to kill you too
because I’m mad at the world.”  If this statement is made to the police just follow-
ing an actor committing murder, or in the commission of a murder, is this what
the statute contemplates?  This statement is obviously made to the policeman on
account of his service or status as a public servant (retaliation) and to delay or
prevent him performing his duty as a public servant (obstruction) and threatens
harm by committing an unlawful act.
237. Injury is defined as
(1) The violation of another’s legal right, for which the law provides a
remedy; a wrong or injustice. (2) . . . Anything said or done in breach of a
duty not to do it, if harm results to another in person, character, or prop-
erty.  Injuries are divided into real injuries (such as wounding) and ver-
bal injuries (such as slander). They may be criminal wrongs (as with
assault) or civil wrongs (as with defamation).  (3) Any harm or damage.
Some authorities distinguish harm from injury, holding that while harm
denotes any personal loss or detriment, injury involves an actionable in-
vasion of a legally protected interest.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 7 cmt. a (1965).
238. See Russell v. State, 155 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  The defendant in
Russell was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for causing the
death of Tanjala Brewer while committing or attempting to commit the offense of
retaliation. Id. at 177.  The victim and the defendant had previously been in-
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In an obstruction case, the State must prove the defendant “inten-
tionally or knowingly harm[ed] or threaten[ed] to harm another by an
unlawful act” (i.e., murder in this context) and obstructed, “pre-
vent[ed] or delay[ed]” (1) a public servant, witness, prospective wit-
ness, or informant from their service or (2) a person who has or the
defendant knows intends to report a crime.239  “Nothing . . . requires
an intent to prevent the reporting of a specific crime,” and although
the defendant’s reasons for obstructing are relevant to show his mo-
tive, they are not an element of the offense.240  Motive though “may be
a circumstance indicative of [the defendant’s] guilt,”241 and such cir-
cumstantial evidence can be legally sufficient to affirm a capital mur-
der conviction.242
In a retaliation case, the State must prove the defendant intention-
ally or knowingly harmed or threatened to harm another by an unlaw-
ful act (i.e., murder in this context) in retaliation for a person being or
serving as (1) a public servant, witness, prospective witness or inform-
ant or (2) a person who has reported, or the defendant knows intends
volved romantically and the victim, as a police informant introduced the defen-
dant to an undercover narcotics officer which led to the defendant’s arrest. Id. at
177–78.  In the defendant’s taped statement he said he had broken off his rela-
tionship with the victim because she had set him up. Id. at 178.  The defendant
admitted killing the victim. Id.  All of the points of error raised on appeal were
evidentiary and procedural complaints having nothing to do with the construc-
tion of that portion of the capital murder statute under which he was prosecuted.
Id.  In Ward v. State, No. AP-75750, 2010 WL 454980 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 10,
2010), the defendant was convicted of intentionally murdering a city code enforce-
ment officer, who was at the defendant’s home in a city truck wearing a city uni-
form, following up on a code violation. Id. at *1.  The defendant’s arguments on
appeal again had to do with matters unrelated to the effect or application of the
statute. See id. at *2.  In Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009), the defendant “was convicted of capital murder [and sentenced to death]
for shooting his wife . . . in the course of committing or attempting to commit
burglary or retaliation.” Id. at 281.  The court only addressed the issue of suffi-
ciency of the underlying burglary and only mentioned the retaliation in passing.
Id.  The victim had filed for divorce from the defendant and he had apparently
confronted her on the issue of whether she was going to go through with the di-
vorce. See id. at 283.  The court stated that “[t]he evidence need be sufficient to
prove only one of [the] two [underlying charged] felonies, not both.” Id. at 286–87
(citing Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
239. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a)(2).
240. Hall v. State, No. AP-75121, 2007 WL 1847314, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 27,
2007) (holding that trial court did not err in finding defendant guilty of capital
murder and sentencing him to death).
241. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Clayton v.
State, 169 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App. 2005)).
242. See King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Evans v.
State, No. 05-08-01289-CR, 2010 WL 779327 (Tex. App. March 9, 2010) (af-
firming defendant’s  conviction of capital murder while in the course of commit-
ting and attempting to commit obstruction and retaliation as the victim was a
potential witness against the defendant in a drug case in another state).
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to report, a crime.243  Should one be charged with committing or at-
tempting to commit another named offense and retaliation in the al-
ternative, the evidence is sufficient if it proves only one of the two
charged felonies.244
7. Terroristic Threat
A person who intentionally commits a murder in the course of com-
mitting or attempting to commit certain specific forms of terroristic
threat245 commits a capital felony.246  If a person threatens violence
243. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a)(1).  As to these underlying crimes, are the
courts and fact finders to also assume the requisite intent to commit obstruction
or retaliation by the subsequent “harm or threat,” which raises a committed mur-
der to the level of a capital felony, even without any injury?  Does the inferential
assumption of intent doctrine establish a nexus between the murder and any af-
ter-the-fact behavior by the defendant reasonably tied to the murder as showing
the murder occurred in the course of committing or attempting to commit the
underlying crimes of obstruction or retaliation?  How does the subsequent com-
mission of those crimes after a murder is completed ever establish a nexus suffi-
cient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a capital murder?  Does a husband that
takes a telephone away from his wife as she calls 911 and subsequently murders
her commit a capital murder?  What if after the murder he “obstructs” the inves-
tigation by some act?  Is “harm,” no matter how insignificant the underlying
crime, now enough to increase a murder to capital murder?  Who in the commu-
nity knows this is the law?  Under the tests of Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108 (1972), it can be argued that the application of the obstruction and retaliation
statute as an aggravating circumstance is so vague as to violate due process as it
fails to “give [a] person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly” and that it provides no “ex-
plicit standards for those who would apply” the statute to prevent “arbitrary and
discriminatory” enforcement even for the most minor of underlying crimes. Id.
244. Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[T]he evidence in
a capital murder prosecution need be sufficient to establish only one of the under-
lying felonies alleged in the indictment.” (citing Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 557
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999))); Matamoros v. State, 901 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995).  However, in Robinson v. State, 266 S.W.3d 8 (Tex. App. 2008),  the
Jury charge presented two alternate grounds, under either of which the jury
could find defendant guilty of capital murder. Id. at 13.  The first ground was
“capital murder as alleged in indictment and described in capital murder statute”
(remuneration). Id. at 15.  The second ground was legally defective as it did “not
constitute capital murder under the statute” (conspiracy felony murder). Id.  As
it is impossible to tell which ground for conviction the jury selected, under Al-
manza the defendant was “egregiously harmed by the error in the jury charge.”
Id.  Judgment was reversed, and case remanded for a new trial. Id.
245. This portion of section 19.03 became law effective Sept. 1, 2003. See H.B. 11,
78th Leg., § 1 (Tex. 2003) (creating another new classification (or many new clas-
sifications) of crime eligible for capital punishment). TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(2).
246. Terroristic threat, as it applies to a capital felony, is defined in TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.07(a)(1),(3),(4),(5),(6).  The reader is reminded that under subpara-
graph (a)(1) of section 22.07, the offense is a Class B misdemeanor, under subpar-
agraph (a)(3) it is a Class A misdemeanor (unless the actor causes pecuniary loss
of $1,500 or more to the owner of the building, room, place, or conveyance, in
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 41 30-AUG-11 12:43
280 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:240
(1) to a person or property to cause a reaction “of any type” by one who
deals with emergencies, (2) to prevent or interrupt the use of a build-
ing, aircraft, automobile, or public place, (3) to affect public communi-
cations, transportation, or utilities, (4) to place the public or a
“substantial” group in fear of serious bodily injury, or (5) to affect the
government at any level, one commits a terroristic threat.247  Based
on the details of the statute this terroristic threat can be a Class B or
Class A misdemeanor or a felony of the third degree.248  No cases
could be found which interpret terroristic threat as the underlying
crime to this portion of section 19.03(a)(2).249
IX. SECTION 19.03(A)(3) PENAL CODE: MURDER
FOR REMUNERATION
A person commits an offense if the person commits murder as de-
fined under section 19.02(b)(1)250 and the person commits the murder
for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employs another
to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remunera-
tion.  One should note that there is no specific mens rea for the under-
lying aggravating circumstances of (1) remuneration, (2) the promise
of remuneration, (3) employing another for remuneration, or (4) em-
ploying another for the promise of remuneration all used to raise a
related murder to a capital felony.
The murder for hire scenario was defined early on in terms of pecu-
niary gain.251  It mattered not whether the gain was for the person
which event the offense is a state jail felony), and under subparagraphs (a)(4),
(a)(5), or (a)(6) it is a felony of the third degree. Id.  It is interesting to note that
while committing or attempting to commit a Class B or Class A misdemeanor one
may commit a capital felony under the current scheme.  Is this something people
of ordinary intelligence would know?
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. The constitutionality of a capital murder based upon such a vague underlying
crime as terroristic threat which includes misdemeanors makes prosecution un-
likely.  Capital murder schemes have consistently been found constitutional
when they “provide[ ] an effective mechanism for categorically narrowing the
class of offenses for which the death penalty could be imposed.”  Pulley v. Harris,
465 U.S. 37, 55 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 198 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276 (1976)).
250. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (defining murder as “intentionally or know-
ingly caus[ing] the death of an individual”).
251. Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711, 733–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1167 (8th ed. 2004) defines pecuniary as “of or relating to money.”
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performing the murder or one benefitting from the murder,252 but
there were limits.253
There are no definitions in the penal code for “remuneration” or
“the promise of remuneration.”  Those terms encompass “a broad
range of situations, including compensation for loss or suffering and
the idea of a reward given or received because of some act.”254  The
TCCA, in defining remuneration, stated “remuneration does not re-
quire the narrow construction requiring payment by a principal to an
agent.”255
To show the murder was performed for the reason of pecuniary
gain, the state must prove the “defendant’s intent or state of mind as
related to an expectation of remuneration.”256  Intent or state of mind
is often shown by circumstantial evidence looking at the defendant’s
actions as reliable proof of his intent.257  Remuneration is not limited
to pecuniary gain, but “is the receipt of some benefit or compensation
to be received” because of a murder.258  The question, for purposes of
252. See, e.g., Beets, 767 S.W.2d at 733–37; McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505, 510–13
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (receiving an inheritance); Duff-Smith v. State, 685
S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (noting the murder was for the proceeds of the
defendant’s mother’s estate; defendant convicted and sentenced to death under
the theory of remuneration, or murder for financial gain); O’Bryan v. State, 591
S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (recovering insurance money).
253. For example, in Rice v. State, 805 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), the
defendant was convicted of capital murder for remuneration.  The court reversed,
holding the killing of a person to “insure [sic] the continuation of [one’s] share of
. . . money from [a] gang’s illegal activities and . . . [to enhance one’s] status in the
gang,” was “insufficient to satisfy the remuneration element” of the capital mur-
der statute. Id.
254. Beets, 767 S.W.2d at 734.  The court stated that when establishing the actor’s
intent or state of mind for purposes of remuneration, the appropriate inquiry is:
“[d]id the actor kill in the expectation of receiving some benefit or compensation,
e.g., life insurance proceeds, pension benefits?” Id. at 735.
255. Rice, 805 S.W.2d at 434.
256. Id. at 434.
257. Parrish v. State, 950 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. App. 1997) (citing Guidry v. State,
896 S.W.2d 381, 386–87 (Tex. App. 1995)).
258. Underwood v. State, 853 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. App. 1993).  In Underwood, the
defendant offered to kill four people to be named by his former cellmate in ex-
change for the former cellmate’s killing of two investigators working on the mur-
der case against the defendant. Id.  The court held this was sufficient evidence of
remuneration, rejecting the defendant’s contention that remuneration is limited
to pecuniary gain. Id.  However, in Urbano v. State, 837 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997), the court found that the defendant killed a fellow inmate in prison on
behalf of a prison gang and that the defendant’s rank within the gang was in-
creased because of the murder. Id.  But, because there was no direct evidence
that at the time of the killing the defendant was aware of the benefit he might
receive for the killing, or that he acted with that benefit in mind, the defendant
was not guilty of capital murder. Id. at 116–17.
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this section is, “Did the actor kill in the expectation of receiving some
benefit or compensation . . . ?”259
Often, murder for remuneration is thought of as “murder for hire”
that involves three persons: “a principal, agent and victim.”260  How-
ever, this type of capital murder does not require a “minimum” of
three persons and is not limited to a murder for hire scenario where
an agent is paid by a principal to murder a victim.261  Murder for re-
muneration also embraces the killer’s expectation that she will benefit
from the death of the victim when she herself is the actor.262  Some-
times, the actor’s efforts can fall short of commission and be an offense
less than capital.263
X. SECTION 19.03(A)(4) PENAL CODE: MURDER WHILE
ESCAPING OR ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FROM A
PENAL INSTITUTION
When a person commits murder, as defined under section
19.02(b)(1),264 “while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal
institution,” that murder is a capital felony.265  Once again there is no
specific mens rea for the underlying aggravating circumstance of es-
cape or attempted escape.  Case law interpreting this portion of the
capital murder statute is scarce.
The only reported case is that of Ignacio Cuevas who was convicted
of intentionally and knowingly causing the death of a woman while
Cuevas and others were attempting to escape from a penal institu-
tion.266  The TCCA affirmed his conviction after his third trial and
259. Beets, 767 S.W.2d at 735.
260. Id. at 736.
261. The decision in Beets overruled the court’s prior decision in Doty v. State, 585
S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), which required a minimum of three actors to
constitute the capital offense of murder for remuneration. Beets, 767 S.W.2d at
736.
262. See Beets, 767 S.W.2d at 733–34. (finding the indictment, which alleged defen-
dant murdered her husband by shooting him with a firearm and the said murder
was committed for remuneration—namely money from retirement benefits, in-
surance, and the victim’s estate—alleged the aggravating element that elevated
the offense of murder to capital murder).
263. For example, criminal solicitation which is defined as: “a person . . . with intent
that a capital felony . . . be committed, . . . requests, commands, or attempts to
induce another to engage in [capital murder] or make the other [person] a party
to its commission.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.03(a) (West 2003).  Criminal so-
licitation is a first degree felony if the crime solicited is a capital murder. Id.
§ 15.03(d)(1).  There is also a definition within the statute for solicitation of any
first degree felony. Id. § 15.03(d)(2).
264. Id. § 19.02(b)(1) (defining murder as “intentionally or knowingly causing the
death of an individual”).
265. Id. § 19.03(a)(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
266. Cuevas v. State, 742 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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third sentence of death.267  The court did not discuss issues that can
advance the discussion herein of mens rea, statutory construction, or
the constitutionality of the different definitions of a captal felony.
XI. SECTION 19.03(A)(5) PENAL CODE: MURDER WHILE
INCARCERATED IN A PENAL INSTITUTION
A person commits capital murder if, while the person is incarcer-
ated in a penal institution,268 the person commits a murder, as de-
fined under section 19.02(b)(1),269 of another person (1) “who is
employed in the operation of the penal institution;” or (2) “with the
intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination270 or in
the profits of a combination.”271
A. Penal Institution Employee
The murder of a prison employee was one of the first five aggravat-
ing circumstances approved in Jurek as properly narrowing the defini-
tion of capital murder.272  To prove a section 19.03(a)(5) capital
267. Id. at 333.
268. Penal institution is defined in the Texas Penal Code as: “a place designated by
law for confinement of persons arrested for, charged with, or convicted of an of-
fense.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(37).  The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
further defines a penal institution as:
[A] confinement facility operated by or under a contract with any divi-
sion of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, a confinement facility
operated by or under contract with the Texas Youth Commission, or a
juvenile secure pre-adjudication or post-adjudication facility operated by
or under a local juvenile probation department, or a county jail.
TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 61.02(e)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).  The
courts have also stated:  “[A] trial court [may] take judicial notice that the [Texas
Department of Criminal Justice]” or a county jail “is a penal institution.”  Moreno
v. State, No. 01-91-00858-CR, 1992 WL 187375, *2 (Tex. App. Aug. 6, 1992); Legg
v. State, 594 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
269. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2003) (defining murder as “intention-
ally or knowingly causing the death of an individual”).
270. Combination is defined as: “three or more persons who collaborate in carrying on
criminal activities, although (1) participants may not know each other’s identity;
(2) membership in the combination may change from time to time; and (3) partici-
pants may stand in a wholesaler-retailer or other arm’s-length relationship in
illicit distribution operations.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.01(a) (West 2003).
271. Id. § 19.03(a)(5) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (footnote added).  Subparagraph (B) of
section 19.03(a)(5) first became effective during the 73rd Legislature in 1993, cre-
ating another new classification of crimes eligible for capital punishment.
272. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976) (“The new Texas Penal Code limits capi-
tal homicides to intentional and knowing murders committed in five situations:
murder of a peace officer or fireman; murder committed in the course of kidnap-
ing, [sic] burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson; murder committed for remu-
neration; murder committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal
institution; and murder committed by a prison inmate when the victim is a prison
employee.”  (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03)).
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murder, the state has to first prove the defendant intentionally or
knowingly committed murder.273  Additionally, the State must prove
the defendant was incarcerated in a penal institution at the time of
the murder, and that the victim was employed by a penal institu-
tion;274 both of which are factual determinations without mens rea.
There are no cases discussing the construction of this statute.275
1. Combination
Incarcerated individuals who commit murder with the intent to
participate in a combination make up a clear and definite subclass
category of incarcerated murderers.  The courts have held this cate-
gory is not arbitrary, justified by the State’s interest in preventing
prison gang276 violence as it provides a “reasoned, principled basis for
273. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (requiring satisfaction of section 19.02(b)(1)).
274. Id. § 19.03(a)(5)(A).
275. See generally Runnels v. State, No. AP-75318, 2007 WL 2655682 (Tex. Crim. App.
Sept. 12, 2007) (upholding capital murder conviction when defendant killed su-
pervisor in prison boot factory but not discussing construction of capital murder
statute); Hernandez v. State,819 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (upholding
capital murder conviction of defendant when defendant murdered jail employee).
Although the murder of a penal institution employee by an inmate was one of the
original five aggravating factors approved in Jurek the constitutionality of this
specific scheme has not been tested since that time, in light of the continued ex-
pansion of circumstances used to qualify a murder as a capital felony.  Actually
when the component parts of the entire statute are examined the original five
capital murders were at least ten different ways to commit capital murder, to-wit:
(1) murder of a peace officer or (2) fireman; (3) murder committed in the course of
kidnapping, (4) burglary, (5) robbery, (6) forcible rape, or (7) arson; (with attempt
could be five additional ways) (8) murder committed for remuneration (could be
four ways); (9)  murder committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a
penal institution (could be two ways); and (10) murder committed by a prison
inmate when the victim is a prison employee. Arguably, there are nineteen differ-
ent ways to commit capital murder, not counting manner and means within the
statutes.  Under the current statute there are now at least twenty-seven aggra-
vating circumstances or classifications expanding by 270% the original ten com-
ponent part aggravating circumstances, to-wit: murder (1) of a peace officer or (2)
fireman (3) in the course of committing kidnapping, (4) burglary, (5) robbery, (6)
aggravated sexual assault, (7) arson, (8) obstruction or (9) retaliation, or (10) ter-
roristic threat under section 22.07(a)(1), (11) under section 22.07(a)(3), (12) under
section 22.07(a)(4), (13) under section 22.07(a)(5), or (14) under section
22.07(a)(6), (15) for remuneration, (16) while escaping from a penal institution,
(17) while incarcerated of an employee of a penal institution, (18) to establish,
maintain, or participate in a combination or its profits, (19) while incarcerated for
murder, (20) while incarcerated for capital murder, (21) while serving sentence of
life or ninety-nine years for aggravated kidnapping, (22) aggravated sexual as-
sault, or (23) aggravated aobbery, (24) of more than one person (mass murder),
(25) of more than one person (serial murder), (26) of a child under six years of age,
or (27) of a judge of the many courts.  This does not account for attempted crimes
or the many component parts such as in the terroristic threat statute.
276. The Texas Penal Code defines a criminal street gang as: “three or more persons
having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who
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distinguishing offenders eligible for capital punishment” and does not
violate the Eighth Amendment.277  Further, Penal Code section
19.03(a)(5)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague as it “both reasonably
informs citizens of the proscribed conduct and provides adequate
guidelines for enforcement.”278  The underlying aggravating circum-
stance of this section, intending “to establish, maintain, or participate
in a combination279 or in the profits of a combination,”280 is a matter
of specific intent.  Thus, the State need not prove the actual commis-
sion of a series of criminal offenses, but rather that the defendant
committed the murder “with the present intent to commit a continu-
ing series of criminal acts.”281  As a specific intent element of the of-
fense, the intent to “establish, maintain, or participate in a
combination or in the profits of a combination”282 cannot be supplied
through “inadvertent conduct.”283
In this context, the question always arises as to how proof of the
defendant’s membership in a prison gang is admissible.  The Texas
continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities.”
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.01(d). Criminal justice agencies and law enforcement
agencies are required to “compile criminal information into an intelligence
database for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting the criminal activities of
criminal combinations or criminal street gangs.” See TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 61.02 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). “Gangs have been defined based on their
actual or perceived threat to the orderly management of the prison.  Specific gang
membership was based upon identifying signs, symbols, correspondence, prior of-
ficial records, associations, or self admission of inmates.”  Gerald G. Gaes et. al.,
The Influence of Prison Gang Affiliation on Violence and Other Prison Miscon-
duct, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5 (Mar. 9, 2001), http://www.bop.gov/news/
research_projects/published_reports/cond_envir/oreprcrim_2br.pdf. A Security
Threat Group (STG), also known as a prison gang, is any group of inmates in the
prison (Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)) who prison officials rea-
sonably believe poses a threat to the physical safety of other inmates and staff.
TDCJ recognizes twelve Security Threat Groups: Aryan Brotherhood of Texas,
Aryan Circle, Barrio Azteca, Bloods, Crips, Hermanos De Pistoleros Latinos,
Mexican Mafia, Partido Revolucionario Mexicanos, Raza Unida, Texas Chicano
Brotherhood, Texas Mafia, and the Texas Syndicate. Security Threat Groups on
the Inside,TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (August, 2007), http://www.
tdcj.state.tx.us/cid/Pamphlet-Narr%20Form-09-07.pdf; see also Gangs in Texas:
2001, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS (2001), http://www.oag.state.
tx.us/AG_Publications/pdfs/2001gangrept.pdf (describing the nature of gangs and
gang statistics in Texas).
277. Brumfield v. State, 18 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. App. 2000).
278. Campbell v. State, 18 S.W.3d 914, 921 (Tex. App. 2000).
279. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.01(a) (West 2003).  “ ‘Combination’ means three or
more persons who collaborate in carrying on criminal activities, although (1) par-
ticipants may not know each other’s identity; (2) membership in the combination
may change from time to time; and (3) participants may stand in a wholesaler-
retailer or other arm’s-length relationship in illicit distribution operations.”  Id.
280. Id. at § 19.03(a)(5)(B) (footnote added).
281. Campbell, 18 S.W.3d at 921.
282. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(5)(B).
283. Armstrong v. State, 18 S.W.3d 928, 933 (Tex. App. 2000).
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Rules of Evidence provide that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by Constitution, by statute, by these
rules, or by other rules.”284  The Rules of Evidence define “relevant
evidence” as: “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”285
Gang membership evidence may be admissible to show bias,286
motive, intent, or to refute a defensive theory.287  Although generally
gang membership evidence is relevant, and therefore admissible, if it
shows a non-character purpose that tends to show commission of the
crime,288 in a prosecution under section 19.03(a)(5)(B), the “same
284. TEX. R. EVID. 402 (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 401.  Although admissible as relevant, any evidence can nevertheless be
“excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id. at 403.  In
this context, proof of the gang membership is required to prove the crime, there-
fore it is difficult to imagine a court finding such evidence to be unfairly prejudi-
cial, as confusing the issues or misleading the jury.  One cannot imagine how
such evidence would present delay problems for the court but it could present
needless cumulative evidence if such evidence was already provided by other
sources. See Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (author-
izing in Rule 403 exclusion of admissible relevant evidence only when there is a
“clear disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its
probative value”); see, e.g., Joiner v. State, 825 S.W.2d 701, 708 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled
by Bingham v. State, 915 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Green v. State, 840
S.W.2d 394, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), abrogated by Trevino v. State, 991
S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
286. The Texas Rules of Evidence say nothing specifically about bias but does state
that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . may . . . be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b).
The circumstances surrounding a witness’s bias or interest could always be of-
fered as to their credibility and reasons for testifying in general under Rule 613,
in a sexual assault case under Rule 412, or if appropriate, as to prior compromise
efforts as per Rule 408. TEX. R. EVID. 408, 412, 613. In a prison gang capital
murder case, one could imagine a fact pattern for each of these situations.
287. See, e.g., United States v. Sargent, 98 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding evi-
dence of gang membership undermined the coercion defense and explained the
defendant’s illegal behavior); Stern v. State, 922 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Tex. App.
1996) (“The admission of background or ‘context of the offense’ evidence is not a
question for appellate courts unless the evidence appears to have been admitted
by a trial court in order to subvert rule 404(b) by letting inadmissible evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts prove the accused’s character under the guise of
‘background’ or ‘context.’”  (citing Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991))).
288. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 239–40 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (upholding trial court’s “finding that . . . potential character conformity
inference [by admission of the defendant’s membership in a prison gang did] not
substantially outweigh the relevant purpose of showing motive for the robbery
and murder,” and thus survived the defendant’s Rule 403 challenge).
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transaction contextual evidence” rule makes proof of prison gang affil-
iation admissible character evidence under the crimes, wrongs, or
other acts exception but only when the proof of the charged offense
makes little or no sense without it.289  If there is no other reason for
the defendant to have acted as he did in committing the murder, the
defendant’s gang affiliation evidence is admissible during the guilt-
innocence stage of a trial.290
XII. SECTION 19.03(A)(6) PENAL CODE: MURDER WHILE
SERVING A SENTENCE FOR CERTAIN CRIMES
Under this section, a person commits capital murder if the person
commits murder,291 (A) while the person is incarcerated for a previous
conviction of murder or a capital murder,292 or (B) while serving a
sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99 years for an offense of
aggravated kidnapping,293 aggravated sexual assault,294 or aggra-
vated robbery.295  This version of section 19.03(a)(6) became effective
September 1, 1994.296
289. Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing England v.
State, 887 S.W.2d 902, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
290. Tibbs v. State, 125 S.W.3d 84, 94 (Tex. App. 2003) (Anderson, J., concurring) (not-
ing that evidence the defendant was a member of a prison gang (a security threat
group) was admissible to prove his intent to work in a continuing criminal activ-
ity (citing Brumfield v. State, 18 S.W.3d 921, 925–26 (Tex. App. 2000))).
291. Murder is defined in the Texas Penal Code as “intentionally or knowingly
caus[ing] the death of an individual.”  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West
2003 & Supp. 2010).
292. The Texas Penal Code makes it a capital murder to commit a murder while one is
incarcerated for capital murder or murder. Id. § 19.03(a)(6)(A).
293. Id. § 20.04 (aggravated kidnapping).
294. Id. § 22.021 (aggravated sexual assault).
295. Id. § 29.03  (aggravated robbery).
296. In 1993, the state legislature enacted a version of section 19.03(a)(6) which read
as follows: “(6) the person, while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term
of 99 years for the commission of any offense listed in Section 3g(a)(1), Article
42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, murders another.”  S.B. 818, 73rd Leg., (Tex.
1993) (emphasis added).  The current version of section 19.03(b)(6) reads:
(6) the person: (A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section
[capital murder] or Section 19.02 [murder], murders another; or (B)
while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99 years for an
offense under Section 20.04 [aggravated kidnapping], 22.021 [aggra-
vated sexual assault], or 29.03 [aggravated robbery], murders another.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(6).  Interestingly, this change came out of the
same legislative session in 1993 and was approved the same day as the prior
version, however, did not take effect until one year later on September 1, 1994.
S.B. 1067, 73rd Leg., § 19.06 (Tex. 1994).  A search of the advisory committee
notes and reports showed no reason for the two versions approved the same day
but effective a year apart.  Article 42.12, section 3g(a) of the Texas Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure in effect during the summer of 1993 was the same version as the
changes made in the 72nd Legislature during the summer of 1991.  During the
73rd Legislature the decision was apparently made to add “murder” and “inde-
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In Cannady v. State,297 section 19.03(a)(6) of the Texas Penal Code
was challenged for constitutionality.  Contained therein is a discus-
sion of constitutional challenges applicable to any aggravating circum-
stances which qualify a murder as a capital felony.  There are two
requirements under the Eighth Amendment for any aggravating cir-
cumstance, as an element of a capital offense, to pass constitutional
muster.
First, the circumstance must apply to a subclass of those convicted
of murder, not to everyone convicted of murder.298  If everyone that is
convicted of murder qualifies under a statute for capital punishment,
this violates the mandate of Jurek that a constitutional capital scheme
cency with a child” to the list of offenses in section 3g(a) [being the list of offenses
limiting a court’s ability to grant probation without a jury determination].  In the
first draft, effective for only one year, from Sept. 1, 1993 to Sept. 1, 1994, section
19.03(a)(6) added four new ways to commit capital murder.  For that year, a per-
son committed a capital murder who committed murder while serving a sentence
of life or ninety-nine years for the following crimes: capital murder, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated robbery.  Prior to that
time, there was no reference in section 19.03(a) to murdering another while in-
carcerated other than the murder of a penal institution employee which is today
labeled as (a)(5)(A) and then was (a)(5).  By changing the language of section
19.03(a)(6), and removing the reference to section 3g(a)(1), the Legislature set up
another new classification of capital murder under section 19.03(a)(6), now ex-
panding the categories of those eligible for the death penalty by adding murder to
section (A) of section 19.03(a)(6).  Prior to the second version of section 19.03(a)(6)
a person who committed murder, while serving a sentence for murder, was not
eligible for capital punishment because murder was not a designated crime under
section 3g(a)(1).  The new and current version of section 19.03(a)(6) means that if
an actor is serving a sentence of any length for an offense of murder, not just a life
sentence or a ninety-nine year term, and that person commits another murder it
is a capital felony.  The Legislature effectively created a “two-strike and you’re
out” rule.  But this time, the “out” can be a permanent removal from the game not
just being benched. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (setting the punish-
ment for a third, non-state jail, felony at life or a term of imprisonment with a
minimum of twenty-five years and a maximum of ninety-nine years for the “three
strike rule”).  Further, the changes to section  19.03(a)(6), added two additional
aggravating circumstances to the list of persons eligible for a capital felony, those
being section 19.03(a)(5)(B) (an incarcerated person murdering another with the
intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a
combination) and section 19.03(a)(8) (the murder of an individual under six years
of age).  Effectively, in one year, the legislature created seven new ways to com-
mit capital murder.
297. 11 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  The defendant in Cannady, while serving
two life sentences for two previous murders, killed a fellow inmate and was con-
victed under section 19.03(a)(6). Id. at 207.  The TCCA held that the use of a
prior offense where accused is serving a life sentence that occurred before the
effective date of the amendments creating (a)(6) “did not violate the ex post facto
laws.” Id. at 208.
298. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d
544, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
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must “narrow[ ]the categories of murders for which a death sentence
may ever be imposed.”299
“[S]econd, the aggravating circumstance must not be unconstitu-
tionally vague.”300  The test to determine if a statute is so vague as to
violate due process is whether it (1) “give[s][a] person of ordinary in-
telligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that
he may act accordingly” as vague laws do not give fair warning; and
(2) “provide[s] explicit standards for those who apply [it]” to prevent
“arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”301
Also, to survive an equal protection challenge, a statutory classifi-
cation created by an aggravating circumstance must not interfere with
a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class and must
be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.302  Capital
murder defendants do not constitute a suspect class.303  The life of one
convicted of capital murder is “no longer held sacrosanct” and his “life”
may no longer have the status of a fundamental right.304  Therefore,
the courts use the rational basis test and the challenged statute need
only be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”305
Further, maintaining a “safe, orderly, and effective[ly] functioning
prison” is a legitimate and compelling state interest.306  So creating a
subclass of murderers within the category of those convicted of enu-
merated aggravated crimes serving a life sentence or a term of ninety-
nine years and thereby exposing that subclass to capital punishment
is a rational action toward maintaining safe and orderly prisons.307
299. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976).
300. Cannady, 11 S.W.3d at 214 (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971–72, (1994)); Hender-
son, 962 S.W.2d at 563 (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971–72).
301. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). Grayned dealt with a city’s
anti-noise ordinance which had First Amendment questions. Id. at 105–06.  In
addition to these two requirements as to vagueness, the Court discussed the im-
pact of a vague statute that might operate to inhibit the exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms. Id. at 109.
302. Cannady, 11 S.W.3d at 215 (citing Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 560).
303. Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 560.
304. Id. at 556.
305. Id. (citing Kadrmas v. Dickenson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988)).
306. Ex parte Hernandez, 953 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  The safety of
prisons and the requisite public policy concerns are themes which often justify
state action toward affected groups. See e.g., Basden v. State, 897 S.W.2d 319,
321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that the courts, in interpreting the statute in
question, may consider its purpose of deterring incarcerated inmates from as-
saultive offenses for the safety of the guards, inmates, and everyone in the
prison); Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding
that a prison may monitor phone calls using a pen register to ensure the safety of
staff, administrative personnel, visitors, and the inmates).
307. Cannady, 11 S.W.3d at 215.  Although Cannady dealt with a defendant convicted
of a capital murder defined as a murder committed by a person serving a sen-
tence of life imprisonment or a term of ninety-nine years for an offense of aggra-
vated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, or aggravated robbery, id. at 207,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 51 30-AUG-11 12:43
290 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:240
Using the maximum sentences used throughout the Penal Code to
draw a line at ninety-nine years or life to create a sub-class of murder-
ers from those convicted of enumerated aggravated crimes provides
consistency and clarity.308  The Legislature may draw whatever line it
chooses between punishments, and “using the maximum sentences al-
lowed seems to be as good a place as any to draw that line” when it
comes to creating the aggravating circumstance set out in section
19.03(a)(6).309
The status of the defendant as an “inmate serving a particular sen-
tence (life or ninety-nine years) is an element of the crime of capital
murder.”310  In fact, the defendant’s status “is the aggravating ele-
ment that [increases a] simple murder (a first-degree felony) to a capi-
tal offense.”311  This does not violate due process or due course of law
protections.312
In Cannady, the court found inmates who commit murder in prison
while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of ninety-nine
years for the commission of a named aggravated offense (1) make up a
subclass of murderers in general and (2) create a “clear and definite
category” of those that are serving sentences for such aggravated of-
fenses.313  Implicit in this ruling was that section 19.03(a)(6) of the
Texas Penal Code was not constitutionally vague, that this statute did
not interfere with a fundamental right or discriminate against a sus-
pect class, and that the statute did rationally relate to a legitimate
governmental purpose.314
the same legitimate and compelling state interest rationale would apparently ap-
ply to those that commit a murder while incarcerated for a previous conviction of
murder or capital murder under Paragraph (A) of section 19.03(a)(6).
308. Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 562–63.  Once again, this same rationale would pre-
sumably apply to the seemingly arbitrary creation of a subclass of murderers
from a category of those incarcerated from a previous conviction of murder or
capital murder under paragraph (A) of section 19.03(a)(6).  It should be noted,
under this paragraph, when one is incarcerated for a previous conviction of mur-
der or capital murder and one commits another murder, the length of the term of
incarceration being served for the previous conviction is not an element of the
crime, or a consideration for the appropriate aggravating circumstance.  For ex-
ample, a person serving a five year sentence for murder commits a capital felony
if he commits another murder while incarcerated on his five year sentence the
same as if he had originally been sentenced to life on the first murder.  The cir-
cumstances of the sentence being served are apparently not an issue.
309. Cannady, 11 S.W.3d at 215–16.
310. Cannady, 11 S.W.3d at 216; see State v. Mason, 980 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998).  This formulation could also be applied to one serving any sentence
for a previous conviction for murder or capital murder.
311. Cannady, 11 S.W.3d at 216.
312. Id. (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
313. Id. at 214.
314. Id. at 214–15.
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XIII. SECTION 19.03(A)(7) PENAL CODE: MURDER OF
MORE THAN ONE PERSON
A person commits capital murder if the person commits murder,315
and “murders more than one person: (A) during the same criminal
transaction; or (B) during different criminal transactions but the
murders are committed pursuant to the same scheme or course of con-
duct.”316  Murder of the second victim, whether in the same criminal
transaction or during different criminal transactions, pursuant to the
same scheme or course of conduct, is the aggravating circumstance
that renders the first murder a capital felony.317
The multiple murders contemplated by this section require those
murders be committed either intentionally or knowingly.318  Further,
capital murder is a result-of-conduct offense,319 and a jury charge
should only define “intentionally” and “knowingly” as they relate to
the result of the defendant’s conduct.320
Section 19.03(a)(7) defines the murder of more than one person as
a capital felony in two completely different ways.  First, if one
murders more than one person “during the same criminal transaction”
one commits capital murder.321  The term “same criminal transaction”
describes multiple acts, “closely connected in time, place and circum-
stances . . . that arise out of a single guilty design.”322  A “criminal
transaction,” in the context of murder, is “an act, process, or instance
315. Murder is defined in the Texas Penal Code as “intentionally or knowingly
caus[ing] the death of an individual.”  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West
2003 & Supp. 2010).
316. Id. § 19.03(a)(7).
317. Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Narvaiz was a “same
criminal transaction” case, but its logic can be applied to multiple murders in
different criminal transactions, pursuant to the same scheme or course of con-
duct. Id. at 432.  The second murder is the aggravating circumstance that makes
the first murder a capital felony. See id.
318. Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633. 636–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
319. Martinez v. State, 763 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
320. See Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 639–40.  In Medina, the defendant complained it was not
his intent to kill, but only to shoot at the house as he drove by. Id. at 636.  The
TCCA affirmed that the defendant was “guilty of murder because he was aware
that firing an automatic weapon into a crowd of people was, by the nature of the
conduct, reasonably certain to result in death,” stating the defendant’s “intent to
kill can be inferred from the manner in which a deadly weapon is employed.” Id.
at 640 (citing Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)); see
also Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“A charge which
defines ‘intentionally’ or ‘knowingly’ as they relate to the nature of the conduct as
well as the result of the conduct is error.”); Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578,
580–81 (Tex. Crim. App.  1986) (“The specific intent to kill may be inferred from
the use of a deadly weapon” if from “the manner of its use it [was] reasonably
apparent that death or serious bodily injury” could result).
321. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(A).
322. Chapman v. State, 838 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. App. 1992).
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of carrying on or carrying out” the multiple murders.323  Additionally,
the term “criminal transaction,” in this context, should be interpreted
expansively, considering the legislature’s intent to ensure public
safety by exposing those that commit multiple murders to the most
severe punishment possible, and the TCCAs’ broad construction con-
cerning other portions of the capital murder statute.324  Put in other
terms, a criminal transaction embraces facts showing “a continuous
and uninterrupted chain of conduct occurring over a very short period
of time . . . in a rapid sequence of unbroken events.”325  When the
transaction ends depends upon when the criminal conduct ceases.326
“If the evidence supports the rational inference that [the] victims were
323. Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
324. Chapman, 838 S.W.2d at 577.
325. See Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 3411 (2010).  In Williams, the court ruled against the defendant where
the defendant offered self-defense for the second murder and alleged a different
motive between the two killings. Id. at 676–77.  But whether two murders oc-
curred during the same criminal transaction does not depend on the defendant’s
motive, and the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
show both murders happened in the same criminal transaction as there was “a
continuous and uninterrupted chain of conduct occurring over a very short period
of time . . . in a rapid sequence of unbroken events.” Id. at 684 (citing Jackson v.
State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).  Similarly, in Jackson v. State,
17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), two victims were found dead in the same
apartment and were killed in the same manner. Id. at 665.  The defendant’s
DNA matched DNA from blood stains on two towels in the victim’s bathroom and
he could not be excluded as a contributor of the blood mixture covering a metal
bar. Id.  The court found the jury could “rationally conclude [the defendant] en-
gaged in a continuous and uninterrupted process, over a short period of time, of
carrying on or carrying out murder of more than one person . . . .” Id. at 669; see
Coble v. State, 871 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  Also, in Coble, the court
found a same criminal transaction where three murders occurred in close proxim-
ity to each other, on same road, and within a few hours, to be an uninterrupted
series of events. Id; see Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 941 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992). Voung involved a defendant with a semi-automatic rifle, who walked
through a pool hall firing short bursts killing one person and wounding three,
who then entered the café and fired point blank at a sixteen year old, shooting a
total of eleven times, hitting someone with seven shots and killing two. Id. at
930–31.  The court found the defendant killed two victims in a continuous and
uninterrupted chain of conduct occurring over a very short period of time. Id. at
941; see Chapman, 838 S.W.2d 574.  In Chapman, two murders were committed
during the same criminal transaction, where the acts occurred within fifteen min-
utes and 150 feet of each other, and it was the defendant’s single design to kill
both victims. Id.
326. Kalish v. State, 662 S.W.2d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (“When one volunta-
rily engages in criminal conduct consisting of a bodily movement, generally it
produces a ‘victim’ and thus becomes a transaction.  That kind of criminal trans-
action terminates with cessation of conduct—ordinarily in a relatively brief pe-
riod of time.”).
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killed in the same criminal transaction,” the appellate courts will not
disturb a jury verdict.327
Second, under section 19.03(a)(7), one commits a capital felony if
one “murders more than one person during different criminal transac-
tions but the murders are committed pursuant to the same scheme or
course of conduct.”328  Unlike the same criminal transaction scenario,
these murders need not occur in a certain time frame, location, or geo-
graphically limited area.329  These murders have an “over-arching ob-
jective or motive” and show “a regular mode or pattern
of . . . behavior.”330  Only one of the murders must occur in Texas for it
to have jurisdiction.331
The two subsections of section 19.03(a)(7) define two mutually ex-
clusive crimes.  By definition, a defendant cannot be convicted of kill-
ing more than one person in the same scheme or course of conduct
unless there is proof of different criminal transactions.332  The term
“same criminal transaction” amounts to something less than “same
scheme or course of conduct.”333  What separates the two is the con-
tinuity of the killing.334  The legislative history of section 19.03(a)(7)
327. Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
328. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
329. Corwin v. State, 870 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (finding that when the
defendant who abducted, sexually assaulted, and killed two women, and then at-
tempted to abduct and killed a third, over the course of nine months and in three
different counties, committed the separate crimes “during the same scheme or
course of conduct”).
330. Id. at 28; see Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), superseded
by statute on other grounds, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 37.071 (West 2006 &
Supp. 2010), as recognized in Coleman v. State, No. AP-75478, 2009 WL 4696064
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2009) (finding that the defendant’s acts of killing a truck
driver during road rage and killing another truck driver approximately forty-five
minutes later occurred pursuant to the same over-arching objective or motive and
pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct); Burkett v. State, 172 S.W.3d
250 (Tex. App. 2005) (finding that, in the course of murdering one woman and
two youths, the common scheme was car thefts, the common course of conduct
was the use of the same weapon to kill all three, and the separate locales and
lapse of several hours between killings was the break in continuity of killings,
and also finding that the evidence conformed to the indictment alleging capital
murder under TEXAS PENAL CODE section 19.03(a)(7)(B)).
331. Bayless v. State, No. 05-99-01978-CR, 2003 WL 21006915, at *2 (Tex. App. May
6, 2003) (finding that section 1.04 read together with section 19.03(a)(7)(B) gave
the defendant fair notice that she could be convicted of a capital felony for mur-
dering more than one person if one murder occurred in Texas and both murders
were pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct).  Further, Texas has
jurisdiction if “a result that is an element of the offense occurs inside this state.”
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.01(a)(1), 19.03(a)(7)(B).
332. See Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
333. Id.
334. Id.; see also Coble v. State, 871 S.W.2d 192, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“[T]he
difference between sections 19.03(a)(6)(A) and 19.03(a)(6)(B) is the degree of ‘the
continuity of the killing.’”).
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reveals that the “same criminal transaction” language was intended
for mass murders and “same scheme or course of conduct” language
was intended for serial murders.335  However, “the [l]egislature did
not intend that every different-transaction multiple killing” should be
a capital felony.336
Under section 19.03(a)(7), when it comes to the charging instru-
ment, the offense may be indicted under both theories in the alterna-
tive,337 and if the jury gives a general verdict of guilty, the appellate
court will most likely affirm the conviction if the evidence was suffi-
cient to support either theory.338  But an appellate court will not af-
firm a conviction if the fact-finder finds the accused committed capital
murder in both alleged ways.339  Moreover, if an indictment fails to
specifically allege whether the murders were during the “same crimi-
nal transaction” or during the “same scheme or course of conduct,” the
indictment is not insufficient and the trial, judgment, or other pro-
ceedings are also not affected because of a defect of form as long as the
substantial rights of the accused are not prejudiced.340  If a motion to
quash the indictment is overruled, the accused suffers no harm unless
the accused did not receive notice of the prosecution’s theory.341  If the
indictment omits one element of the charged offense, this does not
render an otherwise valid indictment fatally defective.342  The State is
not required to allege the constituent elements of the aggravated mur-
der even in the face of a motion to quash.343
335. Coble, 871 S.W.2d at 199 n.10 (stating that—pursuant to legislative intent—a
mass murderer would be one that “bombs a car killing several people or kills six
people in a row at a bar” and a serial murderer would be one that “kills all sena-
tors over the course of a year for snubbing his legislation”).
336. Corwin v. State, 870 S.W.2d 23, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
337. The alternative theories would be (1) that the defendant committed capital mur-
der if he or she first committed murder and murdered more than one person dur-
ing the same criminal transaction, or (2) that the defendant committed capital
murder if he or she first committed murder and murdered more than one person
during different criminal transactions but the murders were committed pursuant
to the same scheme or course of conduct. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)
(West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
338. See, e.g., Leal v. State, 303 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
339. Rios, 846 S.W.2d at 314.
340. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.19 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); Kellar v. State,
108 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding the indictment notified the
defendant of the nature of the charge even though it was defective for failing to
state whether the deaths were during the same criminal transaction, or during
the same scheme or course of conduct, because the defendant’s substantial rights
were not harmed).
341. Smith v. State, 297 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1689 (2010).
342. Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 270–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
343. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
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In Burkett v. State,344 the indictment was not found to be fatally
defective when it alleged the murders were committed “during the
same scheme and course of conduct” but failed to allege the murders
were committed “during different criminal transactions but pursuant
to the same scheme and course of conduct.”345  However, in Smith v.
State, the indictment wholly failed to set out either subsection and
was therefore defective.346  But after amendment of the indictment
prior to trial to include “in the same criminal transaction,” the defen-
dant had actual notice upon which the State based its allegations and
was not impermissibly charged with an additional or different
offense.”347
A recent capital case of interest is Paredes v. Quarterman,348 in
which the defendant filed a federal habeas petition, made a substan-
tial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and was granted a
certificate of appealability on the issue of whether he was deprived of
his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict regarding which of the
victims he was responsible for killing.349  “Reasonable jurists could de-
bate whether the jury instructions necessarily required a unanimous
verdict as to each murder victim.”350
Section 19.03(a)(7) has been challenged for its constitutionality.351
As discussed above,352 there are two requirements addressed by a con-
stitutional challenge upon any aggravating circumstance that quali-
fies a murder as a capital felony.353  First, the aggravating
circumstance must apply to a sub-class of those convicted of murder—
not to everyone convicted of murder.354  Section 19.03(a)(7) affects
only that very small and specifically identifiable sub-class of persons
344. 172 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App. 2005).
345. Id. at 253 (“[A] written instrument is an indictment or information under the
Constitution if it accuses someone of a crime with enough clarity and specificity
to identify the penal statute under which the State intends to prosecute, even if
the instrument is otherwise defective. . . . [T]he only homicide offense that in-
cludes ‘same scheme or course of conduct’ as an element is section 19.03(a)(7)(B).”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
346. 297 S.W.3d at 267.
347. Id. (listing of a capital murder charge on the face of the indictment “clearly
show[ed] that [the defendant] had actual notice of the capital charge,” particu-
larly when the defense attorney worked for months, prior to trial, in preparation
of a capital murder defense).
348. 574 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1050 (2011).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 293.
351. See, e.g., Corwin v. State, 870 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Vuong v. State,
830 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
352. See supra notes 298–303 and accompanying text.
353. See Cannady v. State,11 S.W.3d 205, 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
354. Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
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guilty of murder.355  Second, the aggravating circumstance must not
be unconstitutionally vague.356
Interestingly, a person to whom a statute clearly applies may not
challenge it for vagueness.357  With this in mind, by understanding
same “criminal transaction” in its narrowest sense to show “a continu-
ous and uninterrupted chain of conduct occurring over a very short
period of time . . . in a rapid sequence of unbroken events,” section
19.03(a)(7)(A) was held not to be unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied.358  Similarly, despite the indefiniteness of the phrase “same
scheme or course of conduct,” section 19.03(a)(7)(B) was held not to be
unconstitutionally vague as applied.359  Finally, the entirety of
19.03(a)(7) was challenged, and held not to be unconstitutionally
vague for failing to specify a culpable mens rea for the second
homicide.360
Section 1.07(a)(38) of the Texas Penal Code361 defines a “person”
as an “individual,” and subparagraph (26) defines an “individual” as “a
human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of
gestation from fertilization until birth.”362  Also, note that the Penal
Code defines murder as “intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the
death of an individual.”363  Consequently, under section 19.03(a)(7), if
one commits murder—intentionally or knowingly causing the death of
an individual—and murders more than one person—defined as an in-
355. Vuong, 830 S.W.2d at 941.  Although Vuong dealt strictly with subsection (A),
which deals with “same criminal transactions,” the same narrowing of those eligi-
ble for the death penalty would apply to subsection (B) because few of those con-
victed of murder also commit other murders either as a mass murderer or as a
serial killer.
356. Cannady, 11 S.W.3d at 214.
357. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755–56 (1974); Briggs v. State, 740 S.W.2d 803, 806
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see also Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) (“[One] who engages in some conduct that
is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others.”).  This would indicate that only those found not guilty—or on
appeal successfully claim they are wrongfully convicted because they did not en-
gage in the proscribed conduct, i.e., capital murder under section 19.03(a)—may
challenge a statute for vagueness.
358. Vuong, 830 S.W.2d at 941.
359. Corwin v. State, 870 S.W.2d 23, 28–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
360. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
361. Subsection (38), which defines “person” as an “individual,” was added in 1979.
See S.B. 952, 66th Leg., § 1 (Tex. 1979), without reference to S.B. 846 , 66th Leg.,
§ 1 (Tex. 1979).
362. The inclusion of unborn children in the definition of an “individual” occurred in
2003. See S.B. 319, 78th Leg., § 2.01 (Tex. 2003) (substituting the phrase “is
alive, including an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until
birth” for the previous “has been born and is alive,” and adding subsection (49),
defining “death” as the failure to be born alive “for an individual who is an un-
born child”).
363. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
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dividual during the same criminal transaction or during different
criminal transactions but pursuant to the same scheme or course of
conduct—it is a capital felony.  Therefore, “a person who intentionally
or knowingly causes the death of a woman and her unborn child, at
any stage of gestation, commits capital murder.”364
In Lawrence v. State, the defendant argued it was a violation of
substantive due process to prosecute him for intentionally or know-
ingly killing an embryo because the embryo was not viable, i.e., it
could not survive outside the womb.365  The TCCA, however, declined
to second-guess the legislature because the legislature is free to pro-
tect the lives of whomever it defines as a human being.366  If a mother
was noticeably pregnant and other facts of the case existed that could
be taken as additional proof of the mother’s pregnancy, such as a crib
or other baby-related items visible where the mother lived, evidence
could be sufficient to show the actor intentionally or knowingly mur-
dered the mother and her unborn child, thereby qualifying these mul-
tiple murders as a capital felony.367
If there is proof of an actor’s intent to kill the same number of indi-
viduals who are actually killed, transferred intent may be used to sup-
port a section 19.03(a)(7) charge of capital murder under either
subsection.368  However, if the defendant did not know that the
mother was pregnant, such as during the early stages of pregnancy,
the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the embryo’s existence will not
support a claim of a separate specific intent to kill the embryo.369
364. Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also infra
Part XIV (discussing these definitions as they relate to section 19.03(a)(8) of the
Texas Penal Code and the murder of a child under six years of age).
365. 240 S.W.3d at 917.  The court noted the defendant focused on viability because
prohibitions on abortion before viability have no “compelling state interest” and
are unconstitutional. But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007)
(holding that states may protect human life not just from viability but “from the
outset of the pregnancy”).
366. Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 917–18; see Carhart, 550 U.S at 157; see also Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (opining that states are free to define human beings
as they see fit).
367. See Eguia v. State, 288 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App. 2008) (describing similar facts).
368. Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“[W]ith intent to
kill both Joe and Bob, the defendant killed Joe and Lou. It may also be used if,
intending to kill both Joe and Bob and being a bad shot, the defendant killed
Mary and Jane.”).
369. Id. (“It is undisputed that appellant did not know that Ms. Ramirez was preg-
nant.  Lacking knowledge of the embryo’s existence, appellant could not form a
separate specific intent to kill the embryo, as is required by statute.”).
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XIV. SECTION 19.03(A)(8) PENAL CODE: MURDER OF A
CHILD UNDER SIX YEARS OF AGE
A person commits capital murder if the person intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of an individual under six years of age.370
This statute has survived Equal Protection and Eighth Amendment
challenges.371
A. Constitutionality
When a statute is attacked for Equal Protection violations, it must
be strictly scrutinized if it interferes with a “fundamental right” or
discriminates against a “suspect class.”372  Otherwise, the statute will
survive the challenge if the “challenged classification [here using six
years of age as the dividing line between murder and capital murder]
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”373
First, capital murder defendants are not a suspect class.374  Next,
life, as the most basic of fundamental rights, loses that status for
those convicted of capital murder.375  Consequently, to survive a con-
stitutional Equal Protection challenge, the State only has to show that
the challenged classification of children under six years of age within
section 19.03(a)(8)—as the aggravating circumstance that raises mur-
der to capital murder—is rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose.376
A state has a “legitimate, and in fact compelling, interest” in pro-
tecting children’s well-being even when another’s constitutionally pro-
tected rights are involved.377  Within the category of “children,” this
legitimate, compelling interest allows the creation of a sub-class of
“young children.”378  The legislature may draw a line between
younger and older children to protect the younger children because of
their “inexperience, lack of social and intellectual development, moral
370. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(8) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).  Sec-
tion 19.03(a)(8) first became law in 1993. See S.B. 13, 73rd Leg., § 1 (Tex. 1993).
In 2011, the legisature amended section 19.03(a)(8) and raised the qualifying age
of the child to ten. See S.B. 377, 82nd Leg., § 1 (Tex. 2011).
371. Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 560–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
372. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457 (1988).
373. Id.  This test is called the “rational basis” test.
374. Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 560; see also Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 813, 834
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (finding the capital murder defendant not a member of a
suspect class).
375. Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 561.
376. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 458; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.”).
377. Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 562.
378. Id.
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innocence, and vulnerability” and to express society’s moral outrage
against the murder of young children.379
In Black v. State,380 the defendant argued that section 19.03(a)(8)
violated Equal Protection because it does not require proof of the
child’s age as an aggravating circumstance, or require proof of the ac-
tor’s knowledge concerning that age.381  The TCCA found that this
statute does require proof that the child’s age is under six, but does not
require proof of the defendant’s specific intent as to the nature of the
circumstances of the crime.382  There is no requirement in section
19.03(a)(8) that the actor know or intend that the victim is a child
under six.383
As discussed above,384 under the Eighth Amendment, for an aggra-
vating circumstance—such as using six years of age for the victim to
delineate between murder and capital murder—to meet a constitu-
tional challenge, the aggravating circumstance must apply to a sub-
class of those convicted of murder—not to everyone convicted of mur-
der—and “the aggravating circumstance must not be unconstitution-
ally vague.”385  In Henderson v. State,386 the TCCA found that section
19.03(a)(8) met both tests because “murderers of children under six is
a subclass of murderers in general, and ‘children under six’ is a clear
and definite category.”387
B. Murder of a Fetus
After the 2003 changes in the Penal Code,388 the legislature chose
to define an “individual” as “a human being who is alive, including an
379. Id.
380. 26 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
381. Id. at 897–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“Again we need no reason other than the
compelling need to protect young children from violence to find a rational basis
for the legislature’s dispensing with a culpable mental state towards the victim
being a young child.  The safety of children provides a sufficient rationale to per-
mit the legislature to hold offenders liable when they intentionally or knowingly
kill and the victim is a young child.”).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 897; see also Ramos v. State, 961 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating
the In re M.A. court “held that the plain language of 19.03(a)(8) suggests that no
knowledge requirement exists, beyond the requirement that the defendant know-
ingly killed the victim, to find a person guilty under this provision.” (citing In re
M.A., 935 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. App. 1996))); McCollister v. State, 933 S.W.2d
170, 172 (Tex. App. 1996) (“We hold that appellant’s knowledge of the victim’s age
is not an element of the offense under Section 19.03(a)(8).”).
384. See supra notes 298–303 and accompanying text (discussing Cannady v. State, 11
S.W.3d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
385. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971–972 (1994).
386. 962 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
387. Id. at 563.
388. See Eguia v. State, 288 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. 2008) (discussing the 2003 changes in
the Penal Code definitions of “individual” and “person” and how those changes
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unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until
birth.”389  This statutory definition has been held to be unambiguous
as to the proscribed conduct.390  By prohibiting the intentional or
knowing killing of any “unborn human, regardless of age,” from fertili-
zation onward, an ordinary person can understand what conduct is
prohibited—that murder includes “victims at all stages of
gestation.”391
The Supreme Court has recognized that states may protect human
life “from the outset of the pregnancy.”392  The legislature may protect
the lives of human beings as it defines them, and a court should not
“second-guess” the democratic process.393  A woman’s liberty interest
in the decision to have an abortion is protected by substantive due
process as the state has no “compelling state interest” in an unviable
embryo.394  But, such substantive due process protection and a state’s
compelling interest in protecting the unborn, even before viability,
have little to do with the occasion when a third party murders the
relate to section 19.03(a)(7) intent to kill an embryo while murdering the mother);
Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (same); supra Part
XIII (examining Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
389. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); see also supra
note 362 (citing specific changes made by the 78th Texas Legislature in 2003).
This change greatly expanded the pool of victims the murder of which qualifies
the offender for capital punishment, and thereby expanded the classifications of
capital eligible crimes and those eligible for prosecution.
390. Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  The defendant in
Lawrence was charged with capital murder and prosecuted under section
19.03(a)(7), wherein he was found guilty of capital murder by committing a multi-
ple murder, i.e., the shooting death of a pregnant woman and her four-to-six week
old embryo. Id. at 914.  The defendant argued that the definition of “individual”
in section 1.07(a)(26) was void for vagueness under State v. Holcombe, 187
S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), and that the statute failed to define the
criminal offense—capital murder by committing a multiple murder in which one
of those killed was unborn—“with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not permit
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 915.  The
defendant brought this complaint about the vagueness of the statute by a motion
to quash the indictment. Id. at 914.  The court ruled that this was not the proper
vehicle with which to attack an element of a crime as unconstitutional. Id. at
916.  The TCCA refused to review the appellate court’s holding that the evidence
was sufficient, finding the statutory definition of an “individual” was not imper-
missibly vague. Id.
391. Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 915–16.
392. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (“[T]he State has legitimate inter-
ests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and
the life of the fetus that may become a child.”  (citing Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)).
393. Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 917–18.
394. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 145 (“Before via-
bility, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abor-
tion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to
elect the procedure.”  (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 846)).
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unborn against the mother’s “will.”395  Judge Johnson voiced her con-
cern that the statute in the future may be unconstitutional “as ap-
plied” in a circumstance where the defendant had no notice of the
mother’s pregnancy and as a result could not have intended the death
of the mother’s unborn child.396
395. See Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 917.
396. Id. at 918–19 (Johnson, J., concurring).  Concurring with the court’s result re-
jecting the “void for vagueness” and “due process” claims, Judge Cochran, in her
concurring opinion, found the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant
knew the victim-mother was pregnant and intended to kill her unborn child. Id.
at 919 (Cochran, J., concurring).  The TCCA refused to review the court of ap-
peal’s holding that the evidence was sufficient and one can only surmise Judge
Cochran disagreed with that decision.  Since the date of Lawrence, Nov. 21, 2007
(a little over thirty months before the preparation of this Article), a search of the
history of Lawrence and the citing references showed Lawrence was cited five
times as authority on these issues—twice by the TCCA itself—and was distin-
guished once.  Three of these cases did not advance the development of the issues
raised in Lawrence, and will now be discussed briefly: First, in Holmes v. State,
No. 01-06-00975-CR, 2008 WL 963021 (Tex. App. Apr. 10, 2008), in a non-death
capital trial, the defendant was convicted of killing his pregnant wife, and there
was evidence he knew she was pregnant. Id. at *6.  The defendant attacked the
definition of “individual” on Establishment Clause grounds, see id. at *7, an argu-
ment addressed and overruled in Flores v. State, 245 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008).  On Eighth Amendment grounds, the defendant claimed the defini-
tion expanded cases eligible for prosecution as a capital murder in an “arbitrary”
and “capricious” manner. Holmes, 2008 WL 963021, at *7–8.  The court cited
Lawrence for the proposition that in a constitutional challenge the court starts
with the “presumption that the legislature has not acted unconstitutionally,” and
it overruled this challenge as being previously rejected in Vuong. Id. (citing Law-
rence, 240 S.W.3d at 915); see Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 941 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992).  Second, in Sanders v. State, No. 01-07-00775-CR, 2009 WL 884741
(Tex. App. Apr. 2, 2009), another non-death capital trial, the defendant was con-
victed of killing a pregnant woman who was carrying his baby. Id. at *1–2.  The
evidence showed the defendant knew she was pregnant but did not want his
other girlfriend to know of the relationship. Id. at *7.  The court found, following
Lawrence, that by shooting the woman in the head at close range, the defendant
would have awareness (knowing) that their unborn child’s death would be rea-
sonably certain to result. Id. at *5–7.  The court rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment that the definition of “individual” violates the Establishment Clause
“because some religions and denominations . . . believe that human life begins at
fertilization . . . [t]here is no basis, other than religious belief, for defining an
unborn child ‘at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth’ as an indi-
vidual who is alive,” following Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and Flo-
res. Id. at *9.  The defendant also made an unsuccessful Eighth Amendment
argument similar to Eguia v. State, see infra notes 408–09 and accompanying
text, which was overruled following Lawrence—although probably more closely
following the same court’s reasoning in Eguia from six months earlier. Sanders,
2009 WL 884741, at *10–11.  Last, the decision in Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d
274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 905 (2011), was issued during
the final stages of preparing this Article.  Although subject to revision or with-
drawal, it is the latest case involving the death of the unborn and the mother.
The defendant in Estrada was convicted of capital murder for murdering a preg-
nant woman and their thirteen-week-old unborn child and was sentenced to
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Less than three months after the ruling in Lawrence, in Flores v.
State the TCCA once again addressed the constitutionality of section
1.07(a)(26) and its definition of an “individual.”397  The defendant
made two constitutional arguments not previously made in this re-
gard.398  Convicted of capital murder in causing the death of two fe-
tuses by stepping on the mother’s abdomen in an effort to cause a
miscarriage, the defendant argued an Equal Protection violation as
women terminating their own pregnancies are exempted from prose-
cution under the Penal Code.399  The defendant’s vehicle for making
death. Id. at 279.  A new punishment hearing was granted on evidentiary con-
cerns unrelated to the constitutionality of the statutes defining the unborn as
“human beings” and “individuals,” thereby making their murder a capital felony.
Id. at 279, 286–88.  The defendant filed a “motion to declare application of the
death penalty to the non-consensual termination of a pregnancy unconstitu-
tional.” Id. at 308.  The court said it was “questionable whether this motion pre-
served many of the claims presented” in the seven points of error addressing
these issues. Id.  These points of error involved virtually all the same issues
raised by the line of cases following Lawrence. See Sanders, 2009 WL 884741, at
*8–11; Holmes, 2008 WL 963021, at *7.  The only point of error preserved for
appeal was a violation of Roe v. Wade. Estrada, 313 S.W.3d at 309.  All the other
points of error were overruled because neither a facial nor an “as applied” consti-
tutional challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 309–10 (citing
Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)); see also Curry v.
State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (addressing the vagueness
issue).  Once again following Lawrence, the court held Roe “has no application to
a case that does not involve [a] pregnant woman’s liberty interest in choosing to
have an abortion” and that Roe has no application “to a statute that prohibits a
third party from causing the death of [a] woman’s unborn child against her will.”
Estrada, 313 S.W.3d at 309–10.
397. 245 S.W.3d at 436.
398. The defendant also made a Due Process argument under Roe, which had previ-
ously been rejected in Lawrence, and an “overbroad” argument not raised in his
petition for discretionary review, which the court summarily overruled. Id. at
436.
399. Id. at 435 (claiming the mother participated by cooperating in his attempts to
terminate the pregnancy).  Section 19.06 reads, “[t]his chapter [Chapter 19: crim-
inal homicide] does not apply to the death of an unborn child if the conduct
charged is:  (1) conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child . . . .” TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (West Supp. 2010).  This conduct would include all the
chapter 19 crimes:  Section 19.02 (murder); section 19.03 (capital murder); sec-
tion 19.04 (manslaughter); section 19.05 (criminally negligent homicide, and pre-
sumably section 19.02(d) (murder-sudden passion).  Similarly, section 22.12
reads, “[t]his chapter [Chapter 22: assaultive offenses] does not apply to conduct
charged as having been committed against an individual who is an unborn child
if the conduct is: (1) committed by the mother of the unborn child . . . .” TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.12.  This conduct would include all the chapter 22 assault-
ive offenses that could possibly apply to the unborn, to-wit:  Section 22.01 (as-
sault); section 22.02 (aggravated assault); section 22.04 (injury to a child); and
section 22.05 (deadly conduct).  It is clear section 22.12 would also exempt a
mother prosecuted for any other crime where her child is the victim if she is
found guilty of one of these assaultive offenses as a lesser-included offense of the
original charge.  Quite frankly, an example escapes this writer, but the creativity
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this claim was through a pre-trial motion to quash the indictment,
and the TCCA criticized the defendant for attempting to address this
“issue” through a pre-trial motion.400  The court expressed no opinion
on the underlying merits of the Equal Protection claim,401 so the issue
remains unresolved.
The defendant also made an Establishment Clause402 argument
that by defining an “individual” to include the unborn the statute
adopts “a religious point of view over a secular one.”403  In overruling
this claim, the TCCA used the three-prong Lemon test for determining
if a statute violates the Establishment Clause: (1) does the statute
have a secular legislative purpose; (2) is the principal or primary effect
of the statute to neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3), does the
statute not promote an “excessive” government entanglement with re-
ligion?404  If a statute happens to agree with a belief in some or all
religions, this does not render it unconstitutional as violative of the
Establishment Clause.405
of law enforcement and prosecutors never fails to amaze.  Finally, section 49.12
reads,“[s]ections 49.07 [intoxication assault] and 49.08 [intoxication manslaugh-
ter] do not apply to injury to or the death of an unborn child if the conduct
charged is conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child.” TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 49.12.  In Ex parte Vela, No. AP-75562, 2006 WL 3518116 (Tex.
Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2006), the defendant pled guilty to endangering her unborn
child by ingesting controlled substances while pregnant, was convicted under sec-
tion 22.04 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to eighteen months state jail
imprisonment. Id. at *1.  The TCCA overturned the conviction because of the
mother’s exemption provided by section 22.12. Id.  Certainly the argument can
be made that with the definition in section 1.07(a)(26) of a child—including a
fetus from fertilization through birth—and the unqualified language of sections
19.06, 22.12 and 49.12, that whatever the behavior of a mother toward her un-
born child may be, i.e., intentional, knowing, reckless, criminal negligence, or
merely an accident with no criminal intent whatsoever, even while intoxicated,
her only responsibility to her unborn child is civil in nature, if that.  Counsel
should carefully study this statute should the occasion arise. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a), 6.03.
400. Flores, 245 S.W.3d at 437.
401. Id. at 436–37.  In a footnote, the court stated, “[i]n light of these considerations,
we should not overturn the well-established requirement that appellant must
preserve an ‘as applied’ constitutional challenge by raising it at trial.” Id. at 437
n.14 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); see also, e.g., Curry v.
State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that an “as applied”
due process challenge is not preserved for appeal if appellant did not raise a “spe-
cific, timely objection” at trial) (citing Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 846, 861
(1994)).
402. Id. at 438.  The First Amendment to the Constitution reads: “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
403. Flores, 245 S.W.3d at 438.
404. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)); Holberg v. State, 38
S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13).
405. Flores, 245 S.W.3d at 438. (“Otherwise, no law against theft or murder could pass
constitutional muster, because those laws are consistent with religious strictures
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However, from a careful reading of Flores, some constitutional
challenges to these and other issues were not settled.406  As an exam-
ple, in Eguia v. State, the First District for the Texas Court of Appeals
held the statutory definitions of “individual” and “death” valid under
both the Establishment Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the
Texas Constitution,407 following both Lemon and Flores, despite the
argument that the statute was unconstitutional as “endorsing religion
as it is based solely upon a religious belief that life begins at concep-
tion.”408  These statutes are valid under the Eighth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution as the legislature has the sole power to define
crimes and punishments.409  The legislature may expand the list of
aggravating factors, and in fact, it did narrow those who qualify for
capital murder by passing section 19.06, which exempts mothers and
certain medical personnel from criminal liability.410
In Lawrence, Judge Johnson saw potential constitutional chal-
lenges should the facts of a case fail to show the defendant knew the
woman murdered was pregnant and, as a result, the defendant could
not have intended the death of the mother’s unborn child.411  In Rob-
such as the Ten Commandments.”  (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319
(1980))).
406. The court, however, failed to address the defendant’s overbroad and equal protec-
tion arguments. Id. at 436–37 (Cochran, J., concurring).  Judge Cochran, joined
by Judge Johnson, made the following point in her concurring opinion:
[T]he plain language of the statute might well be read to make anyone
who assisted the woman or the physician in [a] lawful act [i.e., an abor-
tion procedure] subject to prosecution for capital murder under the law
of parties: the woman’s mother, father, or friend who drives the woman
to the doctor’s office or provides the money for a lawful abortion with the
intent that the woman obtain such an abortion; the unlicensed medical
assistant who helps the licensed doctor in performing the abortion; or, as
appellant claims in this case, the father of an unborn child who assists in
an unorthodox procedure that intentionally leads to a miscarriage.
Id. at 442 (Cochran, J., concurring).
407. Eugia v. State, 288 S.W.3d 1, 11–13 (Tex. App. 2008).  Article 1, section 6 of the
Texas Constitution, which concerns freedom of worship, states:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences.  No man shall be com-
pelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain
any ministry against his consent.  No human authority ought, in any
case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in
matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any
religious society or mode of worship.  But it shall be the duty of the
[l]egislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally
every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode
of public worship.
TEX. CONST., art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
408. Eguia, 288 S.W.3d at 11; see also supra notes 397–405 and accompanying text
(discussing Lemon and Flores).
409. Eguia, 288 S.W.3d at 12.
410. Id. at 13.
411. 240 S.W.3d 912, 918–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Johnson, J., concurring).
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erts v. State,412 Judge Johnson’s factual requirements were presented
but as a transferred intent issue, not as a constitutional challenge,
distinguishing Roberts from Lawrence on the facts.413  The defendant
in Roberts was convicted of causing the death of two individuals—a
pregnant woman and her embryo—during the same criminal transac-
tion.414  As a result-of-conduct offense, capital murder “is defined in
terms of [the defendant’s] objective to produce . . . a specified result,
i.e., the death of the named decedent.”415  Put in other words, the cul-
pable mental state must relate to the result of the conduct.416  The
State attempted to use the doctrine of transferred intent to assign in-
tent to the defendant for the death of the embryo.417  In this multiple
murder situation, transferred intent as to the second murder is per-
missible but only if the actor’s intent to kill is proven as to “the same
number of persons who actually died.”418  The record reflected that
neither the defendant nor anyone else knew the woman was preg-
nant.419  Thus, with no knowledge of the embryo’s existence, the de-
fendant “could not form a separate specific intent to kill the embryo,
as is required by statute.”420
412. 273 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
413. Id. at 325, 327–32.  The defendant’s point of error in this regard read:  “[W]hether
proof that [the defendant] killed a pregnant woman and her embryo in the same
transaction established capital murder when [the defendant] was unaware of the
pregnancy.” Id. at 325.
414. Id. at 324–25.
415. Id. at 329 (citing Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990), overruled on other grounds, Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994)).
416. Id. at 328–29 (quoting Schroeder v. State, 123 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003)).
417. Id. at 327–28.  Texas Penal Code section 6.04(b)(2) reads: “A person is neverthe-
less criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between
what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that: a
different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected.” TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(b)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
418. Roberts, 273 S.W.3d at 331.
419. Id. at 327.
420. Id. at 330–331 (“A classic example of proper application of transferred intent is
the act of firing at an intended victim while that person is in a group of other
persons.  If the intended person is killed, the offense is murder.  If a different
person in the group is killed, the offense is murder pursuant to Tex. Penal Code §
6.04(b)(2).”).
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XV. SECTION 19.03(A)(9) PENAL CODE:
MURDER OF A JUDGE
A person commits capital murder in Texas if the person commits
murder as defined under section 19.02(b)(1) of the Texas Penal
Code,421 and:
[T]he person murders another person in retaliation for or on account of the
service or status of the other person as a judge or justice of the supreme court,
the court of criminal appeals, a court of appeals, a district court, a criminal
district court, a constitutional county court, a statutory county court, a justice
court, or a municipal court.422
There are no reported Texas State cases citing this subsection of sec-
tion 19.03.423
XVI. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR NON-MURDER CRIMES
In addition to the capital offenses listed in section 19.03, there is
still another way for a person to commit a capital offense.  Still a part
of Texas’ capital statutes is section 12.42(c)(3) of the Penal Code,
which makes it a capital offense to commit aggravated sexual assault
of a child as a repeat offender,424 and article 37.072 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which sets forth the procedures to be followed in
such repeat sex offender capital cases.425  Interestingly, in 2008, the
421. A person commits murder if he “intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an
individual.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1).
422. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(9) (emphasis added).  Subsection (9) of section
19.03(a) became effective September 1, 2005. See S.B. 1791, 79th Leg., § 1 (Tex.
2005).
423. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(9) (noting that Westlaw contains no notes
of decisions for this particular section).
424. Specifically, this section states:
[A] defendant shall be punished for a capital felony if it is shown on the
trial of an offense under Section 22.021 [aggravated sexual assault] oth-
erwise punishable under Subsection (f) [minimum term of imprisonment
is 25 years] of that section that the defendant has previously been finally
convicted of:  (A)  an offense under Section 22.021 [aggravated sexual as-
sault]  that was committed against a victim described by Section
22.021(f)(1) [victim younger than 6 years old] or was committed against
a victim described by Section 22.021(f)(2) [victim younger than 14] and
in a manner described by Section 22.021(a)(2)(A) [(i) serious bodily in-
jury (SBI) or attempts death, (ii) puts victim in fear of death, SBI, kid-
napping, (iii) threatens death, SBI or kidnapping to any person, (iv) uses
or exhibits deadly weapon, (v) acts with another, or (vi) uses roofies or
drugs]; or (B)  an offense that was committed under the laws of another
state that: (i) contains elements that are substantially similar to the ele-
ments of an offense under Section 22.021; and (ii) was committed against
a victim described by Section 22.021(f)(1) or was committed against a
victim described by Section 22.021(f)(2) and in a manner substantially
similar to a manner described by Section 22.021(a)(2)(A).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3).
425. The following are selected portions of the procedures to be followed in repeat sex
offender capital cases:
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Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Louisiana426 declared unconstitutional
a Louisiana statute similar to Penal Code section 12.42(c)(3), which
was used to convict and sentence to death a defendant for raping his
eight-year-old stepdaughter.427
Sec. 2. (a)(1) If a defendant is tried for an offense punishable under Sec-
tion 12.42(c)(3), Penal Code, in which the state seeks the death penalty,
on a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether
the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without
parole . . . .
. . . .
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall sub-
mit the following issues to the jury: (1) whether there is a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society; and (2) in cases in which the
jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage permitted the jury to find the
defendant guilty as a party under Sections 7.01 and 7.02, Penal Code,
whether the defendant actually engaged in the conduct prohibited by
Section 22.021, Penal Code, or did not actually engage in the conduct
prohibited by Section 22.021, Penal Code, but intended that the offense
be committed against the victim or another intended victim . . . .
. . . .
(e)(1) The court shall instruct the jury that if the jury returns an affirma-
tive finding to each issue submitted under Subsection (b), it shall answer
the following issue:  Whether, taking into consideration all of the evi-
dence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s char-
acter and background, and the personal moral culpability of the
defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances
to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole rather
than a death sentence be imposed.
Tex. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.072 (West Supp. 2010); see also TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (procedure in a capital murder case); TEX.CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36(a) (procedure for offenses committed before Septem-
ber 1, 1991).
426. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
427. Id. at 412–13, 422–23.  The Louisiana statute in question read as follows:
A. Aggravated rape is a rape committed . . . where the anal or vaginal
sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim
because it is committed under any one or more of the following
circumstances: . . .
. . . .
(4) When the victim is under the age of twelve years.  Lack of knowledge
of the victim’s age shall not be a defense. . . .
. . . .
D. Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by
life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence.
(1) However, if the victim was under the age of twelve years, as provided
by Paragraph A(4) of this Section:
(a) And if the district attorney seeks a capital verdict, the offender shall
be punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit
of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, in accordance with the
determination of the jury.
Id. at 416–17 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2007 & Supp. 2010).  This
statute was amended following the case in 2003 by S.B. 761, 2003 Reg. Sess., § 1
(La. 2003), and in 2006 by H.B. 435, 2006 Reg. Sess., § 1 (La. 2006).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court applied a balancing test set out in
Atkins v. Virginia 428 and Roper v. Simmons,429 examining whether
there was a national consensus on capital punishment for crimes less
than death and whether such punishment was excessive.430  The Lou-
isiana court affirmed the defendant’s conviction and death sentence,
finding “the death penalty for the rape of a child under twelve is not
disproportionate.”431  The Louisiana high court believed adoption of
similar laws in five other states justified the death penalty in this sit-
uation and showed a trend toward adoption of such statutes.432
The defendant argued three main points to the Supreme Court:
that (1) five states did not constitute a “national consensus” for the
purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis of the death penalty for the
rape of a child, (2) Coker v. Georgia433 should apply to all rapes re-
gardless of the age, and (3) the Louisiana statute violated the Eighth
Amendment for failing to narrow the class of offenders eligible for the
death penalty.434
In a 5–4 decision,435 the Supreme Court held the Eighth Amend-
ment bars states from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a
child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in
the child’s death.436  Applying the death penalty in such a case would
be an exercise of “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of a na-
428. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–13 (2002) (executing a prisoner with mental
retardation offends contemporary standards of decency).
429. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–74 (2005) (executing a person who was
under eighteen when capital crime was committed is cruel and unusual).
430. State v. Kennedy, 957 So.2d 757, 782–89 (La. 2007).
431. Id. at 759, 793.
432. Id. at 788.  The five states adopting similar statutes to Louisiana were:  Georgia,
see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (2003 & Supp. 2005); Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-503 (2005); Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 7115 (West 2009)
(current version at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 843.5 (West Supp. 2011)); South
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(C)(1) (Supp. 2009); and Texas, see TEX. PE-
NAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).  In Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554 U.S. 407 (2008), Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Court, noted
that all but Louisiana had “narrowed” their statute in that only those that have
been previously convicted of a sexual assault crime would be eligible for the death
penalty. Id. at 422–25.  This language should not be taken lightly and could be a
sign the Court (more particularly Justice Kennedy) is open to more “narrow” stat-
utes in capital felonies, where death of the victim does not occur and is not in-
tended, that satisfy Furman, Gregg, Profitt, and Jurek.
433. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (applying the death penalty for rape of an adult was cruel
and unusual).
434. Brief for Petitioner at 33–63, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (No. 07-
343), 2008 WL 466093, at *28–50.
435. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the majority, in which Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407.
436. Id. at 421.
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tional consensus on this issue and the country’s evolving standards of
decency.437
This decency “presumes respect for the individual and thus moder-
ation or restraint in the application of capital punishment.”438  The
Court felt there were “special risk[s] of wrongful execution” as the pri-
mary witness can be unreliable because of her special vulnerability to
being induced into providing false testimony or the opportunity that
she may provide imagined testimony.439  Further, the Court felt that
asking a child to participate in a legal process that takes years forces
the child to make a moral choice before she is of a “mature age to make
that choice.”440
The minority of the Court wrote there was no national consensus
on prohibiting the death penalty of child rapists.441  Rather, they felt
the trend was toward the application of the death penalty in such
cases.442  They vehemently opposed the majority’s application of a
“blanket condemnation”443 barring the death penalty in child-rape
cases regardless of the facts of the case, including the age of the child,
the child’s physical or psychological trauma, the prior record of the
rapist, the sadistic nature of the crime, and the number of times the
child was raped.444
Whether or not in response to the views of the minority, when the
Texas Legislature met for its 81st legislative session during 2009, it
failed to repeal or remove Penal Code section 12.42(c)(3) or article
37.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from Texas’ statutory
provisions.
The Texas Legislature and the TCCA must share the responsibility
for this lengthy analysis.  Had Texas Penal Code section 19.03 re-
mained as originally approved by the Supreme Court, genuine criti-
cism might be difficult.  At that time it was limited and met the
requirements of the Court for a substantive, constitutional death pen-
437. Id. at 420–23, 445–46.
438. Id. at 435 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).  “[T]he words of the
[Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static.  The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01
(1958) (footnote omitted).
439. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 443.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 459–60 (Alito, J., dissenting).
442. Id.
443. Id. at 464.
444. Id. at 465–66.  The four dissenting Justices were Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.  With the Supreme Court presently undergoing
changes in two of those in the majority (and perhaps more in President Obama’s
term or soon thereafter), this issue may not be as settled as some believe.
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alty scheme.445  But politicians invariably refuse to leave things
alone, and now they have created a monster.
XVII. THE LEGISLATURE’S EXPANSION OF SECTION 19.03
The Texas Legislature never seems to find an end to its assault on
the artifice of Texas’ death penalty jurisprudence, section 19.03 of the
Penal Code.  As if not aware that the judicial branch has set the
prescripts for constitutionality, what were five original offenses ap-
proved in Jurek have ballooned into ten categories encompassing a
surprisingly large number of capital crimes.446  As shown in Appendix
A, there are now at least 146 ways to commit capital murder in
Texas.447  Given these many ways to commit capital murder, a crea-
tive prosecutor or police officer can almost always find a way to charge
a murder as capital.  Can we now say with certainty that the ordinary
person fully realizes or understands what behavior is proscribed?448
Admittedly not scientific, but to illustrate the problem in an anec-
dotal fashion, I examined the last two dozen cases that included the
word “murder” and the Penal Code murder section “19.02.”  Of these
twenty-four cases, ten were prosecuted as capital murders449 but
nineteen could have qualified as capital murder under the current
scheme.450  Two more could arguably have been filed as capital mur-
445. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
446. These ten categories include nine categories of section 19.03 capital murder, and
the section 12.42(c)(3) category for the capital felony of repeat aggravated sexual
assault of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.03, 12.42(c)(3) (West 2003 &
Supp. 2010).
447. See infra Appendix A.
448. A statute must not fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable op-
portunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly.  Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).  The statute must provide explicit stan-
dards for those who would apply the statute to prevent arbitrary and discrimina-
tory enforcement even for the most minor of underlying crimes. Id.
449. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Contreras v. State, 312
S.W.3d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 427 (2010); Mays v.
State, 318 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011);
Clark v. State, 324 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App. 2010); Odom v. State, No. 2-09-096-CR,
2010 WL 2331439 (Tex. App. June 10, 2010); Johnson v. State, No. 03-08-00448-
CR, 2010 WL 2133900 (Tex. App. May 28, 2010); Logan v. State, No. 07-09-00150-
CR, 2010 WL 2010921 (Tex. App. May 20, 2010); Nickerson v. State, 312 S.W.3d
250 (Tex. App. 2010); Caldwell v. State, No. 14-08-01019-CR, 2010 WL 1655471
(Tex. App. Apr. 27, 2010); Malone v. State, No. 2-08-360-CR, 2010 WL 851409
(Tex. App. Mar. 11, 2010).
450. Of those nineteen, ten were actually filed as capital, see supra note 449, and the
nine that were filed as “plain” murder are referenced below.
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der,451 and only three could not fit into section 19.03, or I lacked the
creativity, or failed to have the facts necessary, to qualify them.452
The nine murders that could have been filed as a capital murder
that were filed as simple murder instead included: (1) a victim beat to
death in his home and money stolen (robbery-murder or burglary-
murder);453 (2) the death of a ten-month old victim (victim under the
age of six);454 (3) the murder of a rival drug dealer where drugs were
taken immediately after the murder, inferring an intent to commit
robbery at the time of the murder (robbery-murder);455 (4) the murder
of an estranged wife by her husband during a divorce (retaliation or
obstruction);456 (5) the murder of a victim to steal a large amount of
451. The two cases that qualify as “maybe’s” are (1) M’Bowe v. State, No. 03-09-00160-
CR, 2010 WL 2133909 (Tex. App. May 27, 2010), involving a drug deal on the
street that could have been a murder in the course of committing or attempting to
commit a terroristic threat of violence to the victim to control the public areas
where drugs were sold. Id. at *1; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(3) (terroristic
threats).  (2) Morales v. State, No. 05-09-00182-CR, 2010 WL 1965889, at *1–4
(Tex. App. Apr. 14, 2010), involving a gang fight where the victim was shot after
an altercation in a public area behind the apartments where the fight took place,
once again, a threat of violence (“bumping shoulders” and insults) to control a
public area shared by competing gangs, or perhaps as a party to a “combination”
murder having to do with the profits of the combination originating out of a
prison gang relationship. Id. at *1–4.
452. The three cases that could not easily fit into an existing capital category were: (1)
Anderson v. State, No. 01-09-00108-CR, 2010 WL 1839945 (Tex. App. May 6,
2010), where an abused girlfriend was shot in the head (which could qualify
under retaliation if she had attempted to report a crime or had previously re-
ported a crime). Id. at 1–2, 4.  (2) Franks v. State, No. 03-08-00129-CR, 2010 WL
1730032 (Tex. App. Apr. 28, 2010), involving a woman shot through the front of
her house (again this could have been retaliation but I could not tell from the
facts provided the motive for this killing). Id. at *1.  (3) Chaney v. State, 314
S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App. 2010), involving a struggle over a loaded weapon that was
reversed and should never have been filed as a murder. Id. at 563–73.
453. Hill v. State, No. 03-09-00213-CR, 2010 WL 2540603, at *1 (Tex. App. June 25,
2010) (finding victim was intentionally beat to death with a shotgun, and defen-
dant was in possession of $991 stolen from victim at the time of the murder).
454. King v. State, No. 05-08-01716-CR, 2010 WL 2293418, at *1 (Tex. App. June 9,
2010) (reiterating that the murder of a child under six can be intentional or
knowing).
455. Ramsour v. State, No. 05-09-00094-CR, 2010 WL 1909595, at *1–3 (Tex. App.
May 12, 2010) (claiming self-defense, defendant intentionally shot victim who
was in a wheelchair and then took others into nearby apartment and took drugs).
456. Langley v. State, No. 03-08-00722-CR, 2010 WL 1632700, at *1 (Tex. App. Apr.
23, 2010).  It is important to note that murder in retaliation or for obstruction
must be intentional. Id.  The defendant in Langley told his son he was going to
kill his wife before leaving his home, upon returning home the defendant told his
son he shot “her.” Id.  The defendant then called 9-1-1 and told them he had shot
and killed his estranged wife. Id.  When police found the victim she had sus-
tained multiple gunshot wounds and was dead. Id.  It would be difficult not to
see this as an intentional act.
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marijuana (robbery-murder);457 (6) the murder of a wife who tried to
serve her stalking husband with a protective order (retaliation);458 (7)
the murder of a man who was subject to repossession of property by an
employee of his creditor (remuneration);459 (8) a felony murder DWI
for killing two pedestrians (killing more than one person during same
transaction);460 and (9) the murder of a seventeen-month-old son by
his father (victim under the age of six).461
That is nineteen of twenty-four cases (and perhaps twenty-one of
twenty-four cases) chosen at random.  Almost eighty percent of the
sample reported cases involving the intentional or knowing death of
another could have been filed as capital.462  Some would argue the
reason so many capital murders were reported was because many
“plain” murders are pled guilty, foreclosing an appeal.  Or, perhaps it
is an anomaly.  But by examining the facts of just the reported cases
filed as murders—which cases could have been filed as capital—one
sees a pattern.
I believe the Texas prosecutors are exercising more discretion, in
Dallas and Houston in particular.463  I would not have been surprised
if all nine of these murders, a few years ago, would have been filed as
capital murders.  But because prosecutors—for whatever reason—are
choosing not to file cases as capital, points to the exact problem in the
early 1970s addressed in Furman—the arbitrary and capricious exer-
cise of the power to place one person in jeopardy for a capital sentence
while allowing another to face less harsh sentencing, and the contin-
457. Wells v. State, 319 S.W.3d 82, 92–93 (Tex. App. 2010).  The defendant in Wells,
and another man, tied a victim up with zip ties and duct tape, and shot the victim
in the head to steal fifty pounds of marijuana. Id. at 92–93.  There appears to
have been no argument that the shooting was anything less than intentional. Id.
458. Dozier v. State, No. 01-08-00901-CR, 2010 WL 1241558, at *1 (Tex. App. Apr. 1,
2010).  Again, murder in retaliation must be intentional. See supra note 456.
The defendant in Dozier bought a gun and two boxes of ammunition. Dozier,
2010 WL 1241558, at *1.  The next day, he rented a car and went to his wife’s
employment and after a confrontation in the parking lot, the victim threatened to
call the police, turned to go back into her workplace and began dialing her cell
phone. Id.  The defendant chased her down, grabbed her, and shot her in the
back of the head. Id.  Certainly these must be seen as intentional acts leading to
the victim’s death, i.e., murder.
459. Hernandez v. State, 309 S.W.3d 661, 662–63 (Tex. App. 2010) (murder for remu-
neration can be intentional or knowing).
460. Sandoval v. State, 310 S.W.3d 73, 74 (Tex. App. 2010) (mass murder can be know-
ing or intentional).
461. Hampton v. State, No. 2-09-021-CR, 2010 WL 670033, at *1 (Tex. App. Feb. 25,
2010) (murder of a child under six can be intentional or knowing).
462. See supra notes 449–452.
463. With the shifting sands of politics, the election of prosecutors with less under-
standing and perverse political ambitions could quickly return us to the whole-
sale calamitous prosecution of capital murder.
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ued over-representation of minorities on death row.464  We have re-
turned once again to those pre-Furman days.  The current Texas
scheme has again become large and unwieldy, and lends itself to pros-
ecution for a capital crime at the whim of the State.  Even Chief Jus-
tice Burger, who wrote a dissent in Furman, agreed that states must
“restrict the use of capital punishment to a small category of the most
heinous crimes.”465
Pandering to a political climate it perceived as requiring more and
more crimes to become death eligible, the Texas Legislature, over the
past thirty-four years, has greatly expanded capital murder—includ-
ing crimes that seldom occur.466  Texas no longer has that rational,
“effective mechanism” for narrowing those who are death-eligible, as
was approved in Jurek.467  A critical examination of some of the rul-
ings of the TCCA—outlined above—will underscore the court’s partici-
pation in this expansive development.
XVIII. THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS’ COMPLICITY
As if oblivious to this growth in death eligible offenses, the TCCA—
on the whole—takes a results oriented, outcome approach to shaping
and interpreting the law.  The same political pressures felt by the
Texas Legislature, in a state dominated by one political ideology,468
seem to direct the court’s interpretations and decisions.  Although
there are voices of reason on the court, the majority continues its jour-
ney toward the day when those with supervisory authority over their
actions will once again declare an end to this process, as the Supreme
Court did in Furman, finding that “the proscription of cruel and unu-
sual punishments forbids the judicial imposition of them as well as
their imposition by the legislature.”469
Within the footnotes accompanying the above compilation are nu-
merous occasions where I wonder about the machinations of the
TCCA, to-wit:  (1) the trial court’s focus on defense counsel’s use of the
words “mental capacity” in refusing to allow argument on reduced
464. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (“[T]he state does not respect
human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe pun-
ishment that it does not inflict upon others.”  (emphasis added)).
465. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
466. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(9) (West Supp. 2010) (murdering a judge in
retaliation has never been applied because of the crime’s nonoccurrence).
467. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 55 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
468. Texas has given its popular vote to the Republican candidate for U.S. President
in nine out of the last ten Presidential elections. See Presidential Election Re-
sults, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/presid
ential.shtml (last visited May 26, 2011).
469. Furman, 408 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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mens rea, and the TCCA dodging the issue by claiming an “incomplete
record;”;470 (2) the TCCA finding there was “no evidence” showing a
connection between the low intellectual functioning of a defendant
and his perception that he was shooting at the police;471 (3) the TCCA
finding that the mens rea of a party to a robbery—who participated
only in the preparation—albeit providing the guns—“supplied” the
mens rea for a capital murder when the murder was committed by a
co-conspirator,472 (4) the TCCA placing blame on the trial counsel for
failing to make requests for a charge or objections to the charge, and
refusing to rule on the merits of the defendant’s complaints;473 (5) the
TCCA refusing to decide if a defendant’s due process rights were vio-
lated because his status as a party was not alleged in the indictment
or passed on by the fact finder in violation of Supreme Court prece-
dent because the issue was not preserved for appeal;474 (6) the TCCA
criticizing the prosecution for allowing a defendant’s statements to go
unchallenged;475 (7) the TCCA finding proof of a theft occurring imme-
diately after an assault is enough evidence from which the fact finder
470. See Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 571–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
471. Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *21 (Tex. Crim. App. May
5, 2010), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 999 (2011).
472. Medrano v. State, No. AP-75320, 2008 WL 5050076, at *10 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov.
26, 2008); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n.18 (1998). The ruling in
Medrano particularly ignored Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) and the
requirement of proof of the attenuated party’s intent to commit murder. See En-
mund, 458 U.S. at 797–801.  Further, this decision merely mentioned, without
addressing the “reckless indifference” test as set forth in Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137, 158 (1987), which is required to allow the attenuated party’s execution.
Instead, the court in Medrano used the “should have anticipated” language from
section 7.02(b) to allow the conviction and the anti-parties charge of article
37.071 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to allow a sentence of death. See
Medrano, 2008 WL 5050076, at *10.
473. There are too many cases to list them all. See, e.g., Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d
776, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (finding the trial court was not required to sua
sponte provide [a] jury instruction).  Why not?  That is one of the few responsibili-
ties of a trial court during trial. See State v. Kitchens, 10 A.3d 942, 953 (2011).  If
the court fails to provide a charge, the blame should be placed where it belongs.
Why have we developed a jurisprudence that places the burden on the defense
counsel to be the only lawyer in the room that knows the law?
474. Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
475. Palafox v. State, 608 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), superseded by statute,
TEX. R. EVID. 607, abrogation recognized in Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  In Palafox, the State introduced the defendant’s written
statement denying his intent to commit a burglary with the intent to commit
theft, as he said the murder was done in its own right, and he tried to make the
house look like there was a burglary. Id. at 178.  The issue of the defendant’s
intent was much more black and white because of the statement admitted by the
State.  The State was criticized by the court for allowing the defendant’s state-
ments on his intent to go unchallenged, as if the court was disappointed that the
prosecution did a poor job and thereby the court was forced to find in the defen-
dant’s favor. Id. at 182–83.  Why else would the court criticize the State?  Per-
haps there was no evidence available to challenge the defendant’s statements of
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can infer intent to commit a robbery, thereby justifying a capital mur-
der charge;476 (8) the TCCA finding the shooting of a sexual assault
victim’s companion, after both were set free, was in the course of com-
mitting aggravated sexual assault;477 (9) the TCCA failing to acknowl-
edge other judges’ concerns that the use of kidnapping as an
aggravating circumstance for a capital prosecution may be over-
broad;478 (10) the TCCA allowing a murder to show the nexus between
the murder and a burglary to commit a felony with no other showing
of intent to commit a burglary, thereby allowing a capital prosecu-
tion;479 (11) the TCCA allowing proof of a “theft,” which occurred after
the victim was dead, to infer the defendant’s intent prior to the mur-
der—even though one can no more steal from the dead than kidnap or
sexually assault the dead;480 (12) the TCCA allowing the use of gen-
eral verdicts to remove the necessity for specific proof of each crime
alleged in the indictment—even if they are simply alternate ways of
proving a capital murder occurred;481 (13) the TCCA allowing the use
his own intent.  It’s not beyond the realm of possibility that the defendant was
telling the truth of his intent.
476. Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  After many agoniz-
ing efforts with the intent issue, including allowing intent to be inferred from the
facts and eventually allowing the simple commission of the underlying crime fol-
lowing a murder to prove intent, the dissent in Cooper makes it plain the juris-
prudence may be reaching its outer limits. See id. at 225–28 (Meyers, J.,
dissenting).  Now, the rule removes the fact finder from the decision of whether
the intent to commit the underlying crime existed prior to or during the commis-
sion of the murder and allows intent to be assumed by the prompt commission of
an element of the underlying crime, thereby effectively removing from the defini-
tion of section 19.03(a)(2) capital felony the element of intent to commit the un-
derlying crime prior to or during the commission of the murder.  The dissent in
Cooper would place the responsibility squarely in the fact finder’s lap for the de-
termination of whether the facts, and inferences drawn from those facts, prove
the requisite intent was formed at the appropriate time to turn the related mur-
der into a capital felony. See id.  The TCCA should not allow the assumption of
an element of a capital crime that should be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.03 (West 1979 & Supp. 2010) (stating
that “[a]ll persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of
an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
477. Dorough v. State, 639 S.W.2d 479, 480–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
478. See Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Miller, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
479. Homan v. State, 19 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
480. Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also supra notes
193–200 (discussing Cooper and the possible ramifications thereof).
481. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
103 (2010).  The facts of Gardner led the TCCA to the ridiculous conclusion that
the defendant took his own keys to his estranged wife’s home, let himself in
against his wife’s wishes, killed his wife, then took her keys from her purse,
locked the house, left her keys outside in a toolbox before leaving, and then
stopped down the road to throw his keys away. See id. at 282–84.  The TCCA
ignored discussing the retaliation aspects, which made much more sense, but fo-
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of obstruction or retaliation as an aggravating circumstance when
only mere “harm” or “attempted harm” is alleged and no injury is sus-
tained by the victim;482 (14) the TCCA excusing a defective indictment
which failed to set out the elements of the crime because the defen-
dant’s substantial rights were not affected;483 (15) the TCCA refusing
to rule on a defendant’s claim that a statute was unconstitutional be-
cause the issue was not raised using a pre-trial motion to quash;484
(16) the TCCA refusing to rule on constitutional challenges because of
the form of a motion;485 (17) the TCCA overruling a constitutional
challenge because it was not in the petition for discretionary re-
view;486 (18) the TCCA not addressing an “as applied” constitutional
challenge because it was not addressed at trial;487 and (19) the TCCA
failing to address overbroad and Equal Protection arguments even
though other judges warned of problems with the statute.488
In particular, assuming intent by inference in the robbery–murder
scenario is particularly troubling.  One wonders if this rationale ex-
tends to any underlying crime of section 19.03(a)(2)?  Most likely, the
answer is “no.”  But how does the TCCA distinguish the rob-
bery–murder scenario from other crimes in section 19.03(a)(2)?  Is rob-
bery–murder subject to its own unique rule?
For example, if a defendant commits murder and the allegation is
that he or she committed it prior to, or during the commission or at-
tempt to commit, aggravated sexual assault, will the nexus exist if the
evidence shows nothing more than the defendant completed the sex-
ual intercourse after the murder?  Again, murder is “intentionally or
knowingly causing the death of an individual.”489  An “individual” is
defined as a “human being who is alive.”490  Therefore, sexual inter-
cused on finding that the evidence led to these conclusions. Id.  This case is obvi-
ously a murder, not a capital murder, but because of the use of retaliation, it fits
under section 19.03.  No rational jury could find a burglary in this case.  There
was no forced entry, and the defendant was obviously contacting the victim to try
to reconcile their marriage.  Perhaps the TCCA did not address the retaliation
aggravating circumstance, as they too believe it is unconstitutionally vague or
over broad. See also Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 877 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005) (determining that the evidence did not have to be sufficient to support a
finding of both robbery and burglary in order to convict defendant of capital mur-
der, but that adequate evidence of either crime would suffice).
482. See Sewell v. State, 629 S.W.2d 42, 46 (1982).
483. Kellar v. State, 108 S.W.3d 311, 313–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
484. Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
485. Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 307–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 905 (2011).
486. Flores v. State, 245 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
487. Id. at 437 n.14.
488. Id. at 442 (Cochran, J., concurring).
489. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
490. Id. § 1.07(26).
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course after a murder could not be assumed to establish the proper
nexus to make the murder rise to a capital felony.491  But why not?
Does the TCCA make an assumption that the defendant will not
follow through with the intent to have sexual intercourse with the vic-
tim merely because the victim dies?  Where does this jump in logic
originate?  Using the reasoning and language of Cooper v. State, the
inference that the requisite intent to commit the underlying crime of
sexual assault was made at the appropriate time to make the murder
a capital felony “will not be negated by evidence of an alternative mo-
tive that the jury could rationally disregard [that the defendant is a
necrophiliac and did not intend a sexual act until the victim was
dead].”492  Isn’t this the same logic applied in the robbery–murder
scenario?
The concepts of assumption of intent by inference and of bootstrap-
ping murder to the underlying aggravating crime to create a nexus—
as in the burglary-murder situation—are not well thought out.  These
rationales are the result of assumptions in other areas of the criminal
law to bypass long standing legal traditions of burden of proof and
presumption of innocence.493  The court’s tendency, all too often, is to
491. See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  In Santellan, the
defendant was indicted and convicted for the offense of capital murder (murder
committed in the course of attempting to commit kidnapping). Id. at 159.  Evi-
dence showed that for two days after the victim’s death the defendant had vari-
ous sexual relations with the corpse of the victim. Id. at 161.  The abuse of the
corpse was a legally separate offense to the indicted offense, falling under a dif-
ferent provision which criminalizes the abuse of a corpse. Id. at 167–70; see TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.10. But see White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989) (holding that theft from a corpse does not provide the nexus to raise
the theft to robbery, thereby creating the nexus between the theft and the previ-
ous murder to create a capital felony).
492. 67 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
493. The use of assumptions (presumptions) removes elements that may make a pros-
ecution more difficult.  This list is not exhaustive, but shows the degree to which
Texas has embraced this concept: (1) There is the assumption (presumption) that
one is intoxicated if one has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, creating a
presumption of intoxication that the defendant must disprove. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 49.01(2)(B).  (2) Sexual assault being one of the enumerated sexual acts
with a child (a person younger than seventeen years of age) without regard to
consent (with some exceptions). Id. § 22.011(a)(2).  (3) Aggravated sexual assault
being the same basic behavior with a person younger than fourteen years of age
(with exceptions). Id. § 22.021(a)(B).  (4) In Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 848,
849–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), a mistake of fact regarding complainant’s age was
no defense to aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault of a child.  (5) In
Aguirre v. State, 22 S.W.3d 463, 475 & n.48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), indecency
with a child statute did not require the State to prove the defendant knew the
victim was under seventeen years of age.  The mens rea does not apply to the age
of the child, implying that the rule is the same for capital murder of a child under
six. Id. (discussing Zubia v. State, 998 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
(6) A person is presumed to possess any obscene material, device, or image if he
or she possesses six or more of them. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.23, 43.26.  (7)
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bend precedent and legal tenets to make the conviction of an accused
easier and more certain.494
XIX. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
Because executions are down in the United States, there are those
that would argue this is much ado about nothing.495  As Figure 1496
shows, during the thirty-three years following Gregg, Profit, Jurek,
and the reinstitution of executions, there was an initial twenty year
increase.  However, over the last ten years, there has been a dramatic
decrease in executions nationwide.  During this same period, even in
Texas, executions have flattened or subtly declined, as shown in Fig-
ure 2.497  Figure 3 confirms that this trend continues as the execu-
tions of Whites in Texas have taken a marked downturn.498
Those opposing the death penalty should take these statistics as
encouraging that the “evolving standards of decency,”499 which some
ridicule, are indeed leading us toward a more mature society.  There
Even to some extent it is the defendant’s burden in a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to rebut the presumption of proper police conduct. See Amador v. State,
221 S.W.3d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  (8) There is a presumption that a
business owner knows property is stolen if he acts knowingly or recklessly in
loaning twenty-five dollars or more (with restrictions). TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 31.03.  (9) A presumption exists that deadly force is reasonable in certain cir-
cumstances. Id. § 9.32(b).  (10) In certain situations, there is a presumption that
one knew the person was a public servant. Id. §§ 22.01(d), 22.02(c), 22.11(e),
38.14(c).  (11) And the following offenses, all in the Texas Penal Code., to-wit:
§§ 22.041(c)(1) (endangering a child), 22.05 (deadly conduct), 28.03 (criminal mis-
chief), 31.04 (theft of service), 31.06 (theft by check), 32.21 (forgery), 32.31 (credit
card abuse), 32.33 (hindering secured creditor), 32.34 (fraudulent transfer of a
motor vehicle), 32.35 (credit card transaction record laundering), 32.41 (issuance
of bad check), 32.49 (refusal to execute release of fraudulent lien or claim), 32.51
(fraudulent use or possession of identifying information), 34.02 (money launder-
ing), 37.10 (tampering with governmental record), 38.12 (barratry and solicita-
tion), and 42.01 (disorderly conduct).
494. See supra notes 470–488 and accompanying text.
495. “For there was never yet philosopher, That could endure the toothache patiently.”
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING act 5, sc. 1.
496. See infra Appendix B.  All execution statistics in Figures 1–5 are from the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. See Executions by Year, TEX. DEPARTMENT
CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/annual.htm (last updated Oct. 22,
2010).
497. See infra Appendix B.
498. See infra Appendix B.
499. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  In Trop, Chief Justice Warren noted that
“the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not
static.  The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 100-01.  Justice
Scalia also remarked:
[I]f you think that [the Constitution] is meant to reflect the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society—if
that is what you think it is, then why in the world would you have it
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will be those that will argue that the reduction in executions shows
interpreted by nine lawyers?  What do I know about the evolving stan-
dards of decency of American society?  I’m afraid to ask.
See Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005) (transcript on file with Nebraska Law Re-
view).  Here is the reason: “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  When deciding matters in-
volving the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it is the job of the judici-
ary to interpret the law. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803).  The use of nine lawyers (or thousands of lawyers in the lower courts) is
the way it was “originally” intended. See id. These lawyers are members of this
society and bring with them those experiences.  There is no requirement—and
indeed it would be a mistake—for the judiciary to remain sequestered from soci-
ety.  “Interpretation of the law and the Constitution is the primary mission of the
judiciary when it acts within the sphere of its authority to resolve a case or con-
troversy.”  Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001); see also
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).  Arguing recently about
the role of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, Justice Scalia held fast to
his “public be damned” attitude in knowing which rights should be protected,
while channeling the framers of the Constitution:
[I]t would be “judicial abdication” for a judge to “tur[n] his back” on his
task of determining what the Fourteenth Amendment covers by “out-
sourc[ing]” the job to “historical sentiment,” that is, by being guided by
what the American people throughout our history have thought.  It is
only we judges, exercising our “own reasoned judgment,” . . . who can be
entrusted with deciding the Due Process Clause’s scope—which rights
serve the Amendment’s “central values,” . . . which basically means pick-
ing the rights we want to protect and discarding those we do not.
McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3052 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (quoting McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3096, 3099, 3101 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).  As if by a parting “shot,” so to speak, Justice Stevens waxes philo-
sophically about the role of history, changing public opinions, and those that in-
terpret the language of the Constitution by their own historical interpretations of
the late eighteenth century:
Not only can historical views be less than completely clear or informa-
tive, but they can also be wrong.  Some notions that many Americans
deeply believed to be true, at one time, turned out not to be true.  Some
practices that many Americans believed to be consistent with the Consti-
tution’s guarantees of liberty and equality, at one time, turned out to be
inconsistent with them.  The fact that we have a written Constitution
does not consign this Nation to a static legal existence.  Although we
should always “pa[y] a decent regard to the opinions of former times,” it
“is not the glory of the people of America” to have “suffered a blind vener-
ation for antiquity.”  It is not the role of federal judges to be amateur
historians.  And it is not fidelity to the Constitution to ignore its use of
deliberately capacious language, in an effort to transform foundational
legal commitments into narrow rules of decision.
Id. at 3119 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
NO. 14, at 72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).  In continuing to
decide “the rights we want to protect and discarding those we do not,” id. at 3052
(Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added), we should recognize the tide of opinion
worldwide condemning the continued use of capital punishment.  The Supreme
Court should read its own opinion:
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that the system is working, that proper discretion is being applied by
the prosecution, and that the courts are thereby appropriately punish-
ing the guilty, removing violent people to the safe confines of prison,
and deterring others from committing similar crimes.  Whether or not
this is true is for others to debate as the reasons for the downturn in
executions nationwide are probably as varied and individualistic as
the states themselves.500
Under our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from
an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels otherwise,
that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no
means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems
that suit local needs and values.
Id. at 3046 (footnote omitted).  Should not the protections of the Eighth Amend-
ment be just as important as the protections of the Second?  Is stare decisis only
applicable should it limit or interpret Second Amendment rights?  But unlike in
McDonald, in protecting Eighth Amendment rights, stare decisis does provide us
counsel.  The current Court is duty bound by stare decisis to always be alert to
those “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety” in interpreting Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and to give those stan-
dards effect. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.  Paraphrasing Justice Scalia, if you think
Trop was a bad idea and it should no longer be the law, persuade your fellow
members of the Court to overrule it.  Ridicule tastes most bitter off the lips of a
Supreme Court Justice.
500. Although space does not allow an in-depth analysis of the many reasons execu-
tions are down nationwide, some of the reasons for this decline could be: (1) the
increase in the use of an option of life without parole and the improvement in
defense resourcefulness and skill, e.g., the use of mitigation specialists. See gen-
erally Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 6, 2003, at
32 (describing the jurors’ decision for the imposition of life without parole).  (2)
The fear of executing the innocent. See Frank R. Baumgartner, Death Penalty’s
Vanishing Point, NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 24, 2010, at A17.  (3) The financial
burden placed on the states. See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
CALIFORNIA 84 (2008) [hereinafter CAL. REPORT].  (4) The public opinion support-
ing life without parole over death. See Bob Egelko, Field Poll:  Support Remains
Strong for Capital Punishment, S.F. CHRONICAL, July 22, 2010, at C1 (stating
that 70% of surveyed voters supported the death penalty, but stating a smaller
survey of voters showed that 42% preferred life in prison without parole and 41%
preferred death, a reversal in ten years from 44% favoring death and 37% favor-
ing life without parole); John Wagner, Md. Voters Remain Divided on Death Pen-
alty, WASH. POST (May 11, 2010, 1:02 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
annapolis/2010/05/md_voters_remain_divided_on_de.html (showing Maryland
citizens consistently support the use of the death penalty by a 60% majority but
continue to “prefer the punishment of life in prison with no chance of parole than
the death penalty—by 49 percent to 40 percent,” which was down slightly from a
51 percent majority in 2007).  (5) The non-use by states that have it available, for
whatever reasons. See Almost Half of U.S. Jurisdictions have had no Executions
in 10 Years, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
almost-half-us-jurisdictions-have-had-no-executions-10-years (last updated Jan.
5, 2011) [hereinafter U. S. Jurisdiction Executions] (showing that at the end of
2010, eight states and the U.S. Military currently have a death penalty but have
had no executions in the last ten years, those states being: Colorado, Idaho, Kan-
sas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming).  (6) The
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The basis of my complaint is that Texas’ substantive capital mur-
der statute—Penal Code section 19.03—has become unwieldy and im-
possible for the ordinary person to understand, and those that are
prosecuted for capital murder, convicted, placed on death row, and ul-
timately executed, are once again subject to the capricious whims of
prosecution and appellate review.
Complaining of the death penalty systems in effect in 1972, Justice
Douglas commented:
[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death pen-
alty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against
the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a
member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social
position may be in a more protected position.501
So the question remains, after decades of capital litigation, are those
accused of capital crimes still the recipients of such prejudices?  If the
trends on executions of minorities—reflected in Figures 4 and 5502—
are any indication, perhaps those prejudices, examined in Furman, re-
quire the courts to take another look at the Texas death penalty
scheme.  As executions are generally on the decline, even in Texas, do
these charts really need comment?  African Americans, who comprise
12.9% of the U.S. population and 12% of the Texas population,503 still
abolition of the death penalty during this same period of time in New Mexico in
2009 and New Jersey in 2007. See State by State Database: New Mexico, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last up-
dated 2010); State by State Database: New Jersey, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last updated 2010).  (7) The
death penalty statute in New York was declared unconstitutional in 2004 and
was not replaced. See State by State Database: New York, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last updated 2010).  (8)
Or perhaps the inhuman method of execution had an influence. See Editorial,
Abolish the Death Penalty in Nebraska, LINCOLN J. STAR (Feb. 9, 2008, 6:00 PM),
http://journalstar.com/news/opinion/editorial/article_056e712e-43e8-53ef-bff9-6fb
db89021e7.html (opining that as the only state that continued to use the electric
chair as its sole means of execution, Nebraska’s method of execution was ruled
cruel and unusual punishment, and quoting the editors from a medical journal—
PLoS Medicine—that “[t]here is no humane way of forcibly killing someone,” and
further suggesting that “[i]nstead of rushing to pass a new means of capital pun-
ishment, the Legislature should take this opportunity to finally get rid of the
death penalty”).  (9) The counter efforts of politicians and those with a political
voice fighting the use of capital punishment. See Dave Perry, Perry: Death Pen-
alty Dollar Diversion Overdue, AURORA SENTINEL, (Apr. 27, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://
www.aurorasentinel.com/opinion/columnists/article_13b4f6cc-fb26-5fd5-8203-f0e
e343f2f88.html (commenting that there is “[n]othing like a little discourse over
human extermination to separate the ranks at the Capitol”).
501. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
502. See infra Appendix B.
503. Texas, QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
48000.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011) (reflecting 2009 data).
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represent 41.53% of those on death row nationwide504 and 38.87% in
Texas.505  Shockingly, in 2008, African Americans constituted 50% of
those executed in Texas, 54% in 2009, and 58% in 2006.506  Clearly,
this is the same type of disproportionality that Furman addressed.
504. CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP, LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DEATH ROW
U.S.A. 1 (Fall 2009) [hereinafter NAACP].
505. Gender and Racial Statistics of Death Row Offenders, TEX. DEPARTMENT CRIM.
JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/racial.htm (last updated Feb. 10, 2011).
506. Executions by Year, TEX. DEPARTMENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://www.tdcj.state.
tx.us/stat/annual.htm (last updated Oct. 22, 2010).  For those that wonder if Afri-
can Americans commit 50% to 58% of the homicides in Texas, statistics for 2008
show that of the 1,003 arrests in Texas for murder and manslaughter that year,
African Americans accounted for 30% of the total. See TEX. DEP’T OF PUB.
SAFETY, CRIME IN TEXAS 2008, at 90 (2009).  Although 33% of those arrested for
murder were African Americans, only 10% of the manslaughter arrests were
Black. See id. This begs the question:  If 90% of the arrests for manslaughter
were White, does this not indicate some prosecutorial or law enforcement bias in
favor of Whites being charged with the lesser offense of manslaughter?  Further
study should be done.  However, the crime statistics provided by the United
States Department of Justice do lump murder and manslaughter arrests together
in one category, so the same convention is used here. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT:  CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, at tbl.43 (2009).
Interestingly, African Americans nationwide are indeed 50% of the arrests for
murder and manslaughter, id., showing perhaps a predilection for Texas African
Americans to actually be less violent in the homicide category—raising the ques-
tion of why so many Blacks are sent to death row and executed disproportionate
to their overall population?  In fact, of all the total arrests in Texas during 2008,
African Americans constituted 25% of the total in all categories (the reasons for
this are probably more to do with socio-economic causes than proclivity for vio-
lence and law breaking). See TEX. DEP’T OF PUB.SAFETY, supra, at 90.  Studies
have indicated there may be other reasons African Americans are disproportion-
ately represented on death row, which are directly tied to the complaints brought
by this Article.  Because of the difficulty in understanding the language of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071, “the deliberation process [of a
death jury] not only fail[s] to eliminate or reduce the race-based effects that have
been identified in many experimental studies of individual juror-level sentencing
behavior, but to the contrary, seem[s] to activate and amplify racialized decision-
making.”  Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation:  Effects on
Death Sentencing, Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
481, 492 (2009) (citations omitted).  Further, mitigation is not weighed as heavily
for African Americans as for Whites, and White jurors tend to sentence African
Americans to death more frequently than if the defendant is White. Id. at
492–94; see also Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Mak-
ing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 621
(2005) (finding that a small, yet significant, effect of racial bias in decision-mak-
ing is present across studies, comparing contemporary studies in light of much
earlier conflicting studies).  It would be only natural that the racial bias endemic
in the jury process must also find its way into other aspects of the capital punish-
ment system, such as to the number of minorities executed disproportionate to
their population on death row, which is already significantly disproportionate to
African American population in general by over 300%. Compare Texas
QuickFacts, supra note 503, with Gender and Racial Statistics of Death Row Of-
fenders, supra note 505.  Even to the most ardent supporters of the death pen-
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alty—unless they believe African American are inherently more violent that
others—these statistics must be troubling.  The Baldus study, discussed in the
early case of McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), highlights another strong
argument that racial bias has existed all along—even from the early years—in
the decision-making process in capital cases.  The study, based on over 2,000
murder cases in Georgia in the 1970s, indicated defendants of all races with
white victims received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants of all
races with African American victims received the death penalty in only 1% of the
cases. See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Emperical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661
(1983); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.  Among other findings were: (1) African
American defendants with white victims were given the death penalty in 22% of
the cases, while white defendants with white victims received the death penalty
in 8% of the cases; (2) the death penalty was given in only 1% of the cases with
African American defendants and black victims, and 3% of the cases with white
defendants and African American victims; (3) prosecutors sought death in 70% of
the cases with African American defendants and white victims, 32% of the cases
with white defendants and white victims, 15% of the cases with African American
defendants and African American victims, and 19% of the cases with white de-
fendants and African American victims; and (4) that those with white victims
were 4.3 times more likely to be given death than those with African American
victims. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286–87 (citing Baldus, supra).  In 2009, North
Carolina passed its “Racial Justice Act,” allowing defendants to use statistical
evidence to prove racial bias in how the death penalty is applied. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2010 (2009) (“No person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death or
shall be executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought or obtained on the
basis of race.”).  With this in mind comes contemporary research in a new study
forthcoming in the North Carolina Law Review by Michael Radelet and Glenn
Pierce. See Michael L. Radelet & Glen L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in
North Carolina 1980–2007, 89 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (working draft on
file with author and Nebraska Law Review).  Therein the researchers examined
15,281 homicides in North Carolina occurring during the years 1980 through
2007, which included 368 death sentences. Id. at 1.  The study finds that those
suspected of “killing Whites are over three times more likely to be sentenced to
death than those who are suspected of killing African Americans.” Id. at 16.
“Overall, 1.2 percent of those suspected of killing African Americans are sen-
tenced to death, compared to 3.9 percent of those suspected of killing Whites . . . .”
Id.  In North Carolina, the victim’s race is a “strong predictor” of who receives a
death sentence in a homicide case and it is a “significant factor in the decision to
seek . . . the death penalty.”  Id. at 21–22.  The data presented by Radelet and
Pierce “reveal[s] strong racial disparities in death sentencing in North Carolina.”
Id. at 23.  In news accounts, Dr. Radelet comments that “[i]t’s just kind of baffling
that, in this day and age, race matters.”  Anne Blythe, Victim’s Race Skews Death
Penalty, NEWS & OBSERVER, July 23, 2010, at 1A.  “ ‘It turns out the racial biases
tend to be lower where there are not as many death sentences.’  Radelet said.” Id.
Additionally, Dr. Radelet commented:  “It confirmed the worst fears. . . . It turns
out the race of the defendant doesn’t matter at all, . . . [i]t all depends on the race
of the victims.”  Brittany Anas, CU-Boulder Research:  Victim’s Race Matters in
Death Penalty, BOULDER CAMERA (July 22, 2010), http://www.dailycamera.com/
cu-new/ci_15581301.  Quoting Mark Rabil, an assistant capital defender, “[The
study] shows that predominantly white juries and prosecutors have been more
protective of white life than of minority victims.”  Michael Hewlett, Disparity
Seen in Death Penalty, WINSTON SALEM J. (July 23, 2010), http://www2.journal
now.com/news/2010/jul/23/disparity-seen-in-death-penalty-ar-392583/.  Perhaps
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In contrast, some would argue it is neither cruel nor unusual for a
society to execute those who have taken another’s life, and it is in fact
a tradition of our Judeo-Christian society to do so.507  But Justice
Douglas reminds us it is cruel and unusual to apply any penalty “se-
lectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of so-
ciety, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer
though it would not countenance general application of the same pen-
alty across the board.”508  Is this evidence that “the imposition of the
death sentence and the exercise of dispensing power by the courts and
the executive follow discriminatory pattern  . . . [and t]he death sen-
tence is disproportionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the
Negro, and the members of unpopular groups”509 once again?
The rule of evolving standards of decency with specific marks on the way to
full progress and mature judgment means that resort to the penalty must be
reserved for the worst of crimes and limited in its instances of application. In
most cases justice is not better served by terminating the life of the perpetra-
tor rather than confining him and preserving the possibility that he and the
Dr. Radelet was taken somewhat out of context when he is quoted as saying that
“the race of the defendant doesn’t matter at all,” but certainly his findings add to
the mountain of data that supports the argument that a system of capital punish-
ment cannot be devised that is race neutral—and there are those that believe it
cannot be so created. See Adam Liptak, Group Gives Up Death Penalty Work,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A11 (reporting The American Law Institute in Fall
2009 pronounced their capital punishment project a failure and walked away,
abandoning their efforts “in light of the current intractable institutional and
structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering
capital punishment”)  In the article, Franklin E. Zimring, a law professor at the
University of California, Berkeley, is quoted saying The American Law Institute
was “the only intellectually respectable support for the death penalty system in
the United States.” Id.  The continued use of the current system is on the collec-
tive conscience of those who persistently ignore the science.
507. The Hebrew Bible states “breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he
hath maimed a man, so shall it be rendered unto him.” Leviticus 24:20.  The King
James version of the Christian Bible states “[b]reach for breach, eye for eye, tooth
for tooth:  as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again.”
Leviticus 24:20.  Those that make this argument forget the teachings in the
Christian New Testament that it is not ours to reap vengeance. See Romans
12:19 (King James) (“Dearly beloved, avenge not yourself, but rather give place
unto wrath:  for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.”);
Hebrews 10:30 (King James) (“For we know him that hath said, Vengeance
belongeth unto me, I will recompense, saith the Lord.  And again, The Lord shall
judge his people.”).  To the victim’s families and their loved ones:  “Ye have heard
that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth:  But I say unto
you, That ye resist not evil:  but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek,
turn to him the other also.” Matthew 5:38–39 (King James).  To the accused:
“But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to
them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute
you.” Matthew 5:44 (King James).
508. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
509. Id. at 249–50 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1st ed. 1967)).
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system will find ways to allow him to understand the enormity of his offense.
Difficulties in administering the penalty to ensure against its arbitrary and
capricious application require adherence to a rule reserving its use, at this
stage of evolving standards and in cases of crimes against individuals, for
crimes that take the life of the victim.510
So which way are our standards of decency evolving?  Or are they
evolving at all?  Surely, we have reached—once again—the outer lim-
its of capital expansion; or, perhaps not.  As Louisiana, Georgia, South
Carolina, Montana, Oklahoma, and Texas adopted statutes in recent
years approving non-death aggravating circumstances,511 I believe
that the four dissenters in Kennedy v. Louisiana would argue the
trend is toward the use of capital punishment in non-death cases, and
that, but for the majority’s decision, these new statutes could have
formed a “strong new evolutionary line.”512
The story of the failed execution of Romell Broom in Ohio last year
should offend even the most ardent death penalty supporters.  For al-
most two and one half hours, Broom’s arm was stuck over, and over,
and over—18 times—in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to open a
vein in his arm to execute him, with the Governor finally stopping the
attempts.513  Is this the evolution of decency?514
What about the innocent?  The Innocence Project has helped exon-
erate 241 inmates through post-conviction DNA testing, of which sev-
enteen were former residents of death row.515  The current
controversy in Texas over the 2004 execution of Cameron Todd Wil-
lingham, whom many believe to be an innocent man, and Governor
Perry’s “midnight massacre” of the leadership of the Forensic Science
Commission, shows that the evolution of decency in Texas is mutating
once again into a system that finds itself “wanton” and “capricious” in
510. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008).
511. Id. at 422–23.
512. Id. at 447–62 (Alito, J., dissenting).  It seems somehow ironic, on more than one
level, that these four would use the word “evolutionary” to describe what could
have been, and may yet be, a line of cases of which Kennedy v. Louisiana may
only be a mutation. See id. at 461.  “If you go back and read the commentaries on
the Constitution by Joseph Story, he didn’t think the Constitution evolved or
changed.  He said it means and will always mean what it meant when it was
adopted.”  Scalia, supra note 499.
513. Alan Johnson, Effort to Kill Inmate Halted:  2 Hours of Needle Sticks Fail: Strick-
land Steps In, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 16, 2009, at A1; Mike Mentrek, Failed
Execution of Romell Broom Prompts Efforts to Block 2nd Attempt, CLEVE-
LAND.com (Sept. 17, 2009, 9:00 A.M.), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/09/
failed_execution_of_romell_bro.html.
514. For a compilation of thirty-two botched executions, see Michael L. Radelet, Some
Examples of Post-Furman Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-
botched-executions#_edn63.
515. Dahlia Lithwick, Innocent Until Executed: We Have No Right to Exoneration,
NEWSWEEK, September 14, 2009, at 25.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 87 30-AUG-11 12:43
326 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:240
the arbitrary prosecution and execution of those the state chooses for
death.516  One commentator recently placed the number of total
wrongful executions at 138.517  Given the number of exonerations in
recent years, including many off death row,518 it seems highly improb-
able that there has not been at least one innocent person executed,
despite the hopeful wishes of some.519
And the financial costs?  California, with 694 inmates on death
row, has not executed anyone in five years and has executed only a
total of thirteen since 1977.520  Each execution in California costs
$250 million,521 and each year California spends $126.2 million more
keeping the inmates on death row than it would cost to hold them in
prison for life without parole.522  In Texas, as far back as 1992, the
516. See David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW
YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42, 62–63; Morgan Smith, Agency Needs More Time for
Willingham Case, TEXAS TRIB. (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/te
xas-dept-criminal-justice/death-penalty/agency-needs-more-time-for-willingham-
case/.
517. Daniel B. Wood, Ronnie Lee Gardner: Is Utah Firing Squad a More Humane Exe-
cution?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Justice/2010/0617/Ronnie-Lee-Gardner-Is-Utah-firing-squad-a-more-hum
ane-execution (citing John Holdridge, director of the ACLU’s Capital Punishment
Project).
518. See id. (noting that a Cleveland based criminal defense attorney placed the num-
ber of death row inmates who have been exonerated at 250 in recent years).
519. For instance, Scalia has stated:
It should be noted at the outset that the dissent does not discuss a single
case—not one—in which it is clear that a person was executed for a
crime he did not commit.  If such an event had occurred in recent years,
we would not have to hunt for it; the innocent’s name would be shouted
from the rooftops by the abolition lobby.  The dissent makes much of the
new-found capacity of DNA testing to establish innocence.  But in every
case of an executed defendant of which I am aware, that technology has
confirmed guilt.
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 188 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
520. NAACP, supra note 504, at 32; Paul Elias, Calif. Case Spotlights Dysfunctional
Death Penalty, ABC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?
id=10471927 (noting the last execution in California was January 17, 2006 when
Clarence Ray Allen was put to death).
521. Editorial, High Cost of Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at A22.
522. See CAL. REPORT, supra note 500, at 84; see also Editorial, supra note 521 (citing
the figure of $114 million).  The California Commission cites several studies dis-
cussing the differences in the costs of the trials, and in some cases, the appeals:
(1) A Kansas study that shows adding a death penalty to a murder trial increases
the cost by 70%. KANSAS LEGISLATIVE DIVISION OF POST AUDIT, PERFORMANCE
AUDIT REPORT, COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 11 (2003).  (2) In Tennessee, adding a death
penalty to a murder trial increases the cost by 48%. See EMILY WILSON ET AL.,
TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 16 (2004).  (3) In Indi-
ana, the trial and appeal of a capital case costs five times over the trial and ap-
peal of a non-capital murder case. See KATHRYN JANEWAY, IND. CRIMINAL LAW
STUDY COMM’N, THE APPLICATION OF INDIANA’S CAPITAL’S SENTENCING LAW 1–122,
124–211 (2002).  (4) A California study showed the increased cost in just the trial
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average cost of a capital trial and appeal was $2.3 million, three times
the cost to house that inmate for forty years in a single cell at the
highest security level.523
of a capital case over a non-capital murder case is $1.27 million.  Rone Tempest,
Death Row Often Means a Long Life, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1 (citing re-
port).  (5) An ACLU study showed a $1.1 million difference between the most
expensive non-death murder case and the least expensive capital trial. NATASHA
MINSKER, ACLU OF N. CAL., THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF SEEK-
ING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 32 (Clair Cooper & Elise Banducci eds., 2008).
523. Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions—Study Finds It’s Cheaper to Jail
Killers for Life, AUSTIN BUREAU OF THE DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at
1A; see also TEX. PUB.POL’Y FOUND., 2009–2010 LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE TO THE IS-
SUES 104 (Bill Peacock ed., 2008) (showing the current prison cost in Texas is
$49.40 per inmate per day, which is $18,031 per year, lower than the national
average of $24,656).  Philip Cook, an economist at Duke’s Sanford School of Pub-
lic Policy, found North Carolina would save $11 million per year by abolishing
death row.  Phillip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty
in North Carolina, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 498, 498, 502 (2009)  This figure is up
from his last study in 1993 showing an annual savings of $4 million. Id..  With
173 people currently on North Carolina’s death row, and no executions since Au-
gust 2006, this would amount to a savings of $63,500 per-inmate per-year for the
rest of the inmate’s life. See Mandy Locke, Study: End Death Cases, Save Money,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 28, 2009), http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives
?p_action=print&p_docid=12CE3CAACBFD2720.  Using this 1992 figure of a
cost of a capital trial and appeal of $2.3 million, see Hoppe, supra, and the costs of
forty years of incarceration in a single cell at one-third of this figure ($766,667),
see id., with the current population of death row in Texas (315 as of March 25,
2011), and using the Indiana study that a murder trial costs one-fifth of a capital
trial, see JANEWAY, supra note 522, had all 315 Texas Death Row inmates been
tried as non-death murder cases, after paying for the total cost of the trial and
appeal ($460,000—one-fifth of $2.3 million) and the forty years of incarceration
($766,667 at 1992 costs, which would take most inmates well into their later
years, see Hoppe, supra), and adding back the savings for each inmate not wait-
ing the ten year average on Death Row ($193,450, based on the cost per-day of
administrative segregation (death row) in Texas in 1998 at $53, see Death Row
Facts, TEX. DEPARTMENT OF CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/drow
facts.htm (10.6 year average) and Tanya Eiserer, Life in Administrative Segrega-
tion Can Make, Break a Prisoner, ABILENE REP.-NEWS (April 26, 1998), http://
www.texnews.com/1998/local/adseg0426.html), the State would have saved al-
most 400 million, and this is after allowing for every variable to err on the side of
a conservative estimate.  The population of death row is available at the Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice Website. See Gender and Racial Statistics of Death Row
Offenders, TEX.DEPARTMENT OF CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/rac
ial.htm (last updated March 25, 2011).  Statistics provided by the Executive Ser-
vices of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice show a per-day cost on death
row during fiscal year 2002 to be $61.58.  Letter from Alicia Frezia Nash, Open
Records Act Coordinator, Exec.Servs., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., to Patrick Metze,
Assoc. Professor, Tex. Tech Univ. Sch. of Law (July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Nash
Letter] (on file with author and Nebraska Law Review). But see CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y COUNCIL, MANGOS TO MANGOS: COMPARING THE OPERATIONAL COSTS OF JU-
VENILE AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS IN TEXAS 12, 34 (2003) (stating the
figure computed by the Criminal Justice Policy Council for that year is $61.63).
Using the figure of $61.58 for a per-day cost, the add back for the ten years saved
would be $224,767 or an additional $31,317 savings per inmate over the $409
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million savings just calculated (a total of almost $10 million additional).  Admit-
tedly, these calculations do not reflect adjustments for inflation and are meant for
illustrative purposes only.  But they also do not include the savings on other re-
sources, e.g., law enforcement, court personnel, expert witnesses, prosecution,
trial courts, appellate courts, and defense counsel.  These expenses would be
saved by freeing up the time now dedicated to capital cases—time better applied
to other matters.  Additionally, an intangible benefit would be the relative quick
disposition of each case, reducing the time the victim’s family and loved ones
have to dedicate themselves to this process before going on with their lives.  Ac-
cording to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the current per-day costs
on death row are computed by the Texas Legislative Budget Board (LBB) since
fiscal year 2002. See Nash Letter, supra.  But a search of the LBB website, http://
www.lbb.state.tx.us/, did not reveal any current data on death row per-day costs.
The LBB showed during fiscal year 2008 a system wide cost per bed at $47.50.
See Nash Letter, supra.  This represents an increase of only 8% over the previous
six years (TDCJ showed costs per-day system wide for fiscal year 2002 was
$44.01, see CRIM. JUST. POL’Y COUNCIL, supra, at 34).  It is my opinion LBB’s
statistics appear to be politically skewed and inaccurate.  In fact, in an email
from a public information officer for the LBB, it was confirmed the LBB “does not
have a cost per-day/per-bed metric for Death Row inmates.” See Barton Email,
supra.  One wonders why this statistic is no longer kept?  By looking at the costs-
per-day per-bed last computed by the Criminal Justice Policy Council in their
report entitled Mangos to Mangos: Comparing the Operational Costs of Juvenile
and Adult Correctional Programs in Texas, prepared for the 78th Texas Legisla-
ture, a political motivation becomes apparent.  The per-bed cost for death row
calculated for fiscal year 2001 was $60.30, see CRIM. JUST. POL’Y COUNCIL, supra,
at 12, and for fiscal year 2002 it was $61.63, see id.  This is an increase of only
2.2% per-year between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002.  If the costs contin-
ued to only rise at 2.2% per year, the 2010 cost for death row would be $73.35 per-
day per-bed.  That is almost a 22% increase in costs for the past nine years at this
modest rate of growth.  At that rate, in nine more years the cost of death row will
be $89.19 per-day or $10.25 million per-year assuming the population does not
change.  At today’s cost, for each year the 315 inmates are kept on death row, the
total cost is a little over $8.43 million, compared to the system-wide cost of almost
$5.35 million—as per the 2008 $46.51 per-day cost.  See email from John Barton,
Pub. Info. Officer, Tex. Legislative Budget Bd., to Patrick Metze, Assoc. Profes-
sor, Tex. Tech. Univ. Sch. of Law (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Barton Email] (on
file with author and Nebraska Law Review).  That is an estimated increased cost
per-year of over three million to house 315 inmates on death row until they are
executed.  It appears politicians do not want people comparing “mangos to
mangos” any longer.  The costs of prosecutions and prisons will eventually factor
into the debate on the viability of Texas continuing to support capital punish-
ment.  Since the time of Ms. Hoppe’s article first mentioned in this note, on a
related issue, “the criminal justice budget [in Texas] has increased from $793
million in 1990 to $2.94 billion in 2008.” TEX. PUB.POL’Y FOUND, supra, at 104.
In this writer’s opinion, the reasons for this alarming growth in spending are
twofold.  First, even though crime has not risen during this period, see Joe Keo-
hane, Imaginary Fiends, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2010, at C1 (showing that across
the country, FBI data shows that crime last year fell to lows unseen since the
1960s—part of a long trend that has seen crime fall steeply in the United States
since the mid-1990s), the people of Texas—through their Legislature—have
fallen in love with using criminal justice agencies, including law enforcement and
correctional facilities, instead of social service agencies to punish the outcomes
rather than treat the causes of crime and poverty.  Second, the people of Texas
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XX. CONCLUSION
As I prepared this compilation of over thirty years of vitiating sec-
tion 19.03 jurisprudence, our political institutions—the Texas Legisla-
ture (Legislative), the prosecutors (Executive), and the TCCA
(Judicial)—confirm and reinforce what we have been told for many
years about the capital punishment scheme in Texas:  This whole pro-
cess has little to do with “justice” and everything to do with mainte-
nance of political power.524
What does it say about a society that ties a man to a chair, puts a
sack over his head, slaps a Velcro target on his chest, and has five
other human beings shoot four .30-30 caliber bullets through his beat-
ing heart?525  For instance, what began with the firing squad execu-
tion of Gary Gilmore in 1977 in Utah has come full circle with the
firing squad execution of Ronnie Lee Garner in June 2010, again in
Utah.526  This is not an evolution; it is a disintegration of decency—an
all-out attack on the character and soul of our people.  Garner’s execu-
tion has opened up the debate once again.527
fail, or refuse, to distinguish crime from sin or the criminal from the mentally ill.
Although there are efforts being made, on the whole, our state shamefully ignores
the causes of why one would abuse drugs or alcohol as a method of coping with
life and refuses to fully accept responsibility for those with medical problems who
cannot seek a remedy by themselves.  A more productive use of available re-
sources away from killing our own—to helping our own—seems more appropri-
ate.  As North Carolina has 173 people on death row, and Philip Cook calculates
the savings to North Carolina at $11 million per year by abolishing their death
row, see Cook, supra, and Lock, supra, Texas could possibly save an equivalent of
$20 million per-year when all contributing factors are considered.  Further study
should be done in these areas.  It appears that Texas will abolish the death pen-
alty when it can no longer financially afford it.
524. Thank you to Millard Farmer of Atlanta, Georgia, whose advice is never forgot-
ten and who continues to inspire and illuminate.
525. See Christopher Smart, Utah Execution Reopens Death-Penalty Debate, SEATTLE
TIMES (June 16, 2010, 6:34 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nation
world/2012136377_utahdeath17.html?sysyndicati=rss.
526. Id.
527. Id.  A Salt Lake City reporter described the execution:
[A] hood was placed over Gardner’s head and a physician attached a Vel-
cro target to his chest in front of his heart. . . . [A] five-person firing
squad, four using live rounds and one using a blank, took aim at the
target on Gardner’s chest. . . . [C]ounting down from five[,] . . . shots were
fired as the number two was pronounced. . . . Gardner’s body tensed at
the moment the four rounds of 30-30 caliber bullets hit their target.  Af-
ter the shots were fired, Gardner’s fingers still moved.  His left arm
starting [sic] moving up and back.  He clenched his fists[;] . . . some
thought he was still alive. . . . The four shots left holes in the back of the
chair which Gardner sat in.  The medical examiner checked for a pulse.
He checked Gardner’s eyes.  His mouth was open.  He was described as
ashen.  A small pool of blood was believed to have gathered at his waist,
although it is difficult to say as he was wearing a navy blue jumpsuit.
Gardner was pronounced dead at 12:17 a.m.
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In Texas, as a society, we find ourselves right back where we be-
gan, killing people through a system that arbitrarily selects minorities
for prosecution and execution at a rate of over three times their popu-
lation in the state.528  In Texas, there are 146 different ways to com-
mit a capital crime,529 which is well beyond the ordinary person’s
ability to understand what behavior is proscribed.  In Texas, the state
that steadfastly clings to a statute making capital the sexual assault
of a child where death was not intended.530  In Texas, where only one
white person has ever been executed for the killing of an African
American.531
In October 2009, the American Law Institute, the premier intellec-
tual source for pro-death penalty scholarship, abandoned their efforts
in this arena “in light of the current intractable institutional and
structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for ad-
ministering capital punishment.”532  Reasons given were the impossi-
Ben Winslow, Convicted Murderer Ronnie Lee Gardner Executed by Firing
Squad, FOX 13 NEWS (June 13, 2010, 9:48 AM), http://www.fox13now.com/news/
firingsquad/kstu-utah-man-facing-firing-squad-execution-ronnie-lee-gardner,0,7
337567.story.  It was described by the reporter as “a violent death.” Gardner Exe-
cution Described as a Very Violent Death, FOX 13 NOW, http://www.fox13now.com/
videobeta/?watchId=D83153b3-5cb2-43c9-ae59-4a4b1af8407e (last visited March
6, 2011).
528. See supra notes 503–06.
529. See infra Appendix A.
530. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
531. The only White person executed in Texas for killing an African American was
Larry Allen Hayes from Conroe, Montgomery County, Texas. See Executed Of-
fenders, TEX. DEPARTMENT CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/executed
offenders.htm (last updated May 4, 2011).  On July 15, 1999, Mr. Hayes killed his
wife, Mary Evelyn Hayes, a white woman, and eighteen-year-old Rosalyn Ann
Robinson, a black woman, who was working at a nearby convenience store.
Hayes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 809, 812–814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  After shooting
Ms. Robinson, Mr. Hayes took her car. Id.  Mr. Hayes volunteered for his execu-
tion on September 10, 2003, after spending less than three years on death row.
See TEX. DEPARTMENT CRIM. JUST., supra.  As the average length of time on death
row is 10.6 years, and as Mr. Hayes was received on death row in May 2000, had
he pursued his appeals Mr. Hayes would probably still be alive and Texas would
still be awaiting its first execution of a white person for the murder of a black
person. See Death Row Facts, supra note 523.  Additionally on death row are the
only other white men that run a reasonably good chance of being executed for
murdering an African American in Texas since Jurek.  Lawrence Russell Brewer
and John William King were sentenced to death for the horrific killing of an Afri-
can American man, James Byrd, Jr., on June 7, 1998, in Jasper, Jasper County,
Texas. See Offenders on Death Row, TEX. DEPARTMENT CRIM. JUST., http://www.
tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/offendersondrow.htm (last updated May 4, 2011).  Their co-
defendant, Shawn Allen Berry, was the last to be tried of the three and was given
a life sentence by a jury. See Jeremy Peters, Texas Jury Picks Death Sentence in
Fatal Dragging of a Black Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at A1.  Should one or
both of these men be executed, their deaths will be the first in Texas where the
victim or victims did not include another white person.
532. Liptak, supra note 506.
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bility of designing a death penalty system that would (1) be fair and
without racial disparities, (2) not be enormously expensive, (3) not
risk executing innocent people, and (4) not be affected by the political
underpinnings involving elected officials.533
Professor Samuel R. Gross, the Thomas and Mabel Long Professor
of Law at the University of Michigan Law School, is quoted as saying
law students will learn the “same group of smart lawyers and
judges—the ones whose work they read every day [who drafted the
model Penal Codes and the initial basic death penalty structure for
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gregg, Profitt, Jurek]—has said that
the death penalty in the United States is a moral and practical
failure.”534
As states such as New Mexico,535 New Jersey,536 and Illinois537
abolish their death penalty, and as states such as California have no
executions,538 and as Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wyoming and the U.S. Military have not
seen an execution in over ten years,539 the TCCA finds every way to
justify these prosecutions by bending definitions of intent, avoiding
constitutional rulings, and creatively applying the facts of a case to
the law to allow our unconstitutional system to flourish.540
As the legislature expands the number of crimes eligible for capital
punishment to 146,541 and reversals on direct appeal become an aber-
rance, when will the appellate courts acknowledge that we have re-
turned to the capricious and arbitrary exercise of power that Justice
Douglas discussed in Furman?  Our system once again panders to “the
discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty[,]” to en-
able the penalty “to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against
the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if
he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those
who by social position may be in a more protected position.”542
533. See id.
534. Id.
535. See Tim Gaynor, New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson Bans Death Penalty, REUTERS
(March 18, 2009, 9:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/19/us-usa-
deathpenalty-idUSTRE52I0I820090319.
536. See Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html?_r=2.
537. See John Schwartz, Illinois Governor Signs Capital Punishment Ban, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/us/10illinois.html.
538. Elias, supra note 520.
539. See U.S. Jurisdiction Executions, supra note 500.
540. See supra Part XVIII.
541. See infra Appendix A.
542. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Ultimately, “[t]he degree of civilization in a society can be judged
by entering its prisons.”543  Today, when entering the prisons of
Texas, people find the largest governmental killing machine in the na-
tion544 and seventh most active in the world.545  Contrastingly, even
considering its long, storied history of apartheid and oppression of its
Black population, in 1995 South Africa’s Constitutional Court coura-
geously and unanimously agreed—against public opinion—that the
death penalty was substantively inconsistent with protection of a
human being’s “right to life” and the post-apartheid constitutional
prohibition on “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punish-
ment.”546  In response to this decision, Archbishop Desmond Tutu
commented that the abolition of the death penalty is “making us a
civilized society.  It shows we actually do mean business when we say
we have reverence for life.”547
Texas could shock the world by demonstrating our reverence for all
human life by understanding and implementing the proper function of
the power of the state.  “That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”548  Leave the convicted
543. This quote is generally attributed to Fyodor Dostoevsky. See FYODOR DOSTOEV-
SKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD (H. Sutherland Edwards trans., 1962).
544. Number of executions by state since 1976:
Total 2010 2009
Texas 460 13 24
Virginia 107 2 3
Oklahoma 92 1 3
Florida 69 1 2
Missouri 67 0 1
DEATH PENALTY INFO.CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (2010).  This
chart shows the five states that have executed the most since 1976. Id.  Overall,
Texas has executed more than four times its nearest rival, and during the last
two years, while other states have been modest, Texas is out front setting the
pace as always. Id.
545. In 2009, the five countries with the highest rates of execution were China (un-
known, but 1,718+ in 2008), Iran (388+), Iraq (120), Saudi Arabia (69), United
States (52, of which 24 were just in Texas alone).  After Yemen (30+), Texas
would rank seventh in the world in executions. AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2009, at 24 (2010).
546. State v. T. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para.8, 10, 144–51.  For a com-
plete discussion of South Africa’s struggle and victory over capital punishment,
see SANGMIN BAE, WHEN THE STATE NO LONGER KILLS:  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS NORMS AND ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 41–61, 11–12 (Zehra F.
Kabasakal ed., 2007).
547. Howard W. French, South Africa’s Supreme Court Abolishes Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1995, at A3.
548. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (London, John W. Parker & Son, 2nd ed.
1859).
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in prison unless they serve their full sentence or earn the right to be
released on parole, and few will earn parole.549
549. To the extent one is worried about those released from death row and given a life
sentence, as is always the case with prison inmates, we must trust our parole
system to make good decisions on the possible release of any inmate from prison,
not just those who may be parole eligible capital murder inmates.  Those whose
death sentences have been set aside and a life punishment assessed, or those that
received a life sentence initially, may become eligible for parole based on the law
in effect at the time of the commission of their crime.  For those whose crimes
occurred from August 29, 1977 through August 31, 1987, parole eligibility is at
twenty years; from September 1, 1987 through August 31, 1989, parole eligibility
is at fifteen years; September 1, 1989 through August 31, 1993, parole eligibility
is at thirty-five years; September 1, 1993 through August 31, 2005 parole eligibil-
ity is at forty calendar years with the vote of the full Board of Pardons and Pa-
roles being required, regardless of date of offense (vote must be of two-thirds of
full Board to approve). See TEX. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, PAROLE IN TEXAS:
ANSWERS TO COMMON QUESTIONS 13–32 (2005).  Effective September 1, 2005, for
offenses that occur on or after that date, a life sentence for a capital murder is
without the possibility of parole. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2010).  The chances for release on parole for capital murder are “slim to
none.” BILL HABERN & DAVID O’NEIL, WHAT ABOUT THE PAROLE PROCESS WHEN
ONE HAS A LIFE SENTENCE ON A CAPITAL MURDER CHARGE? 2 (2001).  For the past
twenty years, all new capital-life sentences have fallen into the thirty-five or forty
year minimum requirement. Id.  How the parole board will handle these cases is
yet to be seen.  It is reported that in fiscal year 2001, of the sixty capital offenders
considered, parole was only approved for three. Id.  According to the statistics
provided by Executive Services of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
from the years 1995 through 2009 there were 1,933 considerations for those serv-
ing a sentence for a capital offense (which would include special review and medi-
cally recommended intensive supervision considerations that may be before
initial parole eligibility), but only seventy-one inmates were actually released on
parole—that is less than an average of five per-year, which equates to an average
per-year parole rate of 3.7% over the fifteen years (the average parole rate for
capital offenders just during 2008–2009 was only 6.4%). See EXEC. SERVS., TEX.
DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., PAROLE CONSIDERATIONS BY THE YEAR OF THE CONSIDERA-
TION, at 1 (2010) (on file with author and Nebraska Law Review).  Compared to
parole rates of other inmates, the annual report for fiscal year 2009 of the Texas
Board of Pardons and Paroles shows the overall approval rate for parole consider-
ations of all crimes (23,182 cases approved) during that year was 30.26%, the
violent aggravated non-sexual offenses (2,513 cases approved) rate was 24.29%,
and the approval rate for violent aggravated sexual offenses (795 cases approved)
was 21.44%, all of which are much higher than the average number of those pa-
roled for capital murder. TEX. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, ANNUAL REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 17, 34 (2010).  Some might argue that the 2009 statistics
are not a fair representation.  According to the annual report for fiscal year 2008
of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, the statistics are similar, to-wit: over-
all approval rate (23,025 cases approved) was 30.74%, violent aggravated non-
sexual offenses (2,236 cases approved) was 23.70%, and violent aggravated sex-
ual offenses (429 cases approved) was 11.47%. TEX. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES,
ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 17 (2009).  Only the sexual offenders
have seen a significant increase in the last year—the other violent offenders and
their overall rates remained about the same). Id.  If California can be used as an
example, at seventy-two years of age, Charles Manson was again denied parole in
2007, and he remains in the California state prison in Corcoran, California.
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Let there no misunderstanding: Our system for prosecution of capi-
tal felonies should immediately be abandoned, removing all living
souls from death row.  Why not save the precious, limited resources of
this state that are currently squandered by this foolish ritual?  Per-
haps these savings could be spent on prevention and treatment of the
causes of these problems, leaving a positive legacy for the next genera-
tion.  A truly enlightened, maturing society, while evolving its ac-
cepted standards of decency, recognizes madness, admits its folly, and
corrects its path.
where he will not be eligible again until 2012. See Associated Press, 72-Year-Old
Manson Again Denied Parole; Next Chance Will be in 2012, L.A. TIMES, May 24,
2007, at B5.  Manson’s death sentence from 1971 was commuted to life when the
California death penalty was declared unconstitutional in People v. Anderson,
493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), superseded by constitutional amendment, Cal. Const.
art I, § 27. See Associated Press, supra.  Thus, it appears doubtful the repeal of
the Texas death penalty statute would have any real effect on the release on pa-
role of former death row inmates.  Also, the fear of capital murder inmates is
unfounded. See J.K. Price et al., Criminal Acts of Violence Among Capital Mur-
der Offenders in Texas, J. OF CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. RES. & EDUC. 1 (2009)
(indicating capital murder death offenders are no more or less likely to commit
criminal acts of violence than other groups of inmates).
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XXI. APPENDIX A
As mentioned in Part III, above, the number of offenses that cur-
rently act as aggravating circumstances, raising a murder to a capital
murder are most commonly referred to as nine.  A closer look at those
statutes, however, shows a massive expansion of eligible crimes.
1. Murder of a peace officer.550
2. Murder of a fireman.551
3. Murder in the course of committing kidnapping.552
4. Murder in the course of committing burglary.553
5. Murder in the course of committing robbery.554
6. Murder in the course of committing aggravated sexual assault.555
7. Murder in the course of committing arson.556
8. Murder in the course of committing obstruction.557
9. Murder in the course of committing retaliation.558
10. Murder while attempting to commit kidnapping.559
11. Murder while attempting to commit burglary.560
12. Murder while attempting to commit robbery.561
13. Murder while attempting to commit aggravated sexual assault.562
14. Murder while attempting to commit arson.563
15. Murder while attempting to commit obstruction.564
16. Murder while attempting to commit retaliation.565
Murder in the course of committing:
17. Terroristic threat under section 22.07(a)(1)566 (four crimes).
18. Terroristic threat under § 22.07 (a)(3)567 (seventy-two crimes).
550. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
551. Id.
552. Id. § 19.03(a)(2).
553. Id.  Burglary could easily have been counted as two separate crimes, with bur-













566. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(2), 22.07(a)(1).  Under this section, one commits a capital offense if
he or she threatens to commit a violent offense to any (1) person or (2) property to
cause a reaction of any type by an (3) official or (4) volunteer agency. Id.
§ 22.07(a)(1).  This could be four different crimes: threatens violence to person to
get reaction from official, threatens violence to person to get reaction from
agency, threatens violence to property to get reaction from official, and threatens
violence to property to get reaction from agency. Id.
567. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(2), 22.07(a)(3).  Under this section, one commits a capital offense if
he or she threatens to commit a violent offense to any: (1) person or (2) property
to (1) prevent or (2) interrupt the (1) occupation or (2) use of a (1) building, (2)
room, (3) place of assembly, (4) place to which public has access, (5) place of em-
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19. Terroristic threat under § 22.07 (a)(4)568 (twenty-four crimes).
20. Terroristic threat under § 22.07 (a)(5)569 (two crimes).
21. Terroristic threat under § 22.07 (a)(6)570 (ten crimes).
22. Murder for remuneration.571
23. Murder for the promise of remuneration.572
24. Employs another to commit murder for remuneration.573
25. Employs another to murder for promise of remuneration.574
26. Murder while escaping from a penal institution.575
27. Murder while attempting to escape from a penal institution.576
28. Murder of a penal institution employee while incarcerated.577
29. Murder to establish/maintain/participate in combination with profits
while incarcerated.578
30. Murder while serving sentence for murder.579
31. Murder while serving sentence for capital murder.580
32. Murder while serving life sentence/ninety-nine years for aggravated
kidnapping.581
ployment or occupation, (6) aircraft, (7) automobile, (8) conveyance, or (9) public
place. Id. at § 22.07(a)(3).  A possible cumulative total of seventy-two crimes.
Threaten to commit violent offense to any:
-person to prevent occupation of a building, room, etc. (nine places total)
-person to interrupt occupation of a building, room, etc.
-person to prevent use of a building, etc.
-person to interrupt use of a building, etc.
-property to prevent occupation of a building, etc.
-property to interrupt occupation of a building, etc.
-property to prevent use of a building, etc.
-property to interrupt use of a building, etc.
568. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(2), 22.07(a)(4).  Under this section, one commits a capital offense if
he or she threatens to commit a violent offense to any (1) person or (2) property to
cause (1) impairment or (2) interruption of (1) public communications, (2) public
transportation, (3) public water, (4) gas, (5) power supply, or (6) other public ser-
vice. Id. at § 22.07(a)(4).  A total of twenty-four additional crimes.
569. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(2), 22.07(a)(5).  Under this section, one commits a capital offense if
he or she threatens to commit a violent offense to any (1) person or (2) property to
place the public or substantial group of public (assuming this is the same thing)
in fear of serious bodily injury.  A total of two additional crimes.
570. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(2), 22.07(a)(6).  Under this section, one commits a capital offense if
he or she threatens to commit a violent offense to any (1) person or (2) property to
influence conduct or activities (assuming this is the same thing) of branch or
agency of (1) federal government, (2) state government or (3–5) other political
subdivision of the state (this could be municipal, county or school boards). Id. at
§ 22.07(a)(6)  A total of ten additional crimes.




575. Id. § 19.03(a)(4).
576. Id.
577. Id. § 19.03(a)(5)(A).
578. Id. § 19.03(a)(5)(B).
579. Id. § 19.03(a)(6)(A).
580. Id.
581. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(6)(B), 20.04.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 98 30-AUG-11 12:43
2011] DEATH AND TEXAS 337
33. Murder while serving life sentence/ninety-nine years for aggravated sex-
ual assault.582
34. Murder while serving life sentence/ninety-nine years for aggravated
robbery.583
35. Murder of more than one person (mass murder).584
36. Murder of more than one person (serial murder).585
37. Murder of a child under six years of age.586
38. Murder of a judge of the many courts.587
39. Subsequent sexual assault of a child.588
When taking into consideration the component parts of terroristic
threat, there are 146 separate ways to commit a capital crime.  Some
will say “manner and means” should not be considered separately in
determining the total number of capital crimes, but I disagree.  There
are great differences between the meaning of words like “person” and
“property,” “prevent” and “interrupt,” “occupation” and “use,” and “im-
pairment” and “interruption.”  Mass murder is not serial murder, a
policeman is not a fireman or a judge, attempting a crime is not the
same as committing the crime, and killing for the promise of remuner-
ation is not the same as employing another to commit murder.  These
are all separate criminal offenses, and facts that might fit one situa-
tion will not fit another.  The legislature obviously provided a vast ar-
ray of circumstances, and hence, a vast number of crimes.
582. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(6)(B), 22.021.
583. Id. §§ 19.03(a)(6)(B), 29.03.
584. Id. § 19.03(a)(7)(A).
585. Id. § 19.03(a)(7)(B).
586. Id. § 19.03(a)(8).
587. Id. § 19.03(a)(9).
588. Id. § 12.42(c)(3); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 37.072 (West Supp. 2010).
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